

# THE FIRST PHIBUN GOVERNMENT AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II

by

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## Introduction

The period of the first Phibun government (1938-1944) has conventionally been viewed in the West as an era of aggressive and expansionist Siamese nationalism. Partly this is because Siam moved into areas on mainland Southeast Asia which had been satisfactorily divided up between two European powers : France and Britain.<sup>1</sup> Partly it is a result of military actions which humiliated the West in Asia, especially the French and the British. Partly, too, it derives from the fact that the Siamese joined the Japanese "enemy" in eliminating Western influence by proclaiming war against the United States and Great Britain. This view of Siamese foreign policy, however, omits all consideration of the complex internal political and social developments which gave that policy its inner rationale. Only a perspective based on domestic changes in Siam can provide a broad and objective view on Siamese foreign policy in that era.

It should never be forgotten that less than a decade passed between the overthrow of absolute monarchy to the coming to power of Phibun Songkhram. These were years of great political turmoil and instability in Siam which also coincided with the wider world economic and political crisis of the 1930s. These two factors were to influence the type of government emerging in Bangkok and its foreign policy.

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1) In a much wider perspective Japan's role in Southeast Asia during the war years has been conventionally seen in the West as one of aggressive militarism, because Japan expanded into areas already under Western domination. Japan's role would be viewed differently if it was not for its conflict and war with the West. See the argument presented in Anderson, B.R. O'G., "Japan: 'The Light of Asia'", in Silverstein, J., ed., *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays*, Monograph Series No. 7, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1966, especially pp. 13-15.

## The Coup of 1932

The year 1932 is undoubtedly one of the most important dates in Siamese history. In June of that year a group of middle-level civilian and military officials, led by four colonels, seized power from the ruling King Rama VII and established a constitution. This event was not a revolution nor a fundamental change in the Siamese political style: governing power merely changed hands from the Chakkri princes to a new oligarchy. The whole affair was strongly reminiscent of traditional Siamese coups wherein discontent within the Army against the monopoly of power by the ruling family led elements within it to seize the throne and establish a new dynasty. The 1932 coup differed mainly in the fact that it did not abolish the existing royal family.

The chief complaint of the coup members was that governing power was monopolized by the royal family. Most of the important government posts were occupied by close relatives of the King.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand less important members of the royal family were moved in to various lower-level posts. Thus most officials from common and bureaucratic families discovered that even with a high level of education there were few avenues open for advancement in government service.<sup>3</sup> It is striking that most of the 1932 coup leaders had received relatively advanced education in Europe. The leader of the coup, Colonel Phahon, spent nine years on a government scholarship studying in Germany and

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- 2) The four most important ministries, Defense, Interior, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, were controlled by the King's close relatives. Hom Ronran, luang, *Mua khaphachao ko kankabot* (When I staged a coup), V. I, Nakornchai, Bangkok, 1949, p. 2.
  - 3) One of the general complaints among middle-level officials was that they were caught in the middle between senior and junior members of the royal family. According to one author these junior members were a great problem since they were installed in various government posts without any consideration of their education. While the senior members were relatively highly educated the junior men were not. This pattern was most obvious in the Siamese Army, which was largely controlled by both senior and junior members of the royal family. At the beginning of the 20th century it was popular practice in Siam for minor members of the royal family to be sent abroad to Europe for a few years to dabble in military science without getting proper training or degrees. Upon their return they were usually given posts in either the Army or the Ministry of Defense. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Denmark.<sup>4</sup> Other members of the coup group, whether they were Army or civilian officials, had a similar experience of education abroad.

The growing discontent among these men eventually burst out when the world economic depression reached Siam in the early 1930s. In order to balance the government budget King Rama VII requested a good number of his officials to resign. Others were faced with cuts in their salary.<sup>5</sup> This was felt most keenly among the middle-level officials of commoner origin and finally led to the coup.

After the coup the King was invited to remain as a constitutional monarch, a figurehead without real power. Powerful relatives of the King were encouraged to go into exile. At the same time an Assembly of seventy appointed members was set up, though the oligarchic character of the new power group was regulated by a decree forbidding the formation of political parties. *Phraya Mano*, an old aristocrat who had taken no part in the 1932 coup, was asked to head the new government, in which the coup leaders merely held posts as ministers without portfolio. The coup leaders nevertheless were at first willing or felt it necessary to maintain some continuity with the old order. Real power, however, now lay not in the Cabinet but in the Army and the Assembly, which were dominated by the coup group.

### Problems facing the new elite

Although the initial 1932 coup was bloodless, its aftermath was very different. The major issue facing the coup group after 1932 was to struggle to remain in power. This struggle lasted until the time Phibun took over the office of Prime Minister. The new elite felt that their security was physically threatened first by the "aristocrats",

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4) Thai noi (pseud.), *Phraya Phahon*, Prae Pitthaya, Bangkok, 1954, pp. 47-8.

5) Phahon, the coup leader, was demoted and his salary was cut down, according to him, without any cause being given. This episode occurred only a few months before the coup of June 24, 1932. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.

secondly by the "royalists", and lastly and surprisingly by the Assembly.<sup>6</sup>

The attempt of the new elite to share power with the aristocrats resulted in failure. Conservative elements among the aristocrats, especially the newly appointed Premier *Phraya* Mano, increasingly came into conflict with the more radical members of the new elite. In this conflict the aristocrats were supported by some more conservative members of the coup group itself. Within a few months of the 1932 coup an open split between the new elite and the aristocrats on the one hand and within the new elite itself on the other hand developed. The famous episode which finally ended co-operation between the aristocrats and the new elite was the controversy which arose over the Economic Plan drafted by Pridi, a radical civilian member of the coup group. The Plan was condemned by the aristocrats as communistic and the drafter was forced to leave the country temporarily.<sup>7</sup> The aristocrats' next move was to dissolve the Assembly since it was dominated by the coup group and their sympathizers. Finally the coup leaders themselves were forced to resign from their posts in the Army.<sup>8</sup>

6) As a matter of convenience the present writer will use general terms such as "royalists", "aristocrats", and "the new elite", to describe the factions struggling for power. However, it should be noted that political affiliation under such complex and disturbed conditions are not easy to pinpoint. By "royalists" I mean members of the royal family as well as people long in their service and still loyal to them. Being a royalist does not necessarily mean he always preferred an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Many royalists felt that they would not be against a change toward constitutionalism in Siam but they could not approve the way in which the change had been carried out by the new elite. By "aristocrats", I mean a group of people from old established families who had traditionally served the absolute monarchy and who generally had higher ranks and social status than the new elite. They remained neutral at the time of the 1932 coup, thus were asked to share power with the coup group. The first Siamese Prime Minister, under the constitutional monarchy, was from this group. However, the aristocrats later turned against the new elite and tried to seize power for themselves. After 1933, royalists and aristocrats shared the same enemy, the new elite, and therefore one finds that the two groups frequently worked together.

7) See David Wilson, *Politics in Thailand*, Cornell Paperbacks, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, pp. 16-7.

8) After the coup of 1932, Phahon, the coup leader, occupied the post of Commander in Chief of the Army. The aristocrats replaced him with someone more sympathetic to their outlook.

On June 20, 1933, almost a year after the 1932 coup, another coup was staged in order to remove the aristocrats and their supporters from power. In this transition period of Siamese politics it is often difficult to distinguish clearly the political affiliation of various contenders for power. It seems that the aristocrats joined with the royalists in opposing the new elite, while at the same time some discontented members of the new elite broke off and supported the aristocrats. Thus after this second coup two of the four colonels who led the 1932 coup were expelled from the country ostensibly because of their association with the aristocrats.<sup>9</sup> The third colonel was shifted to a post without real power. Thus only Phahon was left to take charge of the government.

Within a few months of overthrowing the aristocrats the coup group was faced with a new challenge, this time from the royalists who deeply resented the power monopoly of the new elite and its treatment of the royal family. Led by former Minister of Defense Prince Boworadet, the royalists tried to seize the capital in October, 1933, demanding that the Phahon government resign within the hour. Although the government managed to defeat the "rebels", psychologically, the clash had a serious effect on its attitude towards its rivals.<sup>10</sup>

In particular, the Boworadet counter-coup had severe repercussions on the relations between the throne and the government. After the incident the King decided to leave Siam for England. The new elite was sensitive to the opprobrium they might incur if it was thought to have forced the King to leave his country. Its claim to have brought constitutionalism to Siam by peaceful means would also be jeopardized.

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9) These two colonels were *Phraya* Song Suradet and *Phra* Prasat Phitthayayut. Although they were two of the four most important leaders of the 1932 coup very little is known about them. The two colonels had to leave the country in 1933 but managed to return in 1935. They had to go into exile again when Phibun became the Prime Minister in 1938.

10) The government lost 59 soldiers during the fighting. The Commander in Chief of the "rebel" army was killed in the battle. Thirty four members of the "rebel" leadership, including Prince Boworadet, fled to Indochina to seek political asylum.

Samut Surakksaka, *26 Kanpatiwat thai lae rathaprahan, 2089-2507*, (26 Thai coups, 1546-1964), Bangkok, 1964, pp. 216-17.

Furthermore, the absence of the King would create difficulties for the government in passing laws. According to the 1932 constitution, every act of the government had to be proclaimed by the King with the countersignature of the Premier. This problem was temporarily solved, however, by the appointment of a regent after the new elite failed to persuade the King to stay in the country. But it reappeared when the King decided to abdicate in 1935, and ordered the Regent, his uncle to abstain from doing anything in his name. The abdication of King Rama VII, however, ultimately redounded to the advantage of the new elite since his successor, according to the succession law and the consent of the Assembly, was a minor still in his teens and residing in Switzerland. This fact allowed the government to appoint a Board of Regents, consisting of their sympathizers, to legitimize its actions.

The defeat of the royalists by no means meant an end to political events in Siam. The remainder of the 1930s continued to be full of political instability and agitation. Since the new elite had seized power by the use of force, those in opposition to it felt justified in utilizing the same means. There were at least two attempted coups in 1934 and 1935. In the first affair some 15 people were arrested and imprisoned for from five to seven years.<sup>11</sup> Some 20 junior officers and one civilian were arrested in the second attempted coup. The government implied that the two colonels, who had been Phahon's colleagues in the 1932 coup and who had been expelled from the country after the 1933 coup against the aristocrats, were involved.<sup>12</sup>

11) The prisoners consisted of two princes, six officers, and seven civilians. The charge against them was attempting to assassinate leading members of the new elite, especially Phahon and Phibun.

Thian Prathipasen, *Chom phon P. kunsuk phu rai phaendin* (Marshal Phibun, warrior without a country), Patthana, Bangkok, 1964, p. 51.

12) Withetsakorani, *Khwan pen ma haeng prachathippatai khong thai*, (The Development of Thai Democracy), Charoentham, Bangkok, 1968, p. 528. The incident of the attempted coup was "connected" with the two colonels' entry to Siam from Burma. The government suspected that these men were planning a conspiracy against it since the two colonels had been forced to leave the country in 1933. Although no formal charge were made against them, the two colonels had to retire to a "quiet life" and were closely watched. They were finally expelled again when Phibun came to power.

Besides these two attempted coups the government claimed that the lives of its individual members were repeatedly threatened. Phibun, by this time appointed Minister of Defense, alleged that he had lived through at least four assassination attempts. Other members of the new elite claimed to have had similar experiences. Although it was difficult to know how genuine these attempts were, since they served the government as a good excuse to avert suspected oppositions, a general feeling of insecurity on the part of the new elite is comprehensible. There is some evidence that one member of the government died of poisoning and some of Phibun's claims of attempts on his life can be corroborated. In 1935 he was wounded by gunfire while leaving a soccer field, and in 1938 he and some friends were apparently poisoned. They were immediately taken to a hospital and their lives were saved.<sup>13</sup>

The 1932 constitution contained provisions for the establishment of a National Assembly. Its membership was to consist of equal numbers of appointed and elected representatives. The first "general" elections took place at the end of 1933 and 78 members were elected.<sup>14</sup> In all there were three general elections before Phibun came to power in 1938. The second election was held in 1937 and 91 representatives were elected. But since the Assembly was dissolved the following year, another election had to be held in which almost 50 per cent of 1937 representatives were re-elected.<sup>15</sup>

Almost from the beginning the Assembly was regarded as a threat to the government, whether of the aristocrats or, later, of the new elite. In 1933 the aristocrats had dissolved the Assembly since it voiced the hostile opinion of the new elite against the government. This act of opposition was one of the reasons for the 1933 coup which overthrew the aristocrats. The coup group declared they had been forced to stage the coup in order to save the life of the Assembly, a vital organ in any

13) Thian Prathipasen, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1, 74, 80-1, and 84.

14) It should be noted that these representatives were not elected directly by the people. District representatives were first elected by universal suffrage; then these district representatives would elect one or two provincial representatives (depending on the size of the population of the province) to sit in the Assembly.

15) Withetsakorani, *op. cit.*, p. 600.

democratic order. However, this was more pretext than reality as events were to show. The aristocrats were not so much against the Assembly as such as against a particular Assembly controlled by the followers of the new elite.

After the first general elections in November, 1933 (this was immediately after the defeat of Boworadet) 78 representatives were elected, equal to that same number which had been previously appointed by the government. These elected representatives soon became the opposition to the new elite now in power. For the first time in Siamese history local politicians had an opportunity to voice their opinions at the national level. Many of them took their parliamentary responsibilities seriously and were active in checking abuse of power by the government and at the same time demanding more attention for their provinces. The government, however, consisted mainly of what one might call "Bangkokians" or their sympathizers, depended largely on centrally-appointed members for support, and was generally incapable of understanding these demands. The elected provincial representatives' actions were often regarded as a threat to the government, not as a complementary activity in the democratic process.

