

SIAM AND SIR JAMES BROOKE

by

Nicholas Garling

University of Queensland

Brisbane, Australia

"Sir James thoroughly understood that Eastern princes and chiefs are at first only influenced by fear; the fear of the consequences which might follow the neglect of the counsels of the protecting State..."

Sir Spenser St. John.

The revolutionary impact of economic and social change in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century was intensified by the simultaneous remodelling of its political map. The frontiers of Siam were indeed modified, and its old-fashioned imperial claims widely displaced, but its economic and social history was profoundly affected by the fact that, alone among South-east Asian powers, this kingdom retained its political independence. The explanation of this lies, on the one hand, in the attitude of the Siamese ruling-groups, and, on the other hand, in the policies of Great Britain, the predominant power in the area, and a survey of Anglo-Siamese relations is essential to an understanding of modern Siam. In this survey, the mission to Bangkok of Sir James Brooke should hold a crucial place, since its failure produced a crisis in these relations, the prompt resolution of which re-established them on a new basis and largely determined their future course.

The conquering advance of the East India Company in India from the late eighteenth century onwards aroused concern among the Siamese, who feared lest the ambitious British extended their activities to the Indo-Chinese peninsula. This was not, however, the Company's policy. There was a general disposition against an expansive policy in these regions, and, more particularly, the Company wished to avoid conflict with a country on the confines of China, a tributary of the Emperor who permitted

them to carry on their profitable monopoly trade in tea at Canton. The apprehensions of the Siamese tended to add to the possibilities of conflict, for they provided an argument against the unrestricted admission of British commerce additional to the tradition of trade monopolies on the part of King and Court, and such a policy in fact risked provoking the British. There was another potential source of dispute in Siamese claims over the northern states of the Malay Peninsula. Penang had been ceded to the Company in 1786 by the Sultan of Kedah, a vassal of the Siamese, and the English authorities remained afraid that it would involve them in a conflict with his suzerains.¹ In 1818 Kedah invaded Perak at the instigation of the Siamese, who in turn invaded Kedah itself in 1821. Penang merchants and officials believed that Siamese hegemony would destroy their commerce and influence on the Peninsula, and the Governor was urged to drive the invaders from Kedah. But, he asked, "would the Siamese let us stop there; and are we disposed to furnish the more powerful nations in our neighbourhood, the Burmans, Chinese, and Cochin-Chinese, with additional grounds for distrusting our friendship and accusing us of an ambitious and aggrandizing spirit?" The Supreme Government in Calcutta considered that a war with Siam would be "an evil of very serious magnitude."²

An attempt to deal with the problems by conciliatory negotiation had proved a failure. John Crawford had been sent in 1821-1822 on a mission to two of the countries the Governor mentioned, namely Siam and Cochin-China, i.e. Vietnam. He was quite unsuccessful,³ and at Bangkok it was thought that he

1. Minute by Lord Hastings, 25th. October 1818. *Bengal Secret Correspondence* 307 (2nd. January 1819), India Office Library.

2. Minute by Governor Phillips, 17th. September 1823. *Straits Settlements Factory Records* 91 (2nd. October 1823), India Office Library; *Board's Collections* 22627, p. 123, India Office Library. Governor-General in Council to Phillips, 17th. January 1824. *S.S.F.R.* 94 (15th. April 1824); *B.C.* 22627, p. 177.

3. For accounts of the mission, see G. Finlayson, *The Mission to Siam, and Hué the capital of Cochin China* . . ., London, 1826, and J. Crawford, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China*, London, 1830,

"had come to view the Empire of Siam, previous to the English fitting out an Expedition with ships of war to come and conquer and seize on the Empire..."⁴ The Supreme Government became doubtful about sending further missions, lest an outrage were committed that would necessitate a punitive war. The only possible policy seemed to be one of great caution that might abate Siamese distrust, and induce the Bangkok Government perhaps to treat foreign commerce more liberally at home and in its tributary territories.

In 1824, however, the Supreme Government declared war on the "Burmans", and it subsequently decided to send Captain Henry Burney on a friendly mission to Bangkok while these hostilities were going on. It observed that

"all extension of our territorial possessions and political relations on the side of the Indo-Chinese nations is, with reference to the peculiar character of those states, to their decided jealousy of our power and ambition, and to their proximity to China, earnestly to be deprecated and declined as far as the course of events and the force of circumstances will permit. In the case of Siam, an actual feudatory of the Chinese Empire, it should be especially our policy to avoid contiguity of dominion or intricacy of relations with that state, and the consequent and necessary hazard of collisions and rupture.... Even the negotiation of treaties and positive engagements with the Siamese Government... may be regarded as open to serious objection lest any future violation of their conditions should impost upon us the necessity of resenting such breaches of contract"⁵

The present, however, seemed a favourable opportunity for attempting to deal with the problems of the Peninsula and commercial relations. The idea was at first mooted of ceding some conquests in Tenasserim to the Siamese in return for concessions on these points. In fact, no such offer was made, but the Siamese,

4. Phraklang to Governor, n.d. *S.S.F.R.* 89 (20th. February 1823).

5. G.-G.-in-Co. to Gov.-in-Co., 19th. November 1824. *S.S.F.R.* 99 (4th. January 1825).

perhaps impressed by the defeat of the Burmese, assented to a treaty in which they sacrificed some of their limitations upon British commerce. The chief provisions were that British merchants were to "buy and sell without the intervention of other persons", i.e. monopolists; that residence might be granted; that the importation of opium and the exportation of rice were prohibited; and that a duty was to be levied by measurement of the vessels at the rate of 1,700 ticals for each Siamese fathom.

Burney had, on the other hand, to concede Siamese claims in Kedah under article 13, and under articles 12 and 14 to compromise on those in Perak, Kelantan, and Trengganu.⁶ The Penang authorities were disappointed, and sought to remedy the situation by direct intervention in Perak. For this they were reproved by Lord Amherst, the Governor-General. They must not exaggerate, he said, the menace involved in the proximity of the Siamese to their settlement.