During the period of 1933-1938 while Phahon held the office of Premier, the elected representatives induced him to resign three times. On two of these occasions, however, these resignations were largely a matter of parliamentary formality and Phahon returned immediately to form a new government. Nevertheless, these clashes indicated that even with half the Assembly members being appointed, the government had no guarantee against parliamentary opposition. In part this was because the government could not rely completely on the members it appointed. According to the 1932 constitution, once a member was appointed he could only be removed by a vote of two thirds of the whole Assembly. In other words expulsion required support from the elected members. Accordingly the appointed members had some freedom of manoeuvre and the elected members' action in opposing the government could, sometimes, persuade some of them to cooperate with the opposition.

The first action of the Assembly that caused Premier Phahon to resign occurred in 1934 when the Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty on International Rubber Cartel. The second time was after a debate, in 1937, on the sale of crown property. Many members of the government, including Phibun, then Minister of Defense, had acquired crown land at very low prices through a nominal sale. The matter was brought to the Assembly and one elected representative from Ubol, a province in the Northeast, led the attack on the government.<sup>16</sup> The scandal was so great that both the Premier and the Prince Regent resigned. This was the first serious debate in the Assembly concerning the government's conduct and it was most damaging to its reputation. It was also the first in a series of events leading to a major split between the appointed and elected representatives. This split between two types of representatives matured early in 1938. The Director of the Fine Arts Department, also holding the office of minister without portfolio, made an anti-Chinese speech implying that the Chinese minority problem was comparable to that of the Jewish problem in Germany and suggested that the Nazi solution could well be applied in Siam.<sup>17</sup> The speaker was condemned by the elected representative from Ubol, but defended by some of the appointed Assembly members. The Ubol representative was punished for his outspoken manner by being thrown into the pond in front of the Assembly building. The incident led to a strike of some 30 elected representatives who refused to attend sessions with the appointed members.<sup>18</sup>

Only one year later a group of elected representatives caused Phahon to retire from politics for good. A Northeastern representative induced the Assembly to vote no-confidence in the government budget.<sup>19</sup> Phahon

16) *Ibid.*, p. 547.

17) G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., p. 261.

18) Nai Honhuai (pseud.) *Chaofa Prachathipok* (Prince Prachathipok, Rama VII), V, II, Thaikasem, Bangkok, 1948, p. 351.

19) The role of the elected representatives from the Northeast was all along rather unique. In his *Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand*, Keyes divides the elected representatives of that region into two groups. The first consists of people descended from traditional ruling families who seek an avenue to power at the national level. The writer of this paper believes that these representatives tend to ally themselves with any government in Bangkok and thus do not

retaliated by dissolving the Assembly, but decided to retire himself and handed his power to Phibun, his Defense Minister. In effect the Assembly had brought about the resignation of the coup leader. It is interesting to see that although the Assembly had little effective power given to it, it could be a serious annoyance to the government. Since it had the constitutional right of opposition, it was much more difficult to suppress than the royalists or the aristocrats who could be conveniently charged with treason.

One could conclude that the transition period of Siamese politics paved the way for rule by a strong military government. The six years, between 1933-1938, when Phahon was in power, was the period that decided what kind of regime Siam would have in order to overcome internal political unrest and governmental instability.

### **Phibun's rise to power**

When Phahon decided to retire from the Premiership it was quite clear that Phibun, the Defense Minister, would succeed him. Although there was some initial suggestion that Pridi, a prominent civilian member of the new elite then serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs, should take over the office, the Army was in a strong position to insist on its own candidate. By 1938 the Army had consolidated its administrative control. This, combined with the world political crisis, strengthened its claims to lead the nation. Accordingly, other candidates were by-passed and Phibun became the third Siamese Premier after the 1932 coup.

Phibun was born in 1897 of humble origins. At the age of twelve he was sent to the Bangkok Military Academy where he graduated six

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form a real opposition to it. The second group comes from humble origins and constitutes a genuine opposition, voicing local demands in order to get the support of their constituencies for future elections. Their struggle at the national level has been a long one and they tend not to ally themselves with the regime in Bangkok. They were heavily suppressed in the late 1940s when Phibun came back to power after W.W. II. At least five of these representatives were mysteriously murdered in 1949. See Keyes, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 26-27, 34-35.

years later.<sup>20</sup> In 1924 Phibun won a government scholarship to study military science at Fontainebleau. He spent three years in France and in 1927 returned to Siam and joined the Army. In 1932 he was a member of the group which overthrew the monarchy. Although he was one of the original members his role at the outset was not a leading one. After the 1932 coup, however, he took an active part in suppressing the aristocrats and the royalists in the following year. Furthermore, the expulsion of other military men, Phahon's rivals and sympathizers of the aristocrats, eventually made Phibun the only remaining prominent Army member of the new elite. Subsequently he became Phahon's personal aide and was appointed Defense Minister in 1934. He was then only thirty seven years old. He held the post until 1938 when he became Premier.

In his new Cabinet, besides the Premiership, Phibun also held the Ministries of Defense and Interior. These two posts assured him close control over the Armed Forces and all provincial governors. Subsequently he took over the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As one of the original members of the 1932 coup Phibun inherited the general outlook and the political problems of the new elite. But within the group he was associated with the more radical and activist factions. These people tended to see themselves as building a new society in Siam; in other words, Siam was, in their view, entering a period of "nation building". Since this period of "nation building" coincided with a time of world crisis, the Army must provide strong leadership for solving the problems facing the country. Phibun's own thinking, as suggested by his writings, focussed on the need for powerful and authoritarian leadership. As early as 1934 the Defense Ministry's magazine, *Yuddhakot*, frequently published articles by him to the effect that during the time of "nation building" and world crisis Siam needed a strong leader as much as "an animal herd needs its leader".<sup>21</sup> Phibun

20) It was the practice of the Bangkok Military Academy, at the turn of the century, to expand its recruitment to young boys of humble origin. Upon their graduation these military cadets could take jobs either in the Armed Forces or the civil service. There was no clear border line between services in the Armed Forces and civil service; the two merged and overlapped. See David Wilson in Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-55.

21) Thian Prathipasen, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

was perhaps the first politician to popularize the word *phunam* (leader) in the Siamese language.

Although one of the ideological justifications for the 1932 coup had been to bring democracy and a constitution to Siam, by the end of the 1930s these issues were rarely mentioned. The obsessive desire of the new elite was to consolidate its power, especially through the Army, and at the same time to eliminate all opposition factions. Within one month of assuming the Premiership Phibun arrested some 40 people on charges of treason. It was his first major action against the royalists, the aristocrats, elected members of the Assembly, and personal rivals within the Army. Eighteen of these people were immediately executed, twenty six were condemned to life imprisonment, and others were expelled from the country.<sup>22</sup> This grim episode served as a warning to other potential opposition elements.

In a further effort to strengthen the new elite's position and consolidate its claim to be the sole leading force in the nation Phibun worked to undermine the prestige and strength of its ultimate adversary, the monarchy. Traditionally the Ministry of the Royal Household had been one of the most important governmental agencies, since it was in charge of the elaborate ceremony and protocol which formed an essential element in the power and prestige of the monarchy. Its ancestry can be traced back to the middle of the fifteenth century.<sup>23</sup> When the new elite first came to power it decided to abolish the Ministry in the hope of thereby undermining the importance of protocol, ceremony, and court

22) Withetsakorani, *op. cit.*, pp. 673-681. The prisoners consisted of members of the royal family, aristocrats, Assembly representatives, and some Army rivals of Phibun, a good sample of the people who were regarded as a threat to the security of the new elite. They were tried by Court Martial, despite some slight protest about the way the trial was carried out on the part of certain elected members of the Assembly. *Phraya* Song Suradet, a leader of the 1932 coup and a major Army rival of Phibun, was expelled from the country at this time. This was the second and last expulsion of *Phraya* Song Suradet from Siam. He died in 1944 while in exile in Cambodia. Phibun thus attained undisputed supremacy within the Army.

23) D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, 3rd edition, St. Martin's Press: N.Y., 1968, pp. 179-80.

tradition, as well as eliminating a good number of royalist officials employed within it.<sup>24</sup>

In the assault on the monarchy, however, Phibun went to much greater lengths than Phahon. He prohibited the display in houses of any pictures of ex-King Rama VII, who was in exile in England.<sup>25</sup> In addition in 1939 the ex-King was accused of misusing some six million baht (about \$ 2,000,000 at that time) of the crown property. The government filed suit in the civil courts and eventually won their case. The ex-King's property and his private residence were confiscated.<sup>26</sup>

Thus the first year of Phibun regime was mainly devoted to an active campaign to strengthen the new elite's position, by either eliminating or weakening older elements in Siamese politics to the point where the new elite became the only organized political force within the country.

## Nationalism

While Phibun's first move to consolidate his power was the negative one of crushing old hostile political elements, he soon shifted his main energies to the more positive task of building popular support for his regime among the mass of the population.

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- 24) The Ministry was renamed the Bureau of the Royal Household, and was thus deprived of ministerial status. Since 1932 many of the traditional court ceremonies were suspended. It was not until the early 1960s that some of these ceremonies were revived under the present King, Rama IX. This was only possible after the expulsion of Phibun from Siam in 1957, as a result of a military coup against him. For the first time in almost thirty years the Royal Barges Ceremony was held. This is one of the most important Buddhist ceremonies for it celebrates the end of the Buddhist Lent and the giving of yellow robes to the monks. In the ceremony the King takes command over a flotilla of some fifty ancient barges floating down the Menam River to the Temple of Dawn which is situated across the river from Bangkok, and there presents yellow robes to the chief abbot.
- 25) Nai Honhuai, *op. cit.*, V. II, p. 391.
- 26) *Ibid.*, pp. 374-5. The case was heard behind closed doors. The judge presiding over the court voiced some objections to the way the case was carried on. He was later dismissed from his post. As mentioned in the text that the government won the case and the King's property was confiscated, it was not until 1946 that the new civilian government, which succeeded Phibun's first regime, decided to return the property to the Dowager Queen.

To Phibun and his men the best way of gaining mass support was to awaken, focus and mobilize a specifically national consciousness. The people were often reminded by the government that they were now living in "new Siam", a new society in the process of rebuilding itself. As a symbol of this conception the government established, for the first time, a National Day—June 24, the date of the 1932 coup.<sup>27</sup> At the same time the name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand.<sup>28</sup> The Phibun government announced that since the people generally called themselves "Thai" and their country "Muang Thai" (literally, "country of the Thai"), the government "deems it expedient to establish the official name of the country to correspond with the name of the race and to meet the desire of the People."<sup>29</sup>

27) June 24 was celebrated as the National Day for some 20 years. It was only in 1960, after Phibun's fall from power, that it was changed to December 5 which is the present King's birthday.

28) The name "Siam" was in official use from the reign of Rama IV (1851-1868) until Phibun changed it to "Thailand" in 1939. Between 1939-1944, during the first Phibun government, the name "Thailand" was regarded as the country's official name. After his fall the civilian government in power between 1946-1949, changed it back to "Siam". Again when Phibun came back to power in 1949 he revived the use of the name "Thailand". Since then it has remained the official name of the country. As a matter of consistency the writer will use the name Siam and Siamese throughout this article.

29) Krom phrachasamphan (Department of Public Relations), *Pramuan ratthaniyom* (Collected Cultural Mandates of the State), Bangkok, 1940, p. 13.

*Ratthaniyom* or Cultural Mandates of the State is part of governmental campaign on political education. There was a series of *ratthaniyom* announcements of the Office of the Prime Minister.

The *ratthaniyom* or Cultural Mandates, in all, were :

1. *Ratthaniyom* on the use of names for the country, people, and nationality.
2. *Ratthaniyom* on preventing danger to the nation.
3. *Ratthaniyom* on the further use of the name of the Thai people.
4. *Ratthaniyom* on saluting the national flag, the national anthem, and the royal anthem.
5. *Ratthaniyom* on calling the Thai to consume products which are produced in Thailand.
6. *Ratthaniyom* on the tune and words of the national anthem.
7. *Ratthaniyom* on persuading the Thai to build their nation.
8. *Ratthaniyom* on changing the word Siam to Thailand in the royal anthem.
9. *Ratthaniyom* on the use of the Thai language and on the duty of good citizens.
10. *Ratthaniyom* on the dress of the Thai people.
11. *Ratthaniyom* on the daily activity of the Thai people.
12. *Ratthaniyom* on the treatment of children, the aged, and the handicapped.

At first the movement in the direction of more intense nationalism did not, of course, have much effect on the way of life of the people. Government action was concerned with more or less formal matters, such as new names for race, nation, and new words for the National and Royal Anthems, in an effort to create a psychological feeling that the country was entering a new era.

Subsequently, this nationalistic campaign was broadened to involve organized political education of the population. The Office of the Prime Minister and the Department of Public Information took the active role in this campaign. These two offices, especially the Department of Public Information utilized a variety of means for this program of mass education. For example, one of the most famous programs on Radio Thailand was a series of conversations between two fictitious characters, Mr. Mann and Mr. Kong.<sup>30</sup> The conversation program involved almost every aspect of governmental activity, trying to explain them or persuading people to accept the government's point of view. It became an excellent instrument for sounding out public opinion before some certain projects were to be embarked upon. It became highly popular during Phibun's campaign to reclaim former Siamese territories in Indochina.

During this period drama, song, and literature, were also used for nationalist purposes. A good number of plays based on Siamese history were produced by the government. Most of the stories were about the struggle for Siam's independence and glorified heroes whose duty and love were only for the nation.<sup>31</sup> The government encouraged people to

30) The names Mann and Kong combine to form one Siamese word, *Mamkong*, which literally means stability. This program was carried throughout, almost every night, the Phibun era from 1939 to 1944. According to a man who worked for this program Premier Phibun took an active role in directing it. Most of the time he initiated the subjects of the conversation himself. Sang Patthanothai, *Khvammuk nai krong khang* (Thoughts in prison), Klangwitthaya, Bangkok, 1956, pp. 71 and 205.

31) Actually these plays were the work of one man who was then the Director of Fine Arts, *Luang Wichit Wathakan*. He was later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and toward the end of World War II was sent to be the Siamese ambassador to Japan. *Luang Wichit Wathakan* (1898-1962) demonstrated outstanding ability in cooperating with whatever government in power. His works are still popular and frequently put on stage today. A list of his plays for that period gives a clear picture of what the government was campaigning for.

They are:

1. *Luat Suphan* (Suphan Blood), first staged in 1936. It is the story of some villagers in the late 18th century, who fought against the Burmese inva-

see these plays. Some of the play scripts were circulated to government schools in the provinces to encourage students to perform them locally. At the same time modern popular songs and literature were introduced.

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- ders until they were all killed. The play was so popular that the Fine Arts Department was able to build a new theatre on the basis of tickets sold. The play script was sent to all government schools so that students could perform it for local audiences. In addition the Ministry of Defense required every Armed Forces cadet see the play.
2. *Ratmanu* (Rajamanu), 1936. This is the story of a leading warrior in the 16th century. It is based on the history of Siam and Cambodia during the period when Cambodia was conquered and reduced to the status of a vassal to Siam.
  3. *Phrachao Krung Thon* (The King of Dhonburi), 1937. King Taksin, or the King of Dhonburi, was the man who restored Siam after its capital was sacked by the Burmese in 1767. The play had a two-fold purpose. At first glance it was a conventional story of Siam's fight for independence. However, the story also was intended to damage the reputation of the Bangkok Dynasty, since its founder, Rama I, came to the throne as a result of a coup against the King of Dhonburi.
  4. *Suk Thalang* (The Battle of Thalang), 1937. When the Burmese invaded southern Siam at the beginning of the 19th century, two women led the popular resistance in the island of Junk Ceylon (Phuket). The two women were later awarded titles as heroines by the Bangkok Dynasty.
  5. *Chaoying Senwi* (The Princess of Senwi), 1938. This is a story about two Thai principalities in the Shan States of Burma during the 12th or 13th centuries. Although the story has nothing to do with fighting against outside invaders, it lays emphasis on the Thai race and the Thai's love for their country. The play is still extremely popular nowadays and many songs from it are still regularly sung in Siam. These songs are often used by the Siamese government during periods of difficulty, such as during the Laotian crisis in 1960-62 and during the dispute with Cambodia over the temple, Phra Viharn, on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1962.
  6. *Maha Devi* (The great queen), 1938. Maha Devi was the queen of Chiangmai, a northern Thai state, in the 16th century. In historical reality she fought impartially against the Burmese and the Siamese of present-day central Thailand. However, in the play, history is somewhat distorted : she is depicted as helping to unify Siam into one great country.
  7. *Nanchao* (Nanchao was supposedly a Thai kingdom in Yunnan before the 13th century), 1939. This is perhaps the most popular and important play of the period. It is the story of how this Thai kingdom in southern China was destroyed by Kublai Khan. The play is an ultra-nationalistic saga of how the Thai race was driven out of their original homeland. The play had powerful political effects by popularizing a hitherto obscure

Their themes were like those of the new drama, and emphasized above all patriotism and the glory of the Thai race.<sup>32</sup>

In this process the Department of Fine Arts underwent a severe change in the nature of its work. Its school of classical dance and music was forced to devise new art-forms to serve nationalist purposes. Classical plays and music were ignored, and the school was compelled to perform a mixture of classical dance and western music. It had to stage musical nationalist historical "musicals" instead of the traditional types of drama and music based on Indian epics and simple Siamese stories.

By 1940, the nationalist program began to have conspicuous external effects on the mass of the population. This developed through what was known as the campaign for an ideal "Thai culture". The government passed a series of laws on national culture forcing the people to wear "proper" dress and to behave in a "proper" manner. Wearing western trousers, skirts, and hats was first encouraged and later made mandatory. Some old customs, such as eating betel nut, were prohibited.

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episode of ancient history into a national myth. Even today most Thai historians believe that their ancestors were driven out of Yunnan by the Chinese, who are thus the Thai people's worst enemy.

8. *Anusawari Thai* (The Thai Monument), 1939. This is the only one not based on ancient history. It is a story of nation building and resisting threats from an unidentified outside enemy. Perhaps it was the least popular one.
9. *Pho Khun Phanuang* (The Lord of Pha Muang), 1940. This was the last political play of the period, since the playwright, the Director of the Fine Arts Department, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs after Siam joined in a military pact with Japan. It is a story of a Thai prince who overthrew his Cambodian overlord in the 13th century. Subsequently the Thai established their first historical kingdom in the Indochinese peninsula.

It should be noted that all these plays require at least three hours for one performance. The plays are a combination of classical Siamese dance, modern music, and songs. Most of the basic stories were already well-known to the population, making it easy to popularize the plays.

*Wichit Wathakan Anuson* (In memory of Wichit Wathakan, 1898-1962), V. II, Bangkok, 1962, p. 294.

- 32) The government opened a contest for the best new words for the National Anthem, and the Army came first in this competition. The Army words are still in used today.

The government believed that by doing so the Siamese would appear "civilized" to the outside world. Phibun believed that one pretext used by the colonial powers for intervening in a country was the "uncivilized" character of its people. In facing the world crisis of the 1930s the Siamese had to be prepared to avert such dangers. Phibun was also convinced that Siam had so far managed to maintain its independence as a result of conscious modernization by two of its greatest kings, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn.<sup>33</sup> The aim of the two monarchs had been to accommodate to the Western powers at a time when their aggressive thrust threatened Siam's survival. Although it is by no means certain that this policy of adaptation was the main reason why Siam was not colonized, Phibun believed it to be so, and accordingly enforced his own program of adaptation on the people.

It might be asked why Phibun wanted the people to adopt western customs at a time when his government was strongly anti-French. For Phibun there was no conflict between the two policies. His explanation was that there was much good in the West as well as much that was evil. It was the duty of the government to select the good things and introduce them to the people. These good things, he believed, would help the country in the process of "nation building". Accordingly, a judicious combination of eastern and western customs was felt to be appropriate and highly acceptable. In photographs of the period, one can see that the "proper" dress for a Siamese girl was a combination of western shoes, traditional sarong, modified Siamese blouse, and western hat and gloves.

### **The policy of Thai-ification and the Chinese minority problem**

Up to the beginning of the 20th century Chinese immigrants were generally welcomed in Siam. There was no immigration law until 1927. The Siamese court and nobility regarded them as bringing profit and wealth to the kingdom. The Chinese engaged in almost every aspect of business and in return they turned over a part of their profits to the court

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33) It is certainly true that during the period of high colonialism these two monarchs had abolished many old Siamese customs, such as kneeling and crawling in the presence of the king, and the Siamese court itself had adopted many Western customs. Nonetheless this was done within the limited circle of the court and the mass of population was not affected.

and nobility in the form of various taxes. The Siamese considered the Chinese less foreign than other foreigners and they, the Chinese, lived under the same laws as the Siamese.

Anti-Chinese discrimination has been a phenomenon of the 20th century. It was first introduced into Siam by the nationalist-minded Rama VI (reigned 1910-1925) who compared the Chinese in Southeast Asia to the Jews in the West. It was not surprising therefore that some of the post-coup elite revived this idea in their nationalist campaign. But whereas the anti-Chinese policy of Rama VI was mainly verbal and no drastic action was taken against the Chinese under his rule, during the Phibun government the Chinese became the victim of active discrimination.

From the early 20th century on there was a growing fear among sophisticated Siamese that the size of the Chinese population and their control over the Siamese economy was creating a real problem of "a state within a state".<sup>34</sup> This fear arose for two main reasons: the rapid growth of the Chinese population and the increasing difficulty in its assimilation. It has been estimated that in the peak years 1918-1931 Chinese immigration into Siam totalled roughly 95,000 a year. This was due both to the economic boom in Siamese rubber and tin and to bad social conditions in South China.<sup>35</sup> The number of Chinese immigrants dropped between 1932-1945 to about 33,800 per year.<sup>36</sup> It is believed that toward the end of the 1930s Siam had a Chinese population of between 2-3 million, or about 10 per cent of the whole population. This Chinese minority, though comparatively few in numbers, constituted about 70 per cent of all skilled and unskilled non-agricultural labor.<sup>37</sup> Probably more than 80 per cent of the Siamese economy was in Chinese hands.

Since part of the economic policy of the post-coup elite was to provide jobs for unemployed Siamese, the strategically placed Chinese were regarded as a major obstacle to its implementation. The Phahon

34) Josiah Crosby, "Observation on a Post-war Settlement in South-East Asia", *International Affairs*, XX, (July, 1944), p. 364.

35) Skinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-74.

36) *Ibid.*, p. 176.

37) *Ibid.*, pp. 219-21.

government initiated a policy of discouraging Chinese immigration. In 1932, it raised immigration fees by more than 59 per cent.<sup>38</sup> At the same time the government encouraged Siamese to replace the Chinese in many aspects of business. Nonetheless, by and large Phahon's policy was in practice more words than action. Most Chinese went on with their daily lives as usual.

But it was not only the growing numbers of Chinese which concerned the Siamese leaders but also their increasing political self-consciousness. Traditionally Chinese immigrants to Siam consisted almost entirely of males, who were easily assimilated into Siamese society by marrying local girls. About the beginning of the 20th century, however, Chinese women started to migrate too. From this time on the Chinese tended increasingly to marry among their own people and bring up their children as Chinese. Furthermore the aftermath of the revolution of 1911 created a new sense of identity among the overseas Chinese. Sun Yat-sen's campaign among the overseas Chinese also contributed to a growing nationalism. The result of all these factors was that the Chinese community tended to isolate itself from Siamese society far more than ever before. There was great emphasis now placed on remaining Chinese rather than being assimilated into Siamese society. To this end Chinese schools were built and Chinese studies were encouraged for Chinese children.

During the 1930s the Sino-Japanese conflict exacerbated this minority problem in Siam. The Siamese governments of the period were anxious to keep on good terms with the Japanese since it was obvious that they were a major contender for dominance in East Asia. Accordingly, secret societies and political organizations formed among the local Chinese, strongly anti-Japanese in outlook, became a major concern of the Siamese government. The efforts of these organizations were greatly intensified after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937. Many Chinese trading companies refused to handle Japanese goods, thereby undermining Siamese-Japanese trade relations. Such was the situation of the Chinese minority on the eve of Phibun's rise to power.

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38) In 1937/38 the fee was increased by a further 100 per cent. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

But whereas Phahon's government had been "passively" hostile to the Chinese Phibun's immediately went on the active offensive as part of his campaign to mobilize all forces of Siamese nationalism behind his leadership; in a larger sense his policy was designed to justify the post-coup elite's claim that it took power from the absolute monarchy with the object of doing a better job for the country.

In his first year of office Phibun passed a considerable number of laws attempting to force the Chinese out of business, by discriminating against them in such traditional areas of Chinese business as rice-milling, salt production, fishing, and retail trade.<sup>39</sup> Many professions were reserved for Siamese citizens. Chinese schools and newspapers were put under restriction and many of them were finally closed down. The Chinese were prohibited to buy land and reside in areas which the government regarded as strategic. They were thus cut off from the two most important factors conducive to assimilation into Siamese society—the rights to own land and to settle anywhere in the kingdom.<sup>40</sup>

The Nationalist Chinese government protested about the way in which the local Chinese were treated and proposed to establish official diplomatic relations with Siam. This was the first time that China had tried to re-establish diplomatic relations since the ancient contacts between the two countries were cut off by the penetration of the Western powers in the early 19th century. The Siamese government, however, ignored the approach, fearing that official relations with China would only complicate the problem of dealing with local Chinese.

An anti-Chinese policy served the Siamese government both internally and externally. Internally, the measures against local Chinese helped to mobilize the majority of the people to support the government. It seemed to confirm the government's intention of working for the Siamese nation and Siamese people. Although there was some opposition to the policy expressed, especially in the Assembly, the protests lacked conviction and stature. Externally the anti-Chinese policy fitted in well with the government's aim of conciliating Japan and opening a way for close co-operation between the two countries.

39) *Ibid.*, pp. 261-63.

40) *Ibid.*, p. 276.

41) It should be noted that the Siamese government did not recognize any Chinese government after the revolution of 1911 until after W.W. II.

### Siamese territorial expansion

Under the Phibun government Siam entered one of the most expansionist periods in its history. This expansion can be divided into two stages. The first occurred before the Pacific War and involved the annexation of territories from French Indochina, with the mediating assistance of Japan. The annexed territories consisted of three areas of Laos and Cambodia. The first was the area known as Sayaboury, across the Mekong from the royal Laotian capital of Luang Prabang. The second was Champasak (known to the French as Bassac) in the southern part of Laos, also on the right bank of the Mekong. The third, in Cambodia, consisted of the two provinces of Siemreap and Battambang.<sup>42</sup> (See Map III).

The second stage of Siamese expansion occurred during the Pacific War. In 1943, through negotiations with Japan, Siam received some territories from both British Burma and British Malaya. From Burma Siam incorporated part of the Shan States, the area around the city of Kengtung. From Malaya Siam took the four northern states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu. (See Map III).