"In point of fact, we have ... far more reason to apprehend inconvenience from the extreme dread of our power operating on that timid and suspicious race, so as to impede a free and liberal commercial intercourse between the subjects of the two nations, than from the existence of opposite sentiments Our only national object of policy hereafter in relation to the Siamese should be to endeavour to allay their jealousy of our ultimate views ... and to derive from our connexion with them every attainable degree of commercial advantage, by practising in our intercourse with them the utmost forbearance, temper, and moderation both in language and action, by striving to cultivate a friendly understanding with the Court and its provincial Governors in our neighbourhood, and above all, by faithfully and scrupulously observing the conditions of the treaty which fixes our future relations"⁷

6. Walter F. Vella, *Siam under Rama III*, New York, 1957, pp. 120-121; Nicholas Tarling, 'British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871,' *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXX, Pt. 3, 1957, pp. 34-35. Copy of treaty and commercial convention in, e.g., *F.O. 69/2*, Public Record Office.

7. G.-G. to Gov.-in-Co., 23rd, July 1827. *S.S.F.R.* 142 (6th. September 1827).

The Supreme Government thus hoped that the Burney treaty would prove the basis of increasingly friendly relations with Siam, and thus of increasingly liberal commercial policies in that country. In fact, however, the Siamese attitude did not become more liberal, and, indeed, a new system of farming the taxes in kind virtually restored the old system of monopolies.⁸ The Supreme Government, however, avoided "resenting such breaches of contract."

British policy towards China changed in the 1830s and 1840s, with the abandonment of the Company's monopoly, the impact of the Free Trade, and the Opium War, and it was, of course, possible that these changes would be reflected in British policy towards her neighbours and feudatories, such as Siam and Vietnam. The commercial pressures that influenced the "opening-up" of China might operate here also. In the Archipelago, of course, they contributed to a new determination to oppose the extension of Dutch control and to undertake the suppression of piracy, and a major expression of these policies was the support given to James Brooke in Sarawak and Brunei. He was appointed Governor of the new colony of Labuan and also Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and Independent Chiefs of Borneo. In the latter post, as his instructions of February 1848 showed, the Foreign Office intended him to support and protect British commerce in the Archipelago in general, and to make treaties with native states on the lines of the one he had made with Brunei in 1847 after its bombardment the previous year.⁹ His appointment on a new mission to Siam and Cochin-China late in 1849 was in a sense only an extension of these activities. So far as Siam was concerned, it remained to be seen whether the Bangkok Government would apprehend the changed situation and react by making concessions, and whether, if it failed to do so, the envoy would recommend, and his Government accept, the adoption of the forceful policies adopted elsewhere in the East.

* * * * *

8. Vella, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 127-128.

9. Tarling, *J.M.B.R.A.S.* xxx, Pt. 3, pp. 196-197.

Representations had been received from commercial bodies in England, and from the Chamber of Commerce at Singapore, pressing for measures to place British commerce in Siam and Vietnam on a better footing. The Burney treaty was declared to be inadequate, and, in any case, infringed, and, though the Government was doubtful about the latter allegation, it was clear that "great impediments" were "thrown in the way of British Trade with Siam." Lord Palmerston thus authorized Sir James Brooke to visit Bangkok if he thought that he "might be able to make some arrangements that would effect an improvement in the British Commercial Relations with that Country," and he might also visit Cochin-China. The commercial stipulations, it was suggested, might bear some relation to those made with other "imperfectly civilized States," such as China and Turkey. The other stipulations should provide for "the unrestricted right" on the part of resident British subjects to exercise Christian worship, and for "the exclusive jurisdiction of British authorities over British subjects," as provided for in the Brunei treaty.

"In conducting these Negotiations you must be very careful not to get involved in any dispute or hostile proceedings which would render our position in Siam or in Cochin-China worse than it now is, or which might compel Her Majesty's Government to have recourse to forcible measures in order to obtain redress. It is very important that if your efforts should not succeed, they should at least leave things as they are, and should not expose us to the alternative of submitting to fresh affront, or of undertaking an expensive operation to punish insult..."¹⁰

The Foreign Office did not provide Brooke with a letter from Queen Victoria to the King of Siam, and at Singapore it was thought that this would prove "a serious obstacle in the way of success". Sir James, however, thought that it might be "turned to advantage, and aid me in maintaining the high and firm position which it is necessary to take with Indo-Chinese nations...." His "first impression", on receiving the instructions in March,

10. Palmerston to Brooke, 18th. December 1849. *F.O.* 69/1.

was "that in order to ensure the maintenance of our present relations, the proposed Treaty should be of a very general character, and the arrangements for the amount of duty, and the future conduct of the trade, be afterwards attempted in a supplementary treaty." ¹¹

The explanation of this suggestion appears from a letter Brooke wrote at this time to his friend Templer :

"I shall not advance to them; I shall not seek to make a treaty in a hurry. I shall try to remove apprehensions and obstacles, and pave the way for the future. The king is old and an usurper; he has two legitimate brothers, clever and enlightened men, who ought to be raised to the throne, and the least help on the reigning sovereign's decease, will place one of them on it.

This done, Siam is opened, really and substantially, to English commerce and capital, and it is a noble country, second only to China. A treaty, extorted by fear (for no other way could we get one) would be but a wasted bit of parchment, unless enforced, and if enforced it must be by arms alone, for as to persuasion it is thrown away with this people. Patience and time are therefore requisite.... It is a clumsy style of diplomacy, and with time, perfect sincerity, good intention and scrupulous attentions to the rights of Siam, must have weight; and this is high diplomacy. The Prince Chow-fa-Mongkut is an educated man, reads and writes English, and knows something of our literature and science. His brother ... has a great mechanical turn, and has himself made a small steam-engine and fitted it in a boat!! And these two are the legitimate brothers of the old savage king, who seized the throne. And are they not worthy instruments?... " ¹²

He also wrote to his uncle, Major Stuart :

"I consider that time should be given to the work of conciliation, that their prejudices should be gradually undermined, rather than violently upset, and that as we

11. Brooke to Palmerston, 5th. March 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

12. Brooke to Templer, 12th. June 1850. John C. Templer, editor, *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke* ... London, 1853, ii, pp. 299-300.