Of all his nationalist activities, Phibun's expansion into French Indochina was the most popular. It is no exaggeration to say that this expansion policy was accepted virtually unanimously, and mobilized the vast majority of the people behind the regime. Significantly, it was the one area of Phibun's policies which his opponents tried to follow up after they engineered his downfall in 1944. Knowing that an abandonment of the Siamese claim to the three areas of Sayaboury, Champasak, and Siemreap-Battambang, would severely damage their popularity they tried, though in vain, to retain the annexed territories. The claim was only withdrawn when France threatened to veto Siam's application for membership in the United Nations Organization, by which it was hoped Siam's international respectability would be restored.

The expansionist policy of the Phibun government into areas under French control had a long historical background. In Siamese politics Laos has always had a special place because of the two areas' close

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42) Siemreap is the province where the great monuments of Angkor are situated. According to the treaty negotiated in 1941, the French Vichy government was entitled to retain the ancient monuments and the areas adjacent.

identity in race and language. After the 17th century Laos had declined into a weak and defenseless kingdom, and was forced to accept vassal status to Siam, whether under Ayudhya or Bangkok. At the time of Rama I (1782-1809) Laos was divided into three small states: Luang Prabang (north), Vientiane (central), and Champasak (south). Siamese military expeditions placed the three Laotian states under the control of Bangkok. The two principalities of Vientiane and Champasak tried to regain their independence through rebellion, but were suppressed. The rebel capital at Vientiane was destroyed, and the ruling family of Vientiane was eliminated. After 1827 Vientiane and Champasak were incorporated into Siam proper. Only Luang Prabang was left as a vassal state.

The same pattern developed in Cambodia's relations with Siam. At the beginning of the 19th century Cambodia, heir to the once powerful Khmer kingdom of Angkor, was caught between two powerful and hostile neighbors, Siam and Vietnam, and was forced to accept both as its overlords. Cambodia had to pay tribute to Bangkok as well as to Hué. The two northern provinces of Siemreap and Battambang were given to Bangkok in return for the help given by the Siamese king in settling a succession dispute among the Cambodian royal family.

It was not until the European penetration into the mainland of Southeast Asia that this situation changed. To escape the threat from his two powerful neighbors, the Cambodian king, in 1863 decided to put his country under French protection. Four years later Siam and France signed a treaty by which Siam renounced its claim to suzerainty over Cambodia, but retained the areas of Siemreap and Battambang. This treaty was the result of peaceful negotiations without the use of force.

In 1893 further territorial losses occurred as a result of a small naval battle between Siam and France. Two French gunboats entered the Menam River and headed for Bangkok. The Siamese offered only slight resistance and later complied with French demands. A treaty was signed with France whereby Siam gave up all claims to territories on the left bank of the Mekong River, i.e. the whole of present-day Laos except for Sayaboury and Champasak, which are on the right bank of the river. In order to force the Siamese to comply with the treaty France stationed

troops in the eastern region of Siam. In 1902 the French troops refused to leave unless Siam also renounced its claim to Sayaboury and Champasak. When these areas were surrendered, the French broke their word and remained in the country. In 1907 they demanded the cession of Siemreap and Battambang as the price of their final withdrawal. All these territories were incorporated into French Indochina.

Siamese relations with Great Britain, in the same period, were considerably better than with France. It is true that the four northern states of Malaya had accepted Siamese suzerainty throughout the 19th century. But control over the Malay states was considered less important to Siam than control of Laos and part of Cambodia. Siamese suzerainty over northern Malaya was simply a reflection of the vigorous power of the Bangkok dynasty and did not involve a strategic area as in the case of Laos and western Cambodia. In 1909 Siam agreed to sign a treaty with Great Britain which transferred the four Malay states to British Malaya. We shall see that Phibun's annexation of these states was an unintended result of the Pacific War, not part of a long-term plan of conquest.

This historical background may help to explain why Phibun, in the early stages of his nationalist foreign policy, decided to embark on a policy of hostility toward the French. To Siamese leaders, especially among the new elite, the loss of territory to France was considered a deep humiliation. Siam's boundaries had been unilaterally determined by the open use of force, thus inviting reprisal from the Siamese when an opportunity came. As France's international position weakened in the late 1930s, the new Siamese government felt no obligation to respect the European arrangement of Southeast Asian state boundaries.

While the revision of the boundary with French Indochina was a long-term project of the new elite, its forcible implementation was not seriously considered until World War II drew near. Both in 1936 and 1939 the Siamese Government asked France to adjust the boundary along the Mekong river.<sup>43</sup> The proposal was considered moderate since the Siamese only asked to have the Mekong established as a natural boundary

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43) Sang Patthanotai, *Suk thai nai roi pi*, 2385-2485 (Thai wars in the hundred years between 1842-1942), Bangkok, 1944, pp. 198-99.

between Siam and French Indochina, with the two right-bank areas of Sayaboury and Champasak reverting to Siam. ( See Map II ) However, there was no response from the French government.

Thereafter, there were at least two immediate factors which spurred on the Siamese to take forcible action on their claims in Indochina. The first was the surrender of the Paris government to German troops in June, 1940. A week before the French surrender, Siam and France had agreed to sign a non-aggression pact with the understanding that negotiations on boundary revision would follow.<sup>44</sup> In the two months which followed the French surrender a series of negotiations between the two governments was opened, but in the end the French Foreign Office decided that France could not consider the return of Sayaboury and Champasak. In response the Siamese government refused to ratify the non-aggression pact and prepared to use force.

The second factor which contributed to Siamese military action was the entry of Japanese troops into Indochina. Under the terms of the agreement of September, 1940 (and later again in July, 1941) between the Japanese and Vichy governments Japanese troops were permitted to be stationed in Indochina, primarily in Vietnam.<sup>45</sup> Although Japanese attitudes were generally sympathetic to Siamese claims, the Phibun government feared that Japanese troops would eventually move from Vietnam into Laos and Cambodia and might prove an obstacle to Siamese aims. Phibun therefore decided to invade Laos and Cambodia at once, concentrating on the areas of Sayaboury, Champasak, Siemreap and Battambang.

Fighting along the borders of Siam and French Indochina broke out in December, 1940. By the beginning of the following year the Siamese were able to move in and occupy the claimed areas.<sup>46</sup> Japan immediately offered to mediate between the two parties and a truce was

44) *Ibid.*, p. 200.

45) F.C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia, Its Rise and Fall 1937-45*, Oxford University Press, London, 1954, p. 391.

46) Although the Siamese were on the winning side of these land battles, they lost an important naval engagement in the Gulf of Siam. The French navy was far superior to the Siamese, it destroyed two Siamese submarines and seriously damaged one Siamese gunboat. Sang Patthanotai, *Suk.*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

declared on February 3, 1941 aboard a Japanese ship, anchored in front of Saigon. On May 9, 1941, a peace treaty between France and Siam was signed in Tokyo. From the Tokyo treaty Siam obtained Sayaboury, Champasak, Siemreap and Battambang, an area of about 90,000 sq. kilometers, from French Indochina.<sup>47</sup> (See Map III and Appendix I). For its mediation services Japan obtained commitments from Siam and France that neither would enter into a treaty with any third power against Japan. (See Appendix II).

The success in Indochina was of great benefit to the Phibun government. His career as the leader of Siam was at its height.<sup>48</sup> His government emerged stronger than ever before. His policies were acclaimed by the great majority of the people. There were frequent demonstrations of university students in support of the government program.

The Indochinese campaign also had an effect on the future of the country's foreign policy. It was the first major incident that moved Siam into conflict with the West and paved the way for future close co-operation with Japan. During the crisis the Siamese government had sent a number of diplomatic missions to sound out international opinion. Both Great Britain and the United States made it clear that they preferred the *status quo* in Indochina. Irritation at this response was heightened subsequently by the so-called "aeroplanes episode". The Phibun government had bought some ten bombers from a private American firm. While the planes were in Manila on their way to delivery in Bangkok, the United States government decided to block the delivery because of the

47) After the peace treaty Siemreap was renamed the province of Phibun Songkham. The reason for this was to honor the Premier and to replace the ancient Cambodian name which literally means the Defeat of the Siamese (*Siem*=Siam, and *reap* = defeat), a name which is rather inappropriate for a new Siamese province! Sayaboury was renamed the province of Lanchang (million elephants), an old name for the northern part of Laos.

48) Phibun promoted himself from Major General to Field Marshal, skipping the two ranks of Lieutenant General and General. He was the first man to be appointed Field Marshal after the coup of 1932.

49) John L. Christian, "Thailand Renascent," *Pacific Affairs*, XIV, (June, 1941), p. 193.

deteriorating situation in Indochina.<sup>50</sup> Japan immediately offered the same number of planes to the Siamese government.

The Siamese government thus became convinced that there was nothing to be gained from working with the West. The traditional anti-French attitude of the Siamese broadened into a general anti-Western feeling. In Bangkok the government encouraged anti-American demonstrations. At the same time Japan stepped in to be the "real" friend of Siam. In August, 1941, a few months after the signing of the Tokyo treaty, the Phibun government recognized and later established diplomatic relations with the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.<sup>51</sup>

### Siam, Japan and World War II

To the Siamese, as to other Asians, the Japanese had long been regarded as the only Asian people who could match the West. Japan's industrialization and its military success over Russia in 1905 made a deep impression on Siamese leaders. The common observation that Siam is always attracted by power is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that ever since the beginning of the 20th century Japan had been the object of serious thought to Siamese foreign policy-makers. Japan was a third, new power in Southeast Asia, alongside Great Britain and France, to which Siam would have to adjust. Siamese leaders hoped that eventually Japan, with its anti-Western attitudes, would help to counter Western influence. By using Japan, Siam's awkward position, squeezed in between the British and French Empires, might be improved.

After 1932 Japan's importance to Siam increased still more. Phahon, the leader of the 1932 coup, had spent two years in Japan between 1919 and 1921.<sup>52</sup> Japan's importance to the new elite became evident

50) James V. Martin, Jr., "Thai-American Relations in World War II", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXII, (August, 1963), pp. 454-55.

51) Wanwaithayakon, prince, *Prawat kanthut khong thai* (A history of Thai diplomacy), Phrachan, Bangkok, 1958, p. 66.

52) Phahon later claimed that he was inspired by the story of Baron Saigo, who had brought constitutional monarchy to Japan, and one of his many reasons for organizing the 1932 coup was to emulate the good example of the Japanese. Rightly or wrongly he averred that the conception of the constitutional monarchy he wanted for Siam came to him while in Japan. The coup leader also related that he was told by a Japanese soldier that he looked almost exactly

early in the diplomatic field. After the 1932 coup Siamese ministers to Great Britain and the United States were simply ordered to exchange posts : the Siamese minister in London was sent to Washington and vice versa. But a new man trusted by the coup group was sent to Tokyo to replace an appointee of the monarchy; his task was to observe developments there closely and cement warmer relations with the Japanese leaders. Siam was the only nation to abstain from voting on the Lytton Report in 1933 in effect therefore avoiding any condemnation of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.<sup>53</sup>

But the real turning point in Siam-Japan relations only came during the Indochina border crisis of 1940-1941, during which the Siamese armed forces received supplies from Japan and the Franco-Siamese dispute was mediated by Japan clearly in favor of the Bangkok government. It was not surprising that, after the crisis, Bangkok-Tokyo relations improved immensely and that Siamese leaders began to give serious consideration to the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asians".

However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Siamese government was ready to sacrifice its freedom of action and fall into the Japanese orbit when World War II started in Asia. The government decided to join Japan only when the country was invaded and there was no prospect of help from the Western democracies, especially from Great

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like the celebrated Baron, and that he had later tried on the Baron's trousers himself and found that they fitted him very well. This, he felt, was a good omen for the success of the coup which would eliminate the absolute power of the Siamese monarchy. These stories should perhaps not be taken literally but seen as a traditional kind of self-created legend about a new charismatic leader. Such a leader gives out the story in order to impress people with the idea that his role is a predestined one. The same sort of stories were given out by two great kings of Siam at the end of the 18th century, Taksin and Rama I. Both Kings, like Phahon, were of humble origin. The interesting thing about Phahon's "legend" is not the legend itself, but the fact that Japan is so prominent in it. This indicates the aura of power Japan generated in the period.

- 53) On the other hand it should be noted that the government was careful to avoid giving an impression of being against the dominant Western democracies. When the League of Nations voted for an embargo on Italy to punish it for its invasion of Abyssinia, the Siamese government went along with the resolution. In October, 1935, Siam banned all imports from Italy and stopped sending tin and rubber to that country. When World War II started in Europe, however, Siam reversed this policy and put in orders for Italian shipping.

Britain. The one indication of a special Japanese attitude towards Bangkok was the fact that of all the countries invaded by Japan, Siam was the only one given official warning in advance. At about 10.30 p.m. (local time) on December 7, 1941 the Japanese ambassador asked to see Phibun and presented an ultimatum to be answered within one hour. The ultimatum proposed three choices for the Siamese government. The first was to give passage to Japanese troops on their way to Burma and Malaya. The second was to sign a military pact between Japan and Siam which would require Siamese co-operation in the war. The last was to declare war against the United States and Great Britain.<sup>54</sup>

The Siamese government was unable to give an answer to these demands due to the absence of Phibun, who happened to be touring in the newly acquired area of Battambang. At 2.00 a.m. on December 8, some Japanese troops landed in some areas along the Gulf of Siam and others crossed the border from Indochina and fighting broke out. It was not until about 7.00 a.m. that Phibun returned to Bangkok and held a Cabinet meeting. Both military and civilian members of the government agreed that to fight the Japanese under present conditions would be "suicide." The Cabinet meeting was accordingly cut short (it lasted only half an hour) and Phibun announced a cease-fire at 7.30 a.m. and agreed to give Japan right of passage.<sup>55</sup>

At this early stage of the war, then, the Siamese government chose the first alternative proposal, and gave passage to the Japanese troops on their way to invade the British Empire in Burma and Malaya.<sup>56</sup> However, the rapid series of Japanese victories in the Pacific War,

54) Direck Chainam, *Thai kap songkhram lok khrang thi 2*, (Thailand and W.W. II), Bangkok, 1966, V. I, p. 197.