have delayed for thirty years doing anything, that in the course of this policy we may wait till the demise of the king brings about a new order of things. Above all, it would be well to prepare for the change, and to place *our king* on the throne,"

namely Mongkut, "a highly accomplished gentleman, for a semi-barbarian."¹³

The Chamber of Commerce at Singapore believed that "an imposing display of Force calculated to impress the Siamese with a due sense of the power of Great Britain and its earnestness on this occasion will much facilitate negotiations and avert a risk of failure. . . ."¹⁴ The Raja of Sarawak did not, however, wish to force a convention on the Siamese,¹⁵ and commented that they might "from fear" be "open to conciliation without concession, and I shall consider it fortunate if my visit only paves the way for a more frequent and friendly communication, or if it provides some sure indication of the best course to be pursued in future. . . ."¹⁶

Brooke, it is clear, associated the king, Rama III, with the restrictive commercial policies of the preceding decades, and believed that his brothers, educated by French and American missionaries, might follow quite a different policy when they at last secured power. This event could not be long delayed, since Rama III was an old man, and meanwhile the mission would perform a holding operation and encourage and conciliate the princes. The policy the Raja appears to have contemplated for the future was not unlike the policy of "indirect rule" he had sought to follow with Raja Muda Hassim in Brunei, and which he had recommended as the proper policy for the Sultanate of Acheh.¹⁷

13. Brooke to Stuart, 17th. June 1850. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

14. Logan to Brooke, 14th. June 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

15. Spenser St. John, *Rajah Brooke, The Englishman as Ruler of an Eastern State*, London, 1897, p. 113.

16. Brooke to Palmerston, 2nd. July 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

17. St. John, *op. cit.*, p. xi-xii. The quotation at the head of this paper comes from the same source. See also Tarling, *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, xxx, Pt. 3, pp. 136, 191.

The mission had been delayed while Brooke and his party recuperated from illness at Penang,¹⁸ and in June and July they were held up in Singapore waiting for a ship. Spenser St. John, the Raja's Secretary, found it hard to be angry with Admiral Austen, since he was Jane's brother.¹⁹ In fact, Austen thought that August was the best time for crossing the notorious bar of the Menam,²⁰ but, when the mission at last arrived there, the larger of its two steamers, the "Sphinx", stuck in the mud. It was to this fact that St. John was to attribute the failure of the mission.²¹ Probably, however, only an overwhelming force, such as Brooke had been against using, could have affected Rama III's belief that more was to be lost than gained by any further treaty concessions. He had just turned away an American mission,²² and he was set against any further invasion of Siamese customs and traditions even by the British.

Brooke went up to Paknam in the other steamer, the "Nemesis", and met the Phraklang on August 16th.

"What passed . . . was as follows — Was I aware (it was asked) that there was a Treaty between Siam and the East India Company? How could there be two Treaties? Was my object to annul the Company's Treaty? Had not the Company a right to make a treaty? What was the difference between a treaty with the Company and a treaty with the Queen? Were the Queen and the Company one and the same? Was not a treaty made with one the same as if made with another? To these questions I replied that I was aware of the existence of the Treaty—That there could be two Treaties—That the Company had a full right to make a Treaty having been empowered by the Queen to do so—That the difference between a Treaty with the Queen and a Treaty with the Company was that

18. Spenser St. John, *The Life of Sir James Brooke* . . ., Edinburgh and London, 1879, pp. 217-218.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

20. Austen to Admiralty, 2nd. July 1850. *F.O. 69/2*.

21. St. John, *Life*, p. 222.

22. Vella, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-134.

the first was a direct Treaty made with the Queen and the other an indirect Treaty made with the Company which held its authority under the Queen.—That the Queen was not the same as the Company, but the Company was the same as the Queen.—The one being the Sovereign—the other holding its power under the Sovereign. It was now proposed that the two Sovereigns should make a Treaty".²³

Assuming that Brooke would be demanding a large decrease in customs duties, the King doubted if it were right to assent, as the Phraklang appears to have suggested doing in the hope of maintaining friendly relations and perhaps gaining concessions in Malaya. Rama III also thought that Brooke's credentials should be examined. It seemed, therefore, that the lack of a letter from Queen Victoria might be turned to account by a monarch who had come to the conclusion that more was to be risked by yielding to Brooke, as he had to Burney, than by not yielding. He suggested also that Brooke's conversation with the Phraklang could be turned to account: if a new treaty were required, it could be argued, then a representative of the Supreme Government must revoke the old; and it was objectionable either to increase or reduce the number of articles in the old treaty. There is no evidence in the king's memoranda that the attacks on Brooke in Singapore and in London on account of his policy in Borneo influenced the King's attitude, but it may have been so.²⁴

Brooke, all unaware, went up to Bangkok, noting extensive fortifications on the way, and met the Phraklang and the Senabodi on the 26th. "Every attention that politeness could dictate was shown during this meeting which passed off in the most friendly manner, and it was arranged that any communications which I wished to make to their Government should be made in writing...." Brooke seems still at this juncture to have

23. Brooke's Journal. *F.O.* 69/1. Some of the following quotations are also taken from this.

24. Vella, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136. O. Frankfurter, 'The Mission of Sir James Brooke to Siam,' *Journal of the Siam Society*, viii, Pt. 3, 1912, p. 25.

hoped for a favourable result. It was only "a few days subsequently to this interview," he reported, that "a marked change occurred in the conduct of the Siamese officer towards the mission, their friendly behaviour was succeeded by coldness and distrust," and he thought he experienced various attempts to demean or provoke him. The "Sphinx" had withdrawn beyond the bar, and this, Brooke thought, perhaps encouraged the Siamese to demonstrate "their real feeling towards us," which was, after all, what he had purposed to discover.

Whether he wished further to test this feeling, or whether he was so committed by his agreeing to put in written proposals, is not clear, but Brooke abandoned his earlier plan to work for a merely general agreement, and despatched to the Phraklang several letters and the heads of a treaty and a commercial convention. His first letter emphasized the need to consolidate the friendship established by the treaty of 1826. "Will the ministers of Siam", he asked in a second letter, "endanger the friendly feeling which has lasted so long.—Will they refuse the cordial and sincere alliance now offered by resisting the just and moderate demands of a powerful state like England?" He mentioned the opening of the trade under the Charter of 1833, the Government's protection of commercial interest, the war with China. Now the Government wished to point out the violations of the Burney treaty, and to suggest the conclusion of a new and better one. In a third note, Brooke introduced his general proposals, which would, he said, modify the treaty in some respects. For instance, it would give British subjects a right to reside in Siam, and to lease or purchase land for domestic and commercial purposes and for burial-grounds, though not for plantations and estates. British merchants would be able to reside or trade anywhere in Siam under most-favoured-nation stipulations, and Christian worship would be freely allowed. No regulation would be introduced injurious to the trade of British subjects. Consuls or Superintendents of Trade should be appointed at principal ports if thought desirable, and would decide, with Siamese authorities, any disputes between British and Siamese subjects. Articles of the Burney treaty not

specifically modified were to remain in force, and its principle of reciprocity was to be maintained.²⁵

In another letter, introducing the commercial convention he proposed, Brooke sought to expound the advantages of a free trade between the two countries.

"The revenues of Siam, like the revenues of every other country, are dependent on its internal prosperity; and its internal prosperity is greatly dependent on its foreign trade; burdensome duties must limit trade, the paucity of trade must distress the mass of the people, and the distressed condition of the people must affect the revenues of the monarch and the stability of his throne."

According to his proposals, the Siamese Government were in future to monopolize seven articles, but paddy and rice were to be freely exported, and thus production would greatly expand. At present, it was doubtful if the Siamese could rightly monopolize any products, Brooke observed. Transit duties were to be fixed, the opium prohibition maintained, and measurement duty reduced to 500 ticals.²⁶

After some procedural difficulties, replies were secured "amid a mass of words", as Brooke put it, refusing "every article of the proposed Treaty . . . under one pretext or another." The first letter complained of the obscurity of Brooke's utterance, but praised his friendly sentiments. A second letter insisted that the Siamese desired friendship, and approved of Brooke as "a person of wisdom and affability." It denied any violations of the Burney treaty. Some Singapore sampan-pukats had been seized in 1839 and in 1846 because they were smuggling opium; and the prisoners had, nevertheless, been released at the request of the Straits Government, though it had done nothing to prevent smuggling. The Senabodi next commented on the Raja of Sarawak's treaty proposals. They opposed the provisions on residence, pointing out the objectionable activities of Hunter, a British merchant who had been expelled in 1844.

25. Brooke's three notes of 4th. September 1850, and proposed treaty. *F.O. 69/1*.

26. Brooke's note, 10th. September 1850, and enclosure. *F.O. 69/1*.

"If the English should come in large numbers and reside in Siam and should pass about in the provinces, controversies and quarrelling would rise and proceed to blows, and an Englishman or a Siamese be killed and then the matter would become serious.... it cannot be allowed that many English subjects should come here to reside, it would prevent the quiet of the country and cast a shade on the subsisting friendships...."

As for the Christian religion, American missionaries had long been present, often usefully employed in writting letters and translating books, and no obstructions had been placed in the way of the exercise of Christian rites: there was thus no call for a treaty article on that point. The appointment of consuls was equally superfluous, and, as for consular jurisdiction, Siamese subjects in foreign lands were expected to follow local laws. A new treaty seemed unnecessary, and the Burney treaty, made with Bengal, but in effect with England, was adequate. Elaborate treaties were difficult to execute.²⁷

As for the commercial convention, the Senabodi stated that they could not agree to the reduction of the measurement duties or to the general exportation of rice.

"The object seems to be assiduously to prepare long communications from beginning to end filled with winding crooks and twists, without end, to blot out, to destroy, to change the fixed rules and customs of a great Country which has been established for many hundred years, and bring them all into confusion and ruin...."²⁸

Sir James regretted in reply that the Senabodi "should have forgotten the gravity of advanced age, the dignity of exalted position, and the duty due to the King their master,"²⁹ and departed for Singapore. He pointed out to Palmerston that the mission had been insulted by not being received at Court.

27. Phraklang's three notes of 18th. September 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

28. High Officers to Sir James Brooke, 24th. September 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

29. Brooke to High Ministers, 28th. September 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

"The total want of attention—the want of courtesy in the Phraklang in not returning my visit; the non-permission for any communication with the Siamese nobles.—The slight of placing a man of low rank about the mission—The confinement forced upon us by the improper attendance when abroad and the tone of the High Ministers' letter are all just matters of complaint and demonstrate that amicable communications with the Siamese Government should cease till their feeling of hostility shall have been corrected..."³⁰

These slights were accompanied by "specific acts of outrage and wrongs committed against British subjects", Brooke alleged, and the Government must "decide on the effect which our submission to them may produce on the neighbouring countries, and on British interests." In dealing with Siam, as with other despotic states,

"a resolute attitude and an unflinching determination to support our rights, is the only means of avoiding hostilities, or of attaining permanent peace after a single struggle.

The hope of preserving peace by an expedient Policy—by concession, submission, by indifference, or by any other course, than by rights firmly maintained by power justly exerted, is both a delusion and a cruelty; and after years of embarrassment and the sacrifice of a favourable prestige leads to a sanguinary war.

An adherence to this principle has raised our Indian Empire, and established the reign of Opinion which maintains it; and the departure from this principle has caused the present deplorable conditions of our relations with Siam, and the consequent and embarrassing circumstances which no longer permit of Palliation or inactivity.

... I can only arrive at the conclusion that there is no other course open to Her Majesty's Government, except to demand the freedom of British subjects unwarrantably detained,—a just reparation for injuries inflicted,

30. It has been said that Brooke was not received at Court because of the King's illness. Vella, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 139.

a fair remuneration for pecuniary losses entailed by violations of the Treaty,—and either a more equitable Treaty in accordance with the observance of civilized nations, or a total withdrawal of British subjects and their property from Siam.

Should these just demands firmly urged be refused, a force should be present immediately to enforce them by a rapid destruction of the defences of the river, which would place us in possession of the capital and by restoring us to our proper position of command, retrieve the past and ensure peace for the future, with all its advantages of a growing and most important commerce.

I offer this opinion with the more confidence, from a firm conviction that should any delay be interposed, Her Majesty's Government will, within a short time, be forced to pursue the measures here recommended, under less favourable circumstances."