55) One author comments that "It is said that the factor which finally persuaded the Cabinet to accede to Japan's demands was the receipt of a military telegram from Singapore to the general effect: "Fend for yourselves. Sorry we can't help you" . . . With no assistance coming from abroad, the Government felt justified in giving the required permission for the passage of (Japanese) troops." John Coast, *Some Aspects of Siamese Politics*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1953, p. 18.

56) Roughly 50,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Siam. These troops usually kept to themselves in their camps and seldom mingled with the local population.

especially the assault on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of two British warships, the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, soon convinced the Siamese government, especially its military members, that Japan would be the final victor. Accordingly, they decided to co-operate more fully with Japan. On December 21, 1941, a military pact was signed with Tokyo.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, on January 25th of the following year, the Siamese government declared war on the United States and Great Britain.<sup>58</sup>

The decision to move from passive acceptance to active military alliance with Japan caused a split within the Siamese government. This disagreement began to develop as early as the day of the Japanese invasion. Although the civilian members agreed with the military that passage should be given to Japanese troops, they were upset by Phibun's willingness to make further hasty concessions. Pridi, the leader of the civilians, was alarmed by the fact that some military ministers were already strongly in favor of a military alliance with Japan. He urged the government to insist that Japan accept the giving of passage to be a final act, which would preclude and further commitment such as a military pact. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, another civilian and a close friend of Pridi, protested the trend of Cabinet decisions and refused to appear at the Ministry after the Japanese invasion. Ironically, he was later sent to be ambassador to Tokyo, while his post was assumed by Phibun himself. Growing disunity within the Cabinet made a reshuffle inevitable. Pridi was "kicked upstairs" to become a member of the Board of Regents, essentially a non-political function. Subsequently, two other

57) There was a secret protocol attached to the treaty by which Japan agree to give some British-controlled territories to Siam. This was disclosed by the Japanese war-time ambassador to Bangkok, after the war. Direck, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

58) According to the Siamese constitution a declaration of war had to be signed by the king and counter-signed by the Premier. In 1942 a three-man Board of Regents was acting on behalf of the young King Rama VIII who was still living in Switzerland. Phibun was able to get two Regents to sign the declaration of war on the Allies, but he failed to get the third to comply. The third Regent was Pridi, Phibun's civilian rival, who had recently been removed as Minister of Finance and promoted to the Regency. The absence of Pridi's signature was later used in negotiating with the Allies to convince them that Phibun's declaration of war had been unconstitutional. See appendix III, paragraph II.

leading civilian ministers, Thawee Bunyaket and Khuang Aphaiwong resigned from the Cabinet. (Both men later became Premier after the fall of Phibun in 1944). These ministerial changes took place within two weeks after Pearl Harbor. Phibun now had a free hand to pursue his policy of close co-operation with Japan.

The expulsion of the civilian members from the Cabinet, however, ultimately redounded to their advantage. They regained their freedom of action and were able to begin organizing an anti-Japanese movement in the country. Their first plan was to form a Siamese government in exile, possibly in Chungking. For such a government to be taken seriously by the Allies, the civilians wanted Thawee and Khuang to be appointed President and Vice President of the National Assembly. If this could be accomplished, Thawee, as President of the Assembly, Pridi, as Regent, and various representatives in the Assembly, would flee to China, where their high official status would make the formation of a Siamese government in exile credible. This plan proved abortive since Phibun refused to put Thawee and Khuang in charge of the Assembly. Accordingly, the civilians turned to a second plan, which was to form a Free Siamese Movement within the country and try to get in touch with the Free Siamese movements already in existence in the United States, England, India, and Australia.<sup>60</sup>

59) Direck, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-65.

60) The Free Siamese Movement in Siam itself was formed rather belatedly, emerging formally only at the beginning of 1943. In Washington, a Free Siamese Movement was started soon after the Siamese declaration of war on the United States. The Siamese minister, Seni Pramoj, refused to hand the declaration to the American State Department; he also rejected the Siamese government's order recalling him to Bangkok. He proposed to the State Department the establishment of a Free Siamese Movement and stated that he would act "on behalf of all Thais, since the Thai government is no longer in a position to voice the true will of the people". (Martin, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 461) He also persuaded the American government to disregard the declaration of war. His Free Siamese Movement received help from the Office of Strategic Services, which began training Siamese students in the U.S. in guerrilla warfare. It has been estimated that the movement numbered roughly one hundred members. (Direck, *op. cit.*, p. 472) Some of them were later sent to India and Ceylon to work with their counterparts from England. From Allied headquarters in Kandy they were dropped into Siam and were able to co-operate with Pridi's movement.

## Japanese Impact on Siam

The major areas of Japanese influence on Siam were a change in the Siamese view of the West, the spread of a new style of nation-building emphasizing the role of authoritarian leadership, and the politicization of the masses by appeals to nationalism, and a new self-respect in international affairs.

Japan had shown that the West was no longer invincible. If they were willing and able to improve themselves as the Japanese had done, other Asians should also be able to match the West. Many Siamese leaders believed that this had been demonstrated during the Indochina border crisis. Like Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, Siam's success in Indochina was a triumph of Asians over the West. In the Siamese language of the time, there was an exhilarating feeling that *farang mai chai thewada yang thi khuai nuk* (white foreigners are not *deva* (gods) as we thought).<sup>61</sup>

Japan had also served as a kind of ideal example of building up a weak and technologically backward nation. Walter Vella has remarked that "Japan in particular, an Asiatic state that had grown into a world power, seemed a relevant example for Thailand. Many young Thai military men, including Phibun Songkhram, felt that nations with dictators and strong armies were doing better in the world of the 1930s than the great democracies."<sup>62</sup>

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Likewise in England a movement was formed among the Siamese students, but it did not enjoy the same status as its counterpart in the United States. The Siamese minister to London returned home on Phibun's orders leaving Siamese citizens in England without effective leadership. Moreover, unlike the Americans, the British accepted Siam's declaration of war and Siamese citizens were regarded as enemy aliens. However, the British government was eventually persuaded to co-operate with the embryo Free Siamese Movement. Members were attached to the British Armed Forces with the status of a Pioneer Corps. This was the same treatment given to German and Italian exiles in England. (Direck, *op. cit.*, p. 381).

- 61) Sang, *Khwanmuk*, *op. cit.*, p. 233. During the fighting some 60 French soldiers and their artillery were captured. The Siamese government encouraged the people to have a close look at these prisoners in their jails. According to the same author who was a high government official in the Department of Public Relations during the war years, this was designed to eliminate fear of "white foreigners" among the Siamese.
- 62) Walter F. Vella, *The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand*, University of California Press, 1955, 382.

The importance of the military in Japanese national development seemed to justify Phibun's stress on a central political role for the Siamese Army, and himself as its commander. Not surprisingly, therefore, in Phibun's prescriptive slogan for building up Siam, three major factors were listed in order of their importance to the nation's progress : the Army, the economy, and lastly the culture.<sup>63</sup>

The Japanese example was also emulated in the policy of mass politicization along military lines. Civilians were encouraged to accept military-style discipline : for example they were required to salute the Siamese flag at eight o'clock every morning. An official youth movement was established, known as the *Yuwachon Tahan* (Young Soldiers), to ensure that high school and college students received appropriately military-type training. The boys involved were given army uniforms, very similar to those of military men. Another obvious emulation of the Japanese model was the promulgation of the *Vira Dharma* or the Code of the Brave, along the lines of Bushido, the traditional feudal samurai ethic. These codes applied to all Siamese, not just to military men.<sup>64</sup>

63) Wanwaithayakon, prince, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

64) The *Vira Dharma* was announced by the Office of the Prime Minister on May 2, 1943. It ran as follows :

1. The Thai love their nation more than their lives.
2. The Thai are excellent warriors.
3. The Thai are good to their friends and bad to their enemies.
4. The Thai love Buddhism more than their lives.
5. The Thai are sincere.
6. The Thai are peace-loving.
7. The Thai are grateful.
8. The Thai are industrious.
9. The Thai are an agricultural people who grow their own food.
10. The Thai bequeath good things to their children.
11. The Thai enjoy a good life.
12. The Thai are well dressed.
13. The Thai have respect for children, women, and the aged.
14. The Thai are united and follow their leader.

This code was immediately abolished on September 18, 1944, when the new civilian government came to power.

Japan's concept of a New Order in Asia and its slogan of Asia for the Asians were certainly attractive to many Siamese leaders. In working with the Japanese these leaders believed that they could stand together as equal partners in overthrowing Western domination in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government took a number of actions which seemed to confirm this belief. Japan was the first nation to raise diplomatic relations with Siam from ministerial to ambassadorial level. This move was psychologically extremely important and helped convince many Siamese leaders that only Asians would be willing to recognize the equal status of other Asians. For although Siam remained independent throughout its history, virtually all Siamese leaders felt that in relations with the West their country was regarded and treated as a "second class" nation. The fact that all Siam's diplomatic relations with the rest of the world were conducted at the ministerial level was deeply resented as a sign of international discrimination.

Another example of Japan's skilled diplomacy was the cultural agreement signed on October 28, 1942. The agreement was to confirm the two nations' mutual respect for each other's culture and to promote better understanding between the two peoples. This agreement was considered a major diplomatic success by Siamese leaders who interpreted it as meaning that a world power finally recognized Siam's culture.<sup>66</sup> They were very conscious that such a recognition had never been forthcoming from the West.<sup>67</sup>

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65) Ambassadorial relations were established on September 2, 1941.

66) At least three agreements were officially signed by Siam and Japan during this period. These three agreements were:

1. A Pact of Alliance between Thailand and Japan, signed on December 21, 1941.
2. An agreement between Thailand and Japan concerning culture, signed on October 28, 1942.
3. A treaty between Thailand and Japan concerning Thai territories in Malaya and the Shan States, signed on August 20, 1943. See Appendix IV.

67) It should be remembered that in the world of the 1930s there were very few independent African and Asian nations and their position was often uncomfortable and marginal. Although Siam was one of the original members of the League of Nations, it was an organization so dominated by Europeans and their interests, that it is understandable that the Siamese delegates were on better terms with the Japanese than with the Westerners.

In its proposed New Order for Asia from which the West would be excluded, Japan appeared to offer Siam an important and respected place. Indeed as a result of the Japanese role in the Indochina border crisis, many Siamese leaders believed that in the New Order their country would naturally assume the position of "champion nation" in mainland Southeast Asia. The war-time Siamese government expected that, if France finally collapsed and lost control in Indochina, Laos and Cambodia would be returned to Siam.<sup>68</sup> It seems that Phibun foresaw no political change in Indochina once Western influence was destroyed. In spite of his own strong nationalism, he did not envisage nationalist independence movements emerging in these areas directed as much against Siamese as French domination.<sup>69</sup> For the Siamese government, especially the military men, the political change envisaged in Southeast Asia meant simply the eviction of the West and the restoration of the power of Old Siam which had once held sway over large areas of mainland Southeast Asia. In many respects Phibun's policy can be seen as a revival of the traditional policy of the early Bangkok kings — attempting to exert Siamese imperial control over Laos and Cambodia with a sphere of influence in the Shan States and northern Malaya.

On the strength of the military pact with the Japanese, Phibun began to carry out the second stage of his expansion plans. In May, 1942, Siamese troops marched into the Shan States and occupied the area around the old city of Kengtung. By the treaty of August 20, 1943,

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68) This was stated in a Siamese message to the French government on September 13, 1940. Sang, *Suk., op. cit.*, p. 204.

69) The ideology of the Siamese military was somewhat different from that of the civilians in this respect. It has been suggested by many scholars that the civilians foresaw independence movements among the colonized Southeast Asians and were willing to work co-operatively with these new forces. The Free Siamese Movement, led by civilians, was almost certainly in contact with the nationalist organizations of both Ho Chi Minh and of Prince Souphanouvong in Laos. Keyes states that "Pridi and his followers were anxious to have Thailand associate with, and perhaps even lead, the national forces which were beginning to appear in Indonesia, Burma, and Indochina." See Keyes, *Isan, op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

Japan recognized Siam's suzerainty over the Kengtung area. As a result of these military operations Phibun could claim that for the first time in Siamese history Bangkok had established its control over the Shan States, whose population was of the same race as the Siamese. On three separate occasions, in 1850, 1853 and 1854, the early Bangkok kings had attempted to achieve this, but had never succeeded.<sup>70</sup> The Phibun government naturally took great pride in attaining the historic objective of its predecessors.

Phibun could also claim that his diplomacy had brought the Malay states once again under Bangkok's authority, since the treaty of August 20, 1943, also turned over the administration of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu to the Siamese.<sup>71</sup> Thus the government's decision to join forces with Japan had resulted in the restoration of the power and glory of Old Siam.

Siam's voluntary participation in the New Order was ultimately based on a perceived complementarity of interest between Bangkok and Tokyo and a common desire to eliminate Western influence in Southeast Asia. On one side, Japan accepted Siam as the leading nation in mainland Southeast Asia. It not only respected Siamese integrity and independence, but also encouraged and supported Siam's territorial expansion. By so doing Japan hoped that Siam would maintain peace and order in important areas of Malaya and Indochina, which, as major producers of tin and rubber, formed the very heart of the Co-Prosperity

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70) Sang, *Suk., op. cit.*, p. 258.

71) It should be noted that Siamese troops did not enter Malaya as they did the Shan States. Actually the return of the Malay states was initiated by Tojo as a compliment to Siam for joining the New Order. The Japanese Premier came on a two-day semi-secret mission to Bangkok in July, 1943. The result of the meeting between Tojo and Phibun was the treaty of August 20, 1943 by which Japan accepted Siamese suzerainty over the Shan States and northern Malaya. Back in Japan Tojo was criticized for handing over the Malay states to Siam, since it was in conflict with Japanese anti-colonial propaganda. Sang, *Khivannuk., op. cit.*, p. 453.

Sphere.<sup>72</sup> In return, the Siamese government agreed to accept Japan's leadership of the New Order in Asia and demonstrated this formally by recognizing Japanese-controlled puppet governments in China and Manchukuo.<sup>73</sup>

### The Fall of Phibun

The fall of the Phibun regime was closely connected with the decline of Japan. Two days after Tojo resigned as Premier, on July 20, 1944, the Siamese Assembly turned on Phibun and voted down his proposed plan to move the capital from Bangkok to a malaria-infested area in the north. It is now believed that Phibun foresaw an Allied invasion of Siam and decided to make a last stand by moving the capital away from the sea so that Siam could fight from a strong base in the hinterland. By this time, however, many civilian members of the elite, together with the elected Assemblymen, believed that Siam would do better to negotiate with the Allies, particularly since the Free Siamese Movement was now a functioning force both at home and abroad.

At this juncture Phibun had to decide whether he would resign or dissolve the Assembly and hold new elections. It is probable that Phibun did not want new elections since his critics among the elected members would certainly be returned by their constituents. Furthermore, he seems to have been so convinced of his own power and indispensability that he was confident his resignation would never be accepted as final by the Board of Regents. He therefore submitted his resignation, expecting to be called on immediately to form a new cabinet. Unluckily for Phibun, one member of the Board of Regents, Pridi, was the leader of the underground Free Siamese Movement and, thanks to his influence, the resignation was accepted as final. Phibun then had no other course open to him

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72) Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

73) Siam recognized the governments of Manchukuo and China (Nanking) on August 8, 1941 and July 8, 1942, respectively. Later on, the Siamese government recognized the German-sponsored puppet governments of Croatia (April 30, 1943) and Slovakia (May 8, 1943). Wanwaithayakon, prince, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

but to retire. The civilians with their Free Siamese Movement and the support of the Assembly formed a new government to await the arrival of the Allies.

## Conclusion


What conclusions can be drawn from this study of Siamese politics during the first Phibun regime?

In the first place, it is clear that Siam's pro-Japanese foreign policy during this period was inextricably rooted in its internal politics. The political instability which resulted from the intense struggle for power after the 1932 coup convinced key members of the dominant military faction of the new elite that the maintenance of internal order and their own tenure of power required the mobilization of popular nationalism and the crushing of all opposition. For this type of politics, post-Meiji Japan provided an excellent model. In addition, Japan and Siam shared a common interest in destroying Western power in Southeast Asia and replacing it with their own. Accordingly, a pro-Japanese foreign policy seemed eminently sensible to Phibun and his associates. It cannot be denied that for a while at least the policy helped the Siamese government to develop a very strong internal and external position. Nonetheless, undue reliance on one external power during a time of world crisis inevitably made the maintenance of this position highly dependent on the fortunes of that power. When Japan's power began to decline, the Siamese government could not avoid being seriously affected.


Secondly, the ruthless measures taken by the government in pursuing both internal and external policies created fundamental cleavages within the post-coup elite which were never subsequently to be bridged. The Phibun government's alliance with Japan was possibly the single most important cause of this cleavage. In 1932, the coup group had faced a common adversary in the absolute monarchy. Subsequently, however, there was growing lack of unanimity on basic policies. Some members of the elite, especially the civilians, did not consider that the Allies or the Western powers were permanent enemies of the country. They saw

no reason, therefore, why Siam should commit itself totally to the implacable enemy of the Allies. And such commitment would only bring down on Siam the concerted hostility of two or three imperial powers. For a country in Siam's position, total commitment to any one power was a major mistake. One friend gained would mean at least two enemies created.


The Phibun government erred in trying to revive Old Siam by military means, with too much reliance on external support and without any understanding of the new nationalism growing in other parts of Southeast Asia besides Siam.



MAP I.



MAP II.



MAP III.

## APPENDIX I

### Convention De Paix Entre La France Et La Thaïlande

Le Chef de l'Etat Français et Sa Majesté le Roi de Thaïlande,  
ayant accepté la médiation du Gouvernement du Japon en vue  
d'apporter un règlement final au conflit armé survenu à la frontière de  
l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande,

reconnaissant la nécessité de procéder au rajustement de la fron-  
tière actuelle de l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande, en vue de  
prévenir le retour de conflits à cette frontière, et de s'entendre sur les  
moyens de maintenir la tranquillité dans la zone frontière,

désireux de rétablir pleinement les traditionnelles relations d'amitié  
entre la France et la Thaïlande,

ont décidé, à cet effet, de conclure une Convention et ont nommé  
pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

le chef de l'Etat Français :

M. Charles Arsène-Henry, Ambassadeur

extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de France au Japon;

M. René Robin, Gouverneur Général Honoraire des Colonies; et

Sa Majesté le Roi de Thaïlande :

Son Altesse le Prince Varnvaidyakara, Conseiller de la

Présidence du Conseil et du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères;

Phya Sri Sena, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipoten-  
tiaire de S. M. le Roi de Thaïlande au Japon;

M. le Colonel Phra Silpa Sastrakom, Chef de l'Etat Major  
Général de la Thaïlande;

Nai Vanich Panananda, Directeur du Département du Com-  
merce;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés  
en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

## ARTICLE 1.

Les relations amicales sont rétablies entre la France et la Thaïlande sur la base fondamentale du Traité d'Amitié de Commerce et de Navigation du 7 décembre 1937.

En conséquence, des négociations diplomatiques directes seront engagées dans le plus bref délai à Bangkok pour la liquidation de toutes les questions pendantes résultant du conflit.

## ARTICLE 2.

La frontière entre l'Indochine Française et la Thaïlande sera rajustée ainsi qu'il suit :

En partant du nord, la frontière suivra le fleuve Mékong depuis le point de jonction des frontières de l'Indochine Française, de la Thaïlande et de la Birmanie, jusqu'au point où le Mekong coupe le parallèle du quinzième grade. (Carte du Service Géographique de l'Indochine-Echelle de 1 : 500.000).

Dans toute cette partie, la frontière sera constituée par la ligne médiane du chenal de navigation principal. Toute-fois, il est expressément convenu que l'île de Khong restera territoire de l'Indochine Française, tandis que l'île de Khone sera attribuée à la Thaïlande.

La frontière suivra ensuite, vers l'ouest, le parallèle du quinzième grande puis, vers le sud, le méridien qui passe par le point d'aboutissement au Grand Lac de la limite actuelle des provinces de Siemréap et de Battambang (embouchure du Stung Kombot).

Dans toute cette partie, la Commission de délimitation prévue à l'article 4 s'efforcera, s'il y a lieu, de rattacher la frontière à des lignes naturelles ou à des limites administratives, voisines du tracé défini cidessus, de manière à éviter, dans la mesure du possible, des difficultés pratiques ultérieures.

Sur le Grand Lac, la frontière sera constituée par un arc de cercle de vingt kilomètres de rayon joignant le point d'aboutissement au Grand Lac de la limite actuelle des provinces de Siemréap et de Battambang (embouchure du Stung Kombot) au point d'aboutissement au Grand Lac

de la limite actuelle des provinces de Battambang et de Pursat (embouchure du Stung Dontri).

Dans toute l'étendue du Grand Lac, la navigation et la pêche seront libres pour les ressortissants des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, sous réserve du respect des installations fixes de pêche établies le long du rivage. Il est entendu que, dans cet esprit, les Hautes Parties Contractantes élaboreront, dans le plus bref délai, une réglementation commune de la police, de la navigation et de la pêche sur les eaux du Grand Lac.

A partir de l'embouchure du Stung Dontri, la nouvelle frontière suivra, en direction du sud-ouest, l'actuelle limite des provinces de Battambang et de Pursat, jusqu'au point de rencontre de cette limite avec la frontière actuelle de l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande (Khao Koup) qu'elle suivra ensuite sans modification jusqu'à la mer.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Les territoires compris entre la frontière actuelle de l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande et la nouvelle ligne frontière définie à l'article 2, seront évacués et transférés conformément aux modalités prévues au protocole annexé à la présente Convention (Annexe I).

#### ARTICLE 4.

Les travaux de délimitation de la frontière de l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande, telle qu'elle est définie à l'article 2, seront effectués, tant en ce qui concerne la partie terrestre que la partie fluviale de cette frontière, par une Commission de délimitation qui sera constituée dans la semaine suivant la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention et qui achèvera ses travaux dans le délai d'un an.

La constitution et le fonctionnement de ladite Commission font l'objet du Protocole annexé à la présente Convention (Annex II).

#### ARTICLE 5.

Les territoires cédés seront incorporés à la Thaïlande sous les conditions suivantes :

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Les territoires cédés seront incorporés à la Thaïlande sous les conditions suivantes :

1. Ils seront démilitarisés dans toute leur étendue, à l'exception des territoires limitrophes du Mékong, faisant antérieurement partie du Laos français.

2. En ce qui concerne l'entrée, l'établissement et les entreprises, les ressortissants français (citoyens, sujets et protégés français) jouiront, dans toute l'étendue de ces territoires, d'un traitement absolument égal à celui qui sera accordé aux nationaux de la Thaïlande.

Il est entendu que, en ce qui concerne les ressortissants français, les droits acquis résultant des concessions, affermagés et permis obtenus à la date du 11 mars 1941, seront respectés sur toute l'étendue des territoires cédés.

3. Le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande assurera plein respect aux tombeaux royaux qui se trouvent sur la rive droite du Mékong en face de Luang Prabang et donnera toutes facilités à la Famille Royale de Luang Prabang et aux fonctionnaires de la Cour, pour la conservation et la visite de ces tombeaux.

#### ARTICLE 6.

Dans les conditions prévues au Protocole annexé à la présente Convention (Annexe III), les principes suivants seront appliqués à la zone demilitarisée établie en vertu du point 1<sup>o</sup> de l'article précédent :

1. Dans la zone démilitarisée, la Thaïlande ne pourra entretenir d'autres forces armées que les forces de police nécessaires au maintien de la sûreté et de l'ordre public.

Néanmoins, la Thaïlande se réserve le droit de renforcer momentanément ses forces de police dans la mesure où des opérations de police extraordinaires le rendraient nécessaire. Elle se réserve également la faculté d'effectuer sur son territoire, à travers la zone démilitarisée, les transports, de troupes et de matériel qu'exigeraient des opérations de police dans les circonscriptions voisines ou des opérations militaires contre de tierces Puissances.

Enfin, dans la zone démilitarisée, la Thaïlande sera autorisée à faire stationner en tout temps, des aéronefs militaires non armés.

2. Il ne pourra exister dans la zone démilitarisée ni places fortes, ni établissements militaires, ni aérodomes à l'usage exclusif de l'armée, ni dépôts d'armes, de munitions ou de matériel de guerre, à l'exception des dépôts de matériel courant et de combustible nécessaires aux aéronefs militaires non armés.

Les divers casernements des forces de police pourront comporter l'organisation défensive normalement nécessaire à leur sécurité.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d'accord pour supprimer les zones démilitarisées existant de part et d'autre du Mékong sur la partie du cours de ce fleuve où il forme la frontière entre le Laos français et la Thaïlande.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Dés que le transfert de la souveraineté sur les territoires cédés à la Thaïlande sera définitif, la nationalité de la Thaïlande sera acquise de plein droit par les ressortissants français établis sur ces territoires.

Toutefois, dans l'année qui suivra le transfert définitif de la souveraineté, les ressortissants français auront la faculté d'opter pour la nationalité française.

Cette option s'exercera de la manière suivante :

1. en ce qui concerne les citoyens français, par une déclaration faite devant l'autorité administrative compétente.
2. en ce qui concerne les sujets et protégés français, par un transfert de domicile en territoire français.

Aucun obstacle ne sera apporté par la Thaïlande, quelle qu'en soit la raison, à l'évacuation ou au retour éventuel de ces sujets et protégés français. En particulier, ils pourront, avant leur départ, disposer librement de leurs biens mobiliers et immobiliers. Ils auront la faculté d'emporter avec eux ou de faire transporter, en franchise douanière, leurs biens mobiliers de toute nature, bétail, produits agricoles, monnaies ou billets de banque. En tout état de cause, ils pourront conserver, sur les territoires incorporés à la Thaïlande, la propriété de leurs biens immobiliers.

## ARTICLE 9.

La France et la Thaïlande sont d'accord pour renoncer définitivement à toute prétention d'ordre financier, d'Etat à Etat, résultant du transfert de territoires prévu à l'article 2, moyennant le paiement, par la Thaïlande à la France, d'une somme de six millions de piastres indochinoises. Le paiement de cette somme sera réparti, par tranches égales, sur six années à compter de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention.