To justify these views, and incidentally to refute the Senabodi, Brooke produced cases of outrages, infractions of treaty, and "total disregard of international rights". The first violations of the Burney treaty, he observed, had been ignored, and this indifference on the part of the British authorities had led the Siamese to ignore all international obligations. The treaty, too, was of a type that needed to be "resolutely enforced". There were the vague stipulations over Kelantan and Trengganu, and the sacrifice of Kedah, which ought now to be reconsidered. The commercial provisions were even more objectionable. There was no security for any permanent residence, or for any trade except at Bangkok. The treaty provided for the seizure of opium as contraband, but this could not permit the cruel treatment meted out to the crew of the sampan-pukats. Burdensome duties and other vexations were imposed on British vessels. The treaty was, moreover, violated by "the system of monopolies" maintained by the Government of Siam, and by its prohibition of the exportation of some articles of merchandise. Other infractions of the treaty brought forwards by the merchants

related to "acts of violence—arbitrary conduct on the part of the Siamese officers—the impossibility of recovering just debts—the total denial of justice—the delays of passes and numerous other vexations and impositions...." Sir James thought that the complaints were "well founded" and that there was "a direct exertion of arbitrary power, and an indirect system of spoliation carried on by the authorities against British subjects...." He also mentioned the case of thirty Ceylonese priests detained in Siam for years against their will, an "outrage" he considered

"the climax to the presumption of the Siamese, and of the accumulated wrongs which they have offered to the English; and submission will increase this presumption without solving the difficulty...."

.....Justice—compassion—interest—dignity—and a consistent course of Policy appear to me to call for decisive measures to be taken without delay."³¹

The Siamese, he told Templer, "must be taught a lesson....our policy should be commanding, and our power exerted when necessary. My policy in Sarawak has been high-handed against evil-doers, and there, and in England and in Siam, there are bad to be punished, as well as good to be cared for...."³² The evil-doers in England were the Radical Joseph Hume and the Raja's other assailants.

The revolution in British policy that Brooke proposed was also to effect a dynastic revolution in Siam. In his Journal he had written that "the Parties may be divided into a King's party, and a Princes' party, and it may generally be taken for granted that the Princes themselves and the party adhering to their cause, are favourable to Europeans, whilst the King and the opposite party are opposed to them...." It was, however, difficult to appraise "the relative strength of these factions in case of these disputes proceeding to extremities..." The Princes had to behave cautiously and communicated with the mission only "in a private

31. Brooke to Palmerston, 5th. October 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

32. Templer, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 7.

and guarded manner." Brooke now proposed that decisive action should effect the enthronement of Mongkut, a prospect to which he had earlier looked forward.

"Siam may now be taught the lesson which it has long been tempting—its Government may be remodelled—A better disposed king placed on the throne—and an influence acquired in the country which will make it of immense commercial importance to England. At the same time the Malayan States (particularly Kedah) may be placed on a footing to save them from the oppressions they are now subjected to."

An envoy in a man-of-war should demand the persons and property of British subjects, and redress and remuneration for wrongs and losses. "This would be refused; in six hours afterwards the capital would be in our possession and in three months the whole question will be arranged which in any other way will cause Her Majesty's Government a few years embarrassment before arriving at the same result..."³³

Brook's mission had been due to visit Vietnam, and he had proposed to go in August or September, via Hongkong, perhaps picking up there a letter from the Chinese whose supremacy the King acknowledged.³⁴ In London, Sir John Davis, who had been on an earlier mission, suggested April was a better month, if indeed at any time anything could be expected from such a monopolist.³⁵ In the event, Sir James did not go there at all. Instead he announced:

"Cambodia.... is the Keystone of our policy in these countries, —the King of that ancient Kingdom is ready to throw himself under the protection of any European nation, who will save him from his implacable enemies, the Siamese and Cochin Chinese. A Treaty with this monarch at the same time that we act against Siam might be made. — His independence guaranteed. — The

33. Brooke to Palmerston, 5th. October 1850. Confidential. *F.O. 69/1*.

34. Brooke to Palmerston, 6th. March 1850. *F.O. 69/1*.

35. Davis to Hammond, 1st. May 1850. *F.O. 69/2*.

remnants of his fine Kingdom preserved; and a profitable trade opened. —The Cochin Chinese might then be properly approached by questioning their right to interrupt the ingress and egress of British trade into Cambodia. The example of Siam—our friendship with Cambodia, and our determined attitude (not Treaty seeking) would soon open Cambodia to our commerce and induce the Cochin Chinese to waive their objections to intercourse....”

The invading Vietnamese were interfering with trade at the Cambodian port of Kampot, and this, Brooke thought, would form the basis of the—obviously “commanding”—approach he advocated to the Emperor of Vietnam. “I have thus sketched a course of policy which I believe would be highly advantageous and which would enable us by exerting our power, so to regulate it as to influence these Governments without taking possession of the countries....”³⁶

He hoped he would be granted “full powers”, which he would use “discreetly but with a high hand. No one can know what we give up in these countries for want of energy and action. We ought to have these slaves who crouch before arrogance in their own masters tremble at the least demand from us. Now is the time. The tide which ought to be taken at the flood....”³⁷

Mercantile opinion at Singapore was divided as to whether more would be gained or lost by a resort to hostilities.³⁸ Palmerston, though approving Brooke’s conduct of the mission, decided against any “hostile proceedings”, and thus in favour of the traditional policy towards Siam. He did, however, display some interest in Kampot and sought further information about it.³⁹ Crawford, assuming in Britain the role of an expert on Straits affairs, had pointed it out, and mentioned its trade to Singapore in Chinese junks and small square-rigged vessels. He thought it

36. As footnote 33.

37. Brooke to Eddisbury, 7th. October 1850. *F.O.* 69/1.

38. Hamilton, Gray, and others, to Palmerston, received 19th. December 1850. *F.O.* 69/2.

39. Palmerston to Brooke, 6th. February 1851. *F.O.* 69/3.

could become an entrepot for distributing British manufactures, and "at the same time check the exclusive commercial policy of the Siamese."⁴⁰ Further information, culled by St. John from the "Journal of the Indian Archipelago," showed that Kampot exported wax, cardamums, raw silk, benjamin, and gamboge, and could export rice if transport were improved. The total trade with Singapore was worth about £30,000 a year. The King of Cambodia, hearing of the failure of Brooke's mission and anticipating a punitive attack on Bangkok, had in fact sent an ambassador to Singapore, and an enterprising firm, D'Almeida's despatched a ship, the "Pantaloone," to Kampot, with the Danish adventurer, L.V. Helms, as supercargo. He was able to trade, and to visit the royal capital.⁴¹