Pour assurer l'application du paragraphe précédent, ainsi que pour régler toutes questions monétaires et de transfert de valeurs que peuvent poser les cessions de territoires faisant l'objet de la présente Convention, les administrations compétentes de l'Indochine Française et de la Thaïlande entreront en négociations dans le plus bref délai.

## ARTICLE 10.

Tout conflit pouvant surgir entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application des dispositions de la présente Convention sera résolu amiablement par la voie diplomatique.

Si le conflit ne peut être ainsi résolu, il sera soumis à la médiation du Gouvernement du Japon.

## ARTICLE 11.

Toutes dispositions des Traités, Conventions et Accords existant entre la France et la Thaïlande, qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec les dispositions de la présente Convention, sont et demeurent maintenues en vigueur.

## ARTICLE 12.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Tokyo dans les deux mois suivant la date de sa signature. Le Gouvernement Français pourra, le cas échéant, substituer à son instrument de ratification une notification écrite de ratification; dans ce cas, le Gouvernement Français enverra son instrument de ratification au Gouvernement de la Thaïlande aussitôt que faire se pourra.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur le jour de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente Convention et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait en triple exemplaire, en langues française, japonaise et thaïe, à Tokyo, le neuf mai mil neuf cent quarante et un, correspondant au neuvième jour du cinquième mois de la seizième année de Syowa, et au neuvième jour du cinquième mois de la deux mille quatre cent-quatre-vingt-quatrième année de l'ère bouddhique.

## APPENDIX II

**Protocole entre la Thaïlande et le Japon concernant  
la garantie et l'entente politique**

Le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande et le Gouvernement du Japon, également desireux de maintenir la paix en Asie Orientale, s'inspirant de l'esprit pacifique et amical qui a présidé à l'établissement du traité du 12 juin 1940, et également animés du désir sincère de persister dans cette voie,

soucieux d'assurer la stabilisation des relations amicales qui viennent d'être rétablies entre la Thaïlande et la France, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

1. Le Gouvernement du Japon garantit au Gouvernement de la Thaïlande le caractère définitif et irrévocable du règlement du conflit entre la Thaïlande et la France, tel qu'il résulte, a la suite de la médiation du Gouvernement du Japon, de la Convention de Paix entre la Thaïlande et la France du 9 mai 1941 et des documents y annexés.

2. Le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande accepte la garantie susmentionnée du Gouvernement du Japon. Il s'emploiera au maintien de la paix en Asie Orientale, et en particulier à l'établissement de rapports amicaux de bon voisinage, ainsi qu'au développement des relations économiques étroites entre la Thaïlande et le Japon.

Le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande déclare en outre qu'il n'entend contracter aucun accord ou entente avec une tierce Puissance, prévoyant une coopération politique, économique ou militaire de nature à l'opposer directement ou indirectement au Japon.

3. Le présent Protocole sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Tokyo dans les deux mois suivant la date de sa signature.

Le présent Protocole entrera en vigueur le jour de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi, les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernement respectifs, ont signé le présent Protocole et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait en double exemplaire, en langues thaïe et japonaise, à Tokyo, le neuvième jour du cinquième mois de la deux mille quatre cent quatre-vingt-quatrième année de l'ère bouddhique, correspondant au neuvième jour du cinquième mois de la seizième année de Syowa.

### APPENDIX III

#### **Royal Proclamation issued by the Regent of Thailand in the name of King Ananda Mahidol on August 16, 1945**

“Whereas Thailand has pursued a fixed policy of maintaining strict neutrality and of combatting foreign aggression by all means, as is clearly evidenced from the enactment in B.E. 2484 (1941) of the Law ‘Defining the Duties of Thais in Time of War,’ this fixed determination was made clear when Japan moved her forces in Thai territory on the 8th, December, 2484 (1941), by acts combatting aggression everywhere, and numerous soldiers, police, and civilians lost their lives thereby.”

“This circumstance, which stands as evidence in itself, shows clearly that the declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States of America on the 25th, January, 2485 (1942), as well as all acts adverse to the United Nations, are acts contrary to the will of the Thai people and constitute an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the land. The Thai people inside as well as outside the country, who were in a position to help and support the United Nations who are lovers of peace in this world, have taken action by every means to assist the United Nations as most of the United Nations are already aware. This shows once again that the will of the Thai people does not approve of the declaration of war and of acts adverse to the United Nations as already mentioned.”

“Now that Japan has agreed to comply with the declaration of the United States of America, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union which was made at Potsdam, peace is restored to Thailand as is the wish of the Thai people.”

“The Regent, in the name of His Majesty the King, hereby openly proclaims on behalf of the Thai people that the declaration of war on the United States of America and Great Britain is null and void and not binding on the Thai people as far as the United Nations are concerned. Thailand has resolved that the good friendly relations existing with the United Nations prior to the 8th, December, B.C. 2484 (1941), shall be

restored and Thailand is ready to co-operate fully in every way with the United Nations in the establishment of stability of the world.

“As for the territories the occupancy of which Japan entrusted to Thailand, namely the States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Perlis Kengtung, and Muang Phan, Thailand has no desire for the territories and is ready to arrange for their delivery as soon as Great Britain is ready to take delivery thereof.”

“As for any other provisions of the law having effects adverse to the United States of America, Great Britain, and the British Empire, their repeal shall be considered hereafter. All damages of any kind resulting from those laws will be legitimately made good.”

“In conclusion, all the Thai people, as well as aliens who are in the Thai Kingdom, are requested to remain in tranquility and not to commit any act which will constitute a disturbance of public order. They should hold steadfastly to the ideals which have been laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations at San Francisco.”

## APPENDIX IV

### **Pacte d'Alliance entre le Japon et la Thaïlande December 21, 1941**

Le Gouvernement Impérial du Japon et le Gouvernement Royal de la Thaïlande, fermement convaincus que l'établissement du nouvel ordre dans l'Asie Orientale est le seul moyen de réaliser la prospérité dans cette sphère et la condition indispensable au redressement et renforcement de la paix mondiale, et animés de la volonté ferme et irréductible d'éliminer à fond toutes les mauvaises influences faisant obstacle à ce but, sont convenus des articles suivants :

#### ARTICLE 1.

Une alliance est établie par le Japon et la Thaïlande entre eux sur la base du respect mutuel de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Au cas où le Japon ou la Thaïlande se trouvera dans le conflit armé vis-à-vis d'une ou de plusieurs tierces Puissances, la Thaïlande ou le Japon se rangera immédiatement du côté de l'autre comme son allié et lui prêtera l'aide avec tous ses moyens politique, économique et militaire.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Les détails relatifs à l'exécution de l'article 2 seront déterminés, d'un commun accord, entre les autorités compétentes du Japon et de la Thaïlande.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Le Japon et la Thaïlande, en cas de guerre poursuivie en commun, s'engagent à ne conclure ni l'armistice ni la paix que par le commun accord complet.

#### ARTICLE 5.

Le présent Pacte entrera en vigueur dès sa signature. Il aura une durée de dix ans. Les deux parties se consulteront au sujet du renouvellement du présent Pacte au moment convenable avant l'expiration de ladite durée.

En foi de quoi, les soussignés dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont signé le présent Pacte et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait en double exemplaire, à Bangkok, le vingt-et-unième jour du douzième mois, de la seizième année de Syōwa, correspondant au vingt-et-unième jour du douzième mois de la deux mille quatre cent quatre-vingt quatrième année de l'ère bouddhique.

*L'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et*

*Plénipotentiaire du Japon.*

TEIJI TSUBOKAMI (L.S.)

*Le Président du Conseil des Ministres*

*et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères*

*de la Thaïlande.*

P. PIBULASONGGRAM (L.S.)

# ความตกลงทางวัฒนธรรมระหว่างประเทศไทยกับประเทศญี่ปุ่น

สมเด็จพระมหากษัตริ์แห่งประเทศไทย

และ

สมเด็จพระจักรพรรดิแห่งญี่ปุ่น

มีพระราชประสงค์ที่จะทำความพยายาม ในอันจะเกื้อกูลการจิตใจ วัฒนธรรมของเอเชียตะวันออก และในเวลาเดียวกัน ยังความสัมพันธทางไมตรี ซึ่งมีอยู่โดยมาตุกระหว่างประเทศทั้งสอง ให้มั่นคงแข็งแรงยิ่งขึ้น โดยส่งเสริมความสัมพันธทางวัฒนธรรมระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองยิ่งขึ้นไป ด้วยต่างฝ่ายต่างเคารพลักษณะประจำสภาพวัฒนธรรมแห่งประเทศของตนและกัน และร่วมมือกันโดยสันติชนม

จึงได้ตกลงทำความตกลงทางวัฒนธรรมเพื่อการนี้ และได้แต่งตั้งผู้มีอำนาจเต็มของแต่ละฝ่าย กล่าวคือ

ฝ่ายสมเด็จพระมหากษัตริ์แห่งประเทศไทย

นายดิเรก ชัยนาม เอกอัครราชทูตพิเศษผู้มีอำนาจเต็ม ประจำพระราชสำนักแห่งสมเด็จพระจักรพรรดิญี่ปุ่น

ฝ่ายสมเด็จพระจักรพรรดิแห่งญี่ปุ่น

มาชายกิ ตานี รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงการต่างประเทศแห่งสมเด็จพระจักรพรรดิญี่ปุ่น

ผู้ซึ่ง เมื่อได้ส่งหนังสือมอบอำนาจเต็มของแต่ละฝ่ายให้แก่กันและกัน และได้ตรวจเห็นว่าเป็นไปตามแบบที่ตีและถูกต้องแล้ว ได้ทำความตกลงกันเป็นข้อ ๆ ดังต่อไปนี้ :

## ข้อ ๑.

อภิกษุผู้ทำสัตตบพาลจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะยังความรู้และความเข้าใจซึ่งกันและกันระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองให้ซาบซึ้งยิ่งขึ้น โดยจัดให้รากลานแห่งความสัมพันธ์ทางวัฒนธรรมระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองมั่นคงแข็งแรง และเพื่อการนี้ จะได้ร่วมมือกันโดยสนิทสนมยิ่งในแผนการวัฒนธรรมทั้งปวง

## ข้อ ๒.

อภิกษุผู้ทำสัตตบพาลจะได้จัดให้มีการประชุมทางวัฒนธรรมเป็นครั้งคราว เพื่ออภิปรายกันเกี่ยวกับการก้าวหน้า และการคลี่คลายแห่งวัฒนธรรมของประเทศทั้งสองและจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะอำนวยความสะดวกให้แก่การประชุมที่จัดขึ้นเพื่อการดังกล่าว

## ข้อ ๓.

อภิกษุผู้ทำสัตตบพาลจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะจัดตั้ง บำรุงรักษา และคลี่คลายสถานการณ์ซึ่งเกื้อกูลความสัมพันธ์ทางวัฒนธรรมระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองให้เพิ่มพูนยิ่งขึ้น และต่างฝ่ายจะได้อำนวยความสะดวกทุกทางที่สามารถจะทำได้เกี่ยวกับการนี้

สถานการณ์ที่กล่าวถึงในวิสัยข้างต้นนั้น จะได้รวมถึงองค์การวิทยาศาสตร์และองค์การอื่น ๆ ในทางวัฒนธรรม บันดิทสถาน หอสมุด พิพิธภัณฑ์สถาน สถานการศึกษา และสถานการสุขภาพสงเคราะห์

## ข้อ ๔.

อภิกษุผู้ทำสัตตบพาลแต่ละฝ่ายจะได้ให้ข้อคำนึงโดยเฉพาะแก่การจัดตั้ง บำรุงรักษา และคลี่คลายตำแหน่งศาสตราจารย์ในวิชาวัฒนธรรมของอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง ในมหาวิทยาลัยแห่งประเทศของตน

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาแต่ละฝ่ายจะไดให้ข้อค้ำนึ่งโดยฉพะพะแก่การสอน  
ภษษของอัครฝ่ายหนึ่งนีสถำนการศึกษต้างๆที่เหมาระสมนในประเทศของตน

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดให้ข้อค้ำนึ่งโดยฉพะพะแก่การแลกเปลี่ยน  
เปนครังคราว การส่ง หรือเชินสตรจารย์ บันคิต และผู้เชียวชาญพิเสส  
เพื่อสแดงปาดกถา หรือค้ำบรยายนเืองวัธนธัมของประเทสทงสอง

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมา ต้างฝ่ายจะไดอำนาจควมสควทททุกทงที่สมำถ  
จะทำได้ เพื่อการปฏิบัติตามบทบัญญัติแห่งวัคสมำวัคข้ำงต้น

### ข้อ ๕.

ด้วยควมตกลงพร้อมกัน อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดทำการแลกเปลี่ยน  
เปนครังคราว และทำการส่ง หรือเชินผู้ทงำนคนันควำ นักศึกษ และ  
นักเรียน เพื่อศึกษวัธนธัมของประเทสทงสอง

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดทำควมพยายามนอันจะแลกเปลี่ยน ส่ง  
หรือเชินนักศึกษปฏิบัติ และผู้เข้ำศึกษกะบวณวิชากำหนดภคิสัน

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมา ต้างฝ่ายจะไดอำนาจควมสควทททุกทงที่สมำถ  
จะทำได้ เพื่อการปฏิบัติตามบทบัญญัติแห่งวัคสองวัคข้ำงต้น และจะไดให้  
ข้อค้ำนึ่งแก่การจัดตงทุนเล่าเรียน

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาแต่ละฝ่ายจะไดอำนาจควมสควทเช่นเตียวกัน  
แก่บันคิตและผู้เชียวชาญพิเสสของอัครฝ่ายหนึ่ง ซึ่งมาเพื่อศึกษวัธนธัมแห่ง  
ประเทศของตน