* * * * *

In July Helms was in Bangkok, where Mongkut had succeeded to the throne, and promised to do all he could to encourage foreign trade.⁴² In August, Brooke, who was in England defending himself against the Radicals' attacks, received a letter from the Phraklang's son, describing the illness of Rama III and his death early in April, and the elevation of Mongkut to the throne by the Senabodi, and the appointment of his brother as Second King. The new King, it was added, fully understands the relations of Foreign Nations...any intercourse or consultation may hereafter be conducted in an easier manner than before."⁴³ The Phraklang had, in fact, played an important part in these events,⁴⁴ and he had earlier been in favour of a re-appraisal of relations with Britain. Brooke urged a new mission, so as to "enable us to place our relations...on a satisfactory footing", and "guide the reforms which they are about to make in their government." He

40. Crawford to Stanley, 21st. December 1850. *F.O.* 69/2.

41. St. John to Palmerston, 24th. August 1851, and enclosures. *F.O.* 69/3. See also *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, v, May and July 1851, and L.V. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* . . . , London, 1882, pp. 95-108.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-122.

43. Letter to Brooke, 23rd. April 1851. *F.O.* 69/3.

44. Vella, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

would be glad to go and bring back a treaty, and thought it should be done at once.

"There really is no finer a field for the rapid extension of commerce than in Siam—there is now no danger of collision and from the character of the present King—his brother the Wangna or sub-king and his ministers we may gain everything we desire and open a direct trade between the two countries second only to the trade with China...."⁴⁵

The Foreign Office was in favour of a mission—though, Palmerston thought, without "any great Parade I think it a mistake to send grand missions to these semibarbarous chiefs." Brooke would again be the envoy, and the Foreign Office this time sought to arrange with him beforehand the outlines of the treaty he might propose at Bangkok.⁴⁶ The instructions were duly prepared early in September, Brooke planning to leave in October. He agreed that the force with the mission should be as before: it certainly "should not present itself in a less dignified shape.... If it did so, the King, being a vain though a well-intentioned and educated Man, might imagine that we held him cheaper than his Predecessor." Brooke suggested spending £ 500 on presents principally "scientific instruments and objects, as both of the Kings are men of science." He might also have this time a letter from the Queen. Palmerston agreed to all this, and to giving the envoy a certain discretion in regard to alterations in the draft treaty.⁴⁷

According to the instructions, Brooke was to consider the "general principles" of the despatch of 1849 "still applicable," but more specific direction was given on some points. For instance, it was stated that, in regard to consular jurisdiction, reciprocity was out of the question:

45. Brooke to Palmerston, 24th. August 1851. *F.O.* 69/3.

46. *F.O.* to Brooke, 29th. August 1851, and note thereon. *F.O.* 69/3.

47. Addington's Memo. on Brooke's mission to Siam, 4th. September 1851. *F.O.* 69/3.

"If is of vital importance to the security of the persons and property of British Subjects in an imperfectly civilised State like Siam, that a right of jurisdiction in all matters in which they are concerned should be secured to the British Agent resident in such State; but the same necessity does not exist for giving, nor indeed has the British Government the power of giving to Siamese Agents in the British Dominions a concurrent jurisdiction with British judicial authorities in cases in which the interests of Siamese Subjects are concerned...."

The declaration that opium was contraband, it was thought, would only encourage smuggling and demoralisation in the foreign trade, and importation under duty would be preferable; but, if the Siamese insisted upon prohibition they must not expect British aid in enforcing it. The British Government were also against the specification of monopolies in treaties. Measurement duties, though simple in operation, would discourage imports of a "bulky or cheap description", and perhaps a better arrangement could be made. The two conventions that Brooke had suggested should be made into one.⁴⁸

Some days later, Brooke heard from the Governor of Singapore "that the King of Siam is anxious that no British mission should be sent to Siam and no change made in the external Policy of the Kingdom until after the funeral of the late King which takes place in April next...." Perhaps the mission should be postponed; or "a discretion should be allowed to Sir James Brooke to make his first visit purely of a complimentary character and so to lay a foundation for a treaty, remaining in the East in the discharge of his ordinary duties until the negotiation can be effectively commenced and returning on its conclusion."⁴⁹ A

48. F.O. to Brooke, September 1851, two drafts, and treaty projet. F.O. 69/3.

49. Memo. by Brooke, 18th. September 1851. F.O. 69/3. Mongkut had written to Governor Butterworth, 22nd. May 1851. 'English Correspondence of King Mongkut,' *Journal of the Siam Society*, xxi, Pt. 1, 1927, pp. 7-10.

decision followed to defer the mission till after the funeral,⁵⁰ and "Sir James went down to hunt with Harry Keppel"⁵¹

The following March, the Permanent Under-Secretary, H. U. Addington, asked on behalf of the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, if Brooke were ready to leave.⁵² The Raja was now down at Brighton and declared that "the season for the journey overland and the residence in Siam is very unfavourable and would alone be a good cause for the postponement of the mission. In my present state of health I require a few months longer residence in England" The feeling in Siam was very favourable, but "if we evince any anxiety for a treaty we shall raise their suspicions and a treaty after all without the cordial support of the government would only be a future source of trouble" A letter from Bangkok showed that reforms were in progress: measurement duties had been lowered to 1,000 ticals, and the interdict on rice exportation had been modified. Opium was to be farmed, and sold only to Chinese immigrants, and English and American merchants were to trade where they pleased, and establish their own chapels and burial-grounds. Brooke suggested that the commercial and political changes in progress were a reason for putting off the mission till their completion. He would be ready to leave for Singapore in October, "so as to reach Siam during the cold season when the Ships engaged may be anchored off a weather shore."⁵³ Brooke thus argued against the early despatch of the mission, as he had earlier argued for it, and it was put off by the Government till the autumn.⁵⁴

The Foreign Office had, however, received a letter from Crawford, expressing doubt about any further mission. Before Brooke's previous mission, he had suggested that it should have

50. F.O. to Admiralty, 20th. September 1851. *F.O.* 69/3.

51. St. John, *Life*, p. 238.

52. Addington to Brooke, 23rd. March 1852. *F.O.* 97/368.

53. Brooke to Addington, 24th. March 1852, one private, with enclosures. *F.O.* 97/368.

54. F.O. to Manchester Commercial Association, 22nd. April 1852. *F.O.* 97/368.

been merely complimentary, and express the Queen's desire for friendly relations and the extension of commerce.

"This recommendation was derived from my own experience which satisfied me that the vain Court of Siam was ambitious of direct communication with the Crown and impatient of one with the vicarial Government of India. The recommendation to abstain from negotiation arose from a thorough conviction that any attempt of the kind would not only fail, but might arouse suspicion and provoke irritation."

So it had, and Crawford felt that a further mission would be "inexpedient, indiscreet, and cannot be expected to be followed by any beneficial results. . . ." The Siamese were "semi-barbarous, and although essentially unwarlike, they are unspeakably vain, presumptuous, and suspicious, while through frequent intercourse with the Chinese they are by no means strangers to our Indian supremacy, and the means by which it was acquired. . . ." Some might expect more from a commercial negotiation now than "a prince of far more enlightened views than any of his predecessors" had succeeded to the throne.

"Such hope, I am satisfied, would be utterly delusive. That prince was raised to power by the very same men who gave such a categorical refusal to the propositions of the last mission, and down to the present time, they continue in the exercise of authority, while the powerful party opposed to them is still more reluctant to advance, more national, and consequently more jealous of foreign interference."

Even if a treaty were made, its provisions would be evaded, like Burney's.

"My assured conviction is that a liberal commercial policy is more to be hoped for, on the part of the Siamese, without a Treaty, than with one. They would, in my opinion, feel fettered, uneasy and suspicious when shackled by stipulations which compulsion alone would make them abide by—a compulsion which, to say the least, it would be both inconvenient and unprofitable to exercise."

Indeed, some improvements had already been made voluntarily. A "frequent, friendly, and complimentary correspondence" with the Governors of Singapore and Labuan would encourage this "spontaneous development" and be preferable to a mission. "Too busy an interference in the affairs of Siam might even put to risk the very power of its liberal sovereign, against whose reforms, as might be expected, there is a powerful party at Court as already stated. . . ."⁵⁵ Some of Brooke's arguments for deferring the mission here became arguments for not sending it at all.

The Foreign Office asked the advice of the India Board, and this agreed with Crawford. "Mr. Crawford's letter contains a great deal of good sense and sound reason, founded upon much practical experience, upon this question, and I should be disposed on the whole," the President wrote, "to let well (or ill?) alone in this matter. Time and experience will probably teach the Siamese Government what is their real interest in promoting friendly intercourse with us. Raja Brooke is not likely to convince them."⁵⁶

The attacks upon Brooke's policy in the Archipelago had been meanwhile intensifying, and no doubt this afforded a reason for his staying in England. In August, Lord Stanley, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, was arranging an interview with him as to the course of British policy in relation to piracy in the Archipelago. In October he told his friend, W.H. Read, that he was "working hard to place our policy in the Archipelago upon such basis to prevent any future obstruction arising from the malice and spleen of individuals. . . ." It was arranged that he should leave his post at Labuan, but have greater scope as Commissioner, and in November he was removed from the Governorship.⁵⁷ His future activities would include the new mission to

55. Crawford to Derby, 25th. March 1852. *F.O.* 97/368.

56. Herries to Malmesbury, 28th. May 1852; 16th. June 1852, private. *F.O.* 97/368.

57. G.L. Jacob, *The Raja of Sarawak . . .*, London, 1876, ii, p. 62. Tarling, *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, xxx, Pt. 3, pp. 202-203. In a forthcoming book, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World*, the author deals more fully with these arrangements.

Siam, though the time originally set for it had passed by. That matter had "rested" with the receipt of the India Board letter, Addington later wrote, for

"in the meantime Mr. Hume had been making representations to this Office in inculcation of Sir James Brooke, and desiring an investigation into his conduct as Raja of Sarawak, Governor of Labuan, Consul General, and Suppressor of Piracy in the Indian Archipelago.

The season accordingly went by without anything fresh having been done in furtherance of Sir James Brooke's projected Mission to Siam.... I have heard speak in the Office of a sort of roving commission having been projected by or for Sir James Brooke which was to embrace Cochin China and other Countries in that part of the world; but I know nothing about such a project."⁵⁸

In fact, Lord Stanley had been dealing with it. The aim seems to have been to modify the controversial policies in the Archipelago,—and thus Brooke was removed from Labuan,—but to amplify his field of activity as Commissioner, to make him in name what he had been in fact in 1849, and, despite the India Board, to despatch him again to Bangkok.

In November Sir James sent in to the Foreign Office a letter from the old Phraklang's son, now the Kralahom, which welcomed the prospect of a new mission.

"As to the three kingdoms embracing Siam, Burma, and Cochin-China, they are not far from being equal in the number of their subjects, and they are all adjoining countries.— But Burma, judging falsely of her own power and being ignorant of the power and forces of other Kingdoms, has fallen into collision with the English power, and thereby lost much territory and many subjects."

After this allusion to the second Burma War, which had broken out in April 1852, it was emphasised that the King and High

58. Memo., 4th. February 1853. *F.O.* 97/368.

Ministers of Siam were "well accustomed to estimate the comparative strength of Kingdoms and Nations...."⁵⁹

Late in December, there were further ministerial changes, the Aberdeen Coalition took office, Lord Malmesbury was replaced by Lord John Russell, Lord Stanley by Lord Wodehouse. On January 31st., Brooke wrote to Wodehouse, asking "whether the appointments by the late government are to be confirmed; and at the same time, should any change of this arrangement be contemplated Sir James Brooke will be glad of an opportunity of stating to Lord John Russell or to Lord Wodehouse the reason which he previously used to Lord Malmesbury in its favour."⁶⁰ It was at this point that Addington prepared his memorandum with a view to explaining the situation.

"Whether Sir James Brooke is or is not a proper man for undertaking the negotiation of a Treaty with Siam is a question for the Secretary of State to determine. Some are vehemently opposed to him; others vehemently favourable. I am neither the one nor the other. But I think him a very capable man.

The main point for consideration, however, is not the man but the thing. Ought we, or ought we not, to endeavour to conclude a Treaty with Siam under the altered circumstances of that Country? This question does not appear to me to have been quite satisfactorily solved and I cannot but think that we should do well to refer the communication from the Siamese Minister to the India Board, and once more request their consideration of the matter."