### ข้อ ๖.

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดส่งเสริมกิจการของนักประพันธ์ ศิลปิน และ  
นักภษษน ซึ่งจะพิจารณำเห็นว่าเป็นการเกอกุลควมสัมพันธ์ทงวัธนธัม

ระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองให้มั่นคงแข็งแรง และจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะแลกเปลี่ยน สิ่ง หรือเงินบุคคลดังกล่าว

อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาจะได้ส่งเสริม การสแดงบทละคอน การพ่อนรำ และดนตรี ซึ่งจะได้พิจารณาเห็นว่าเป็นการเกื้อกูลความสัมพันธ์ทางวัฒนธรรมระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองให้มั่นคงแข็งแรง และจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะแลกเปลี่ยน สิ่ง หรือเงินบุคคล และคณะบุคคลที่ประกอบารสแดงนั้น ๆ

### ข้อ ๗.

อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาแต่ละฝ่ายจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะจัดส่งสิ่งซึ่งจะกล่าวต่อไป ให้แก่อีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง เป็นจำนวนมาก และบ่อยครั้งที่สุกเท่าที่สามารถทำได้ คือ สารโคสนา ฟิล์มภาพยนตร์ กระจกฉายภาพ รูปถ่าย แผ่นเสียง และบทดนตรีแห่งประเทศของตน ซึ่งจะได้พิจารณาเห็นว่าเป็นการเกื้อกูลให้ความรู้ และความเข้าใจซึ่งกันและกันระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองชาวบังษังขึ้น และอีกฝ่ายหนึ่งจะได้ให้ข้อคำนึงเป็นพิเศษแก่การเก็บรักษา แจกจ่าย นำออกสแดง และสแดงพิพิธภัณฑ เพื่อสิ่งเหล่านี้จะได้ใช้ประโยชน์ให้ประสิทธิผลในประเทศของตน

อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาได้แลกเปลี่ยนฉบับชีวารโคสนา และสติปกัมของประเทศแต่ละฝ่าย ซึ่งพิจารณาเห็นว่ามีค่าสมควรมที่จะนำเข้ามาในประเทศของอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง และจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะนำเข้ามา และเผยแพร่สิ่งเหล่านี้โดยทางที่เหมาะสม

อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะเสนอความเอื้อเฟื้อและอำนวยความสะดวกช่วยเหลือที่จำเป็นในการแปล และถอดแบบสารโคสนา และสติปกัมที่กล่าวข้างต้น

อัครภคินีผู้ทำสัตมาแต่ละฝ่ายจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะเพิ่มพูนการรวบรวมสมฤต และพิพิธภัณฑเกี่ยวกับอีกฝ่ายหนึ่งไว้ในหอสมฤต และพิพิธภัณฑสถานในประเทศของตน และจะได้อำนวยความสะดวกทุกทางที่สามารถจะทำได้ แก่คนชาติของอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง เกี่ยวกับการใช้ประโยชน์จากสถานการเหล่านี้

ข้อ ๘.

อัครภคินีผู้ทำสัตมาจะได้จัดให้มีการสแดงพิพิธภัณฑเป็นครั้งคราว เพื่อให้ความรู้ และความเข้าใจซึ่งกันและกันและกันชาวซึ่งยังขึ้นในทางวิทยาศาสตร์ วิจารณ์ศิลปะ และอุตสาหกรรมศิลปะแห่งประเทศทั้งสอง และจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะเสนอความเอื้อเฟื้อ และอำนวยความสะดวกช่วยเหลือที่จำเป็นในการจัดให้มีการสแดงพิพิธภัณฑ เพื่อประโยชน์ที่กล่าวแล้ว

ข้อ ๙.

อัครภคินีผู้ทำสัตมาแต่ละฝ่ายจะได้ให้องค์การวิทยุกระจายเสียงแห่งประเทศของตน กระจายเสียงเป็นครั้งคราวไปยังอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง และจะได้ให้องค์การเหล่านี้ ถ่ายทอดการกระจายเสียงเป็นครั้งคราวจากอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง

อัครภคินีผู้ทำสัตมาแต่ละฝ่าย จะได้ให้องค์การวิทยุกระจายเสียงแห่งประเทศของตนกระจายเสียงปาถกถา บทละครอน ดนตรี ฯลฯ เกี่ยวกับวัฒนธรรมของอีกฝ่ายหนึ่งเป็นครั้งคราว

ข้อ ๑๐.

อัครภคินีผู้ทำสัตมาจะได้ทำความพยายามในอันจะแลกเปลี่ยน ส่งหรือขึ้นคนะยุวชน และนักกรีทา และชุดนักกีฬา เพื่อให้การติดต่ออันมิตรระหว่างคนชาติแห่งประเทศทั้งสองมั่นคงแข็งแรง

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดัทำคความพยายามในอันจะแลกเปลี่ยน ส่งหรือเชินคนะนักท่องเที้ยว และคนะเดินทางเพื่อกการสิคสา ทงนั เพื่อให้คความรูั และคความเข้าใจซึ่งกันและกันแห่งประเทศทงสองชาบซังยังชน

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมา ต่างฝ่ายจะไดัอำนาจคความสคคททททางที่สามาคจะทำได้ เพื่อกการปฏิบัติตามบทบัญญัติแห่งวัคสองวัคข้างตั้น

### ข้อ ๑๑.

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดัทำคความพยายามในอันจะจัดตั้งสถานวัชนธัมขันในนครหลวงของกันและกัน เพื่อกกอลคความสัมพันธ์ทางวัชนธัมระหว่างประเทศทงสองให้มันคกแข็งแรง และต่างฝ่ายจะไดัอำนาจคความสคคททททางที่สามาคจะทำได้ ให้แกกกิจการแห่งสถานวัชนธัมที่กล่าวแล้ว

### ข้อ ๑๒.

อัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดัจัดตั้งคนะกัมการร่วมมือทางวัชนธัมขัน ณ กรุงเทพ ฯ และโตเกี้ยว แล้วแต่กรนั เพื่อกการติดต่อระหว่างประเทศทงสองเกี่ยวกับการปฏิบัติตามบทบัญญัติแห่งคความคคคทงนั

เจ้าหน้าทีการทูตแห่งอัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดักำหนดรายละเอียตเกี่ยวกับการจัดอ้งคการ และการดำเนิงงานของคนะกัมการนั ด้วยคความคคคทงพร้อมกัน

### ข้อ ๑๓.

เจ้าหน้าทีการทูตแห่งอัครภคิผู้ทำสัตตมาจะไดักำหนดรายละเอียตเกี่ยวกับการปฏิบัติตามบทบัญญัติแห่งคความคคคทงนั ด้วยคความคคคทงพร้อมกัน

ข้อ ๑๔.

ความตกลงนี้จะได้รับสัตยาบัน และสัตยาบันทั้งสองฝ่ายจะได้แลกเปลี่ยนกัน ณ กรุงเทพร โดยเร็วที่สุดที่จะเป็นไปได้

ความตกลงนี้จะเริ่มใช้ในวันแลกเปลี่ยนสัตยาบัน และให้คงใช้อยู่เป็นเวลาสิบปีนับแต่วันที่แลกเปลี่ยนนั้น ในกรณีที่อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาฝ่ายหนึ่งฝ่ายใดมิได้บอกกล่าวแก่อีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง หนึ่งปีก่อนสิ้นกำหนดสิบปีดังกล่าวแล้ว ถึงเจตนาของตนที่จะเลิกความตกลงนี้ ก็ให้คงใช้หยู่ต่อไปจนกว่าจะสิ้นกำหนดหนึ่งปี นับแต่วันที่อัครราชทูตผู้ทำสัญญาฝ่ายหนึ่งฝ่ายใดจะได้บอกกล่าวเช่นนั้น

เพื่อเป็นพยานแก่การนี้ ผู้มีอำนาจเต็มแต่ละฝ่าย ได้ลงชื่อและประทับตราความตกลงนี้ไว้เป็นสำคัญ

ทำคู่กันเป็นสองฉบับ เป็นภาษาไทย และภาษาญี่ปุ่น ณ โตเกียว เมื่อวันที่สิบแปด เดือนตุลาคม พุทธศักราชสองพันสี่ร้อยแปดสิบห้า ตรงกับวันที่สิบแปด เดือนสิบ ปีสโยวาทิสบเจ็ด

(ลงชื่อ) ดิเรก ชัยนาม

และประทับตรา

(ลงชื่อ) ตานี มาษายุกิ

และประทับตรา

## ประกาศ

### ใช้ความตกลงทางวีซ่านัก ระหว่างประเทศไทยกับประเทศญี่ปุ่น

มีพระบรมราชโองการให้ประกาศให้ชาวทั่วกันว่า

โดยที่ความตกลงทางวีซ่านักระหว่างประเทศไทยกับประเทศญี่ปุ่น ซึ่งได้ลงชื่อกัน นะ โตเกียว เมื่อวันที่ ๒๘ ตุลาคม พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๕ มีบทในข้อ ๑๔ ว่า ให้เริ่มใช้ตั้งแต่วันแลกเปลี่ยนสัตยาบันเป็นต้นไป และ

โดยที่สัตยาบันของทั้งสองฝ่าย ได้แลกเปลี่ยนกัน นะ กะชวงกร ต่างประเทศ กรุงเทพฯ เมื่อวันที่ ๒๑ ธันวาคม พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๕

ฉะนั้น ความตกลงฉบับนี้ จึงเป็นอันใช้ตั้งแต่วันที่ ๒๑ ธันวาคม พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๕ เป็นต้นไป

ประกาศ นะ วันที่ ๒๑ ธันวาคม พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๕ เป็นปีที่ ๙ ในรัชกาลปัจจุบัน.

ผู้รับสนองพระราชโองการ

จอมพล ป. พิบูลสงคราม

นายกรัฐมนตรี

## สนธิสัญญาระหว่างประเทศไทยกับประเทศญี่ปุ่น ว่าด้วยอาณาเขตของประเทศไทยในมาลย์และภูมิภาคฉาน

รัฐบาลสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวแห่งประเทศไทย และรัฐบาลสมเด็จพระจักรพรรดิแห่งประเทศญี่ปุ่น

มีเจตจำนงแน่วแน่ด้วยความร่วมมือกันอย่างใกล้ชิดระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองที่จะดำเนินการสงครามร่วมกันต่อสหรัฐอเมริกาและอังกฤษ จนบรรลุชัยชนะบริบูรณ์ และสร้างมหาอาณาจักรบูรพาตามมูลฐานความยุติธรรม

จึงได้ทำความตกลงกันเป็นข้อ ๆ ดังต่อไปนี้ :

### ข้อ ๑.

ประเทศญี่ปุ่นยอมรับนับถือการรวมรั้วดังต่อไปนี้ คือ กลันตัน ตรัง-กานู เกตะ ปะลิส และบันคาเกาะที่ขึ้นแก่รั้วนั้น ๆ เข้าเป็นอาณาเขตของประเทศไทย.

### ข้อ ๒.

ประเทศญี่ปุ่นยอมรับนับถือการรวมรั้วเชียงตุงและรั้วเมืองพาน ซึ่งตั้งอยู่ในภูมิภาคฉานเข้าเป็นอาณาเขตของประเทศไทย.

### ข้อ ๓.

ภายในหกสัปดาห์ นับรวมแต่วันใช้สนธิสัญญานี้ ประเทศไทยจะได้หยุดเลิกการปกครอง ซึ่งประเทศญี่ปุ่นดำเนินอยู่ขณะนี้ ในบันคาอาณาเขตที่กล่าวในข้อสัญญาทั้งสองข้างต้นนี้.

## ข้อ ๔.

เขตแดนแห่งบันดาอานาเขตที่กล่าวในข้อ ๑ และข้อ ๒ นั้น จะได้กำหนดโดยหลักเขตแห่งรัศมีนั้น ๆ ตามที่หลักเขตเหล่านี้มีอยู่ นะ วันลงลายมือชื่อสนธิสัญญา.

## ข้อ ๕.

รายละเอียดที่จำเป็นแก่การปฏิบัติตามสนธิสัญญานี้ จะได้กำหนดด้วยความตกลงร่วมกันระหว่างเจ้าหน้าที่ผู้มีอำนาจแห่งประเทศทั้งสอง.

## ข้อ ๖.

สนธิสัญญานี้จะได้เริ่มใช้ตั้งแต่วันลงลายมือชื่อเป็นต้นไป

เพื่อเป็นพยานแก่การนี้ ผู้ลงลายมือชื่อข้างท้ายซึ่งได้รับมอบอำนาจโดยถูกต้องจากรัฐบาลของตนเพื่อการนี้ ได้ลงลายมือชื่อและประทับตราสนธิสัญญานี้ไว้เป็นสำคัญ

ทำคู่กันเป็นสองฉบับ เป็นภาษาไทยและภาษาญี่ปุ่น นะ กรุงเทพฯ ฯ เมื่อวันที่สิบ เดือนที่แปด พุทธศักราชสองพันสี่ร้อยแปดสิบหก ตรงกับวันที่สิบ เดือนที่แปด ปีสโยวา ที่สิบแปด.

(ลงชื่อ) จอมพล ป. พิบูลสงคราม (ประทับตรา)

นายกรัฐมนตรี

และผู้รักษาสถาบันรัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงการต่างประเทศ

(ลงชื่อ) หลุยโระคามิ เทอจิ (อัครราชทูต) (ประทับตรา)

เอกอัครราชทูตวิสามัญผู้มีอำนาจเต็ม