Russell thought Crawford's arguments against a treaty conclusive; "there might be some use, but also some danger in an embassy of compliment." He would consider the matter further.⁶¹

59. Brooke to Malmesbury, 17th. November 1852, and enclosure. *F.O.* 97/368.

60. Brooke to Wodehouse, 31st. January 1853. *F.O.* 12/13.

61. Minute, 5th. February 1853. *F.O.* 97/368.

Addington then learned from Brooke that Malmesbury had agreed to appoint him

“as regular Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam and other Principalities of the Eastern Archipelago with a salary of £1,000 a year

This arrangement, as far as I can understand, seems to have originated with Lord Stanley. At all events I had nothing to do with it; and am unable to see utility of it at this moment”⁶²

On February 7th. the Raja of Sarawak saw Lord John Russell. In a note of the following day, he emphasized that he could not demean himself by accepting a lower public position than he had previously occupied, and would rather separate himself from the public service and promote the cause of Sarawak independently; in other words, having lost the Governorship, he must expect the appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary.

“On the question of Siam, Sir James Brooke may venture to say that the jealousy of that government, as well as every other in the East, is not excited by intercourse and is not allayed by non-intercourse: it is of a permanent character, arising out of the constant territorial aggrandisement of the East India Company. The former mission to Siam in 1850, undertaken under circumstances of peculiar difficulty and delicacy, owing to the strong aversion of the reigning monarch to the English, so far from exciting jealousy, imparted a degree of confidence to the present King and his ministers which has since led to a friendly correspondence, and has induced them to propose an embassy to England. It is a remarkable circumstance that on the occasion of the last Burmese war the East India Company despatched a mission to Bangkok to allay any jealousy which might exist; and under more favourable auspices, an alarm is now entertained during the pending contest with Burma of exciting jealousy by the proposed mission”⁶³

62. Minute, 6th. February 1853. *F.O.* 97/368.

63. Brooke to Russell, 8th. February 1853. *F.O.* 12/13.

The tide was, in fact, again to be taken at the flood.

Sir Charles Wood, now at the India Board, was, on the whole, opposed to the mission. He was, like his predecessor, "inclined to think that trade will introduce itself on a better footing, and in a manner more likely to be permanent than Government can do for it by treaty." This was also the opinion of the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the Company. "Whether there is any necessity for a visit of compliment is another matter, but I should not think it worth the expense." They should wait: two Siamese envoys had come down to Rangoon, and some further contact with Bangkok might become desirable in relation to Burma.⁶⁴ Russell accordingly decided that there was "no immediate advantage" in sending an ambassador to Siam. Brooke would retain his Consular appointment.⁶⁵ Thus the new ministry declined to adhere to Stanley's plan of giving Brooke the benefit of the Siamese doubt so as to enable the Government to re-define its policy in Borneo without striking at his prestige, or appearing to join in the attacks upon him. Brooke was to be left as Consul-General, and so he was informed on the 19th.⁶⁶ The Raja then proposed to leave for Borneo on April 4th.⁶⁷ By that time the Coalition had yielded to Radical pressure and agreed to appoint a Commission of Enquiry into the Borneo proceedings.⁶⁸

* * * * *

The reversion to the policy of letting well (or ill) alone in relation to Siam did not last long. In 1854 it was arranged that Sir John Bowring should visit Bangkok, and he secured a commercial treaty in the following April. Discussions had taken place at Court, he reported, as to the policy to be followed.⁶⁹ The

64. Wood to Russell, 14th. February 1853. *F.O.* 97/368.

65. Note, 16th. February 1853. *F.O.* 97/368.

66. *F.O.* to Brooke, 19th. February 1853. *F.O.* 12/13.

67. Brooke to *F.O.*, 24th. February 1853. *F.O.* 12/13.

68. Tarling, *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, xxx, Pt. 3, p. 203.

69. John Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam; with a Narrative of the Mission to that Country in 1855*, London, 1857, i, pp. 463-464, ii, p. 228.

treatment given to Brooke had not provoked any reaction, and one party advocated its repetition, while the Kralahom worked for a treaty. His views prevailed, and the treaty provided, *inter alia*, for the appointment of a Consul at Bangkok, for limited rights of purchasing land, for the opening of the rice trade, and for the fixing of various rates of import duties.⁷⁰ Siam thus made further concessions to the European economic world with a view to preserving her continued independence of European political power. It is clear that it had been, as in Burney's time, a matter of appraising the risks involved, rather than of ideology, and the new Burma War had made it plain, particularly to the Kralahom, where the greater risk lay.

Bowring had been sent to Bangkok from China, rather than from the Archipelago, and he appears not to have been instructed in regard to the affairs of the Peninsula. The Siamese suggested a new article on Kedah, replacing that of 1826 and saying that in serious though not in minor matters involving Kedah the British authorities would seek the intervention of the Bangkok Government. Bowring referred to the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie.⁷¹ The Governor of the Straits Settlements, E. A. Blundell, thought: "the 12th. and 14th. articles of Captain Burney's Treaty seem of more importance than the 13th., as they provide in a measure for the independence of Perak, Selangor, Trengganu, and Kelantan, which states it would not be convenient to see subject in any way to Siamese domination . . ."⁷² In the event, it was agreed on the ratification of the Bowring treaty that these and some other articles of the Burney treaty should

70. Copy in *F.O. 97/368*; Bowring, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 214-226; *B.C. 171870*, p. 15.

71. Bowring to Dalhousie, 17th. April 1855. *B.C. 171870*, p. 7.

72. Blundell to Secretary, 27th. December 1855. *B.C. 171870*, p. 53, and *B.C. 189617*, p. 7.

not be abrogated.⁷³ Brooke had, of course, taken the Peninsula into account: a reorganisation of political relations there was to follow from intervention at Bangkok. That intervention had not occurred, and never did occur, although, by the late nineteenth century, it would seem that it was only a desire to avoid encouraging the French, who had intervened first in Cochin-China and then in Cambodia, that prevented a demand for the Peninsular provinces of the Siamese empire.⁷⁴

73. Bowring, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 231-232.

74. V.G. Kiernan, 'Britain, Siam, and Malaya: 1875-1885,' *The Journal of Modern History*, xxviii, 1956, pp. 18, 20.