"Iudia ou Sian" by Allain Mannesson Mallet, 1683.

"MANDALA," "SEGMENTARY STATE" AND POLITICS OF CENTRALIZATION IN MEDIEVAL AYUDHYA

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I

One of the most common uses of the term *mandala* is defined as follows in every standard Sanskrit-English dictionary: "A circular orb, globe, wheel, ring, circumference, anything round or circular."[1] However, this term means "circle" in many senses:[2] in its geo-cosmological connotation, it is the circle of continents around the central mountain of the universe— Mount Meru;[3] in a ritual sense, it is borrowed to describe any magic circle used in sorcery;[4] in politics, it is the circle of a king's near and distant neighbors.[5] The political meaning of the term *mandala* is directly illustrated in the *Arthasastra* of Kautilya (a Machiavellian Hindu text on political management traditionally attributed to Kautilya at the end of the fourth century B.C., but, in fact, at least as likely to represent a school compiled at some time during several following centuries),[6] and the Laws of Manu, the *Manava Dharmasastra*, as a network of interstate relations among kings whose principalities are enclosed by at least three different types of neighbors: allies (*mitra*), enemies (*ari*), and neutrals (*madhyama*).[7] For clarification, the theory of *mandala*, understood as a classical policy of interstate politics, is based on an analysis of the possible participants in hostilities:

> These were the *vijigisu*, the ambitious, aggrandizing state; the *ari*, or enemy (an immediate neighbor of the *vijigisu*); the *madhyama* and *udasima*, which may be of potential assistance to either of the principal belligerents— the former being located closer to the adversaries and having, therefore, a more directly mediatory role. A complex *Geopolitik* further elaborates the allies of the central contestants and their secondary allies (i. e., the ally's ally): ally of the rearward ally, ally of the enemy's ally, and so forth. Thus diplomacy is constructed on the interrelationships within a group of twelve states, all neatly catalogued as to the ways they can affect the fortunes of the home state. This "sphere of influence" is termed *mandala*. The *mandala*

theory is based on the assumption that the king, by nature, aspires to conquest, and that the adjacent king is his enemy—for the two are not in immediate competition and the other neighbor of the enemy would also stand to bendfit from the weakening of the latter. Surround and conquer.[8]

My primary concern is not, however, to provide any detailed discussion regarding the origins and the diagram of Kautilya's *mandala* construction, which have already been illustrated in ancient Sanskrit manuscripts and extensively described in books on Indian political philosophy.[9] Instead, I am interested in the ways in which Kautilya's theory of *mandala* has been interpreted by historians for the purpose of studying ancient states in South and Southeast Asia.

II

Historians studying the dawn of early states in India use the *mandala* concept to analyze political situations when imperial kingdoms were found.[10] The Mauryan empire (320 B.C.-185 B.C.), for example, is generally accepted by historians as the earliest unitary centralized empire state or "metropolitan state" where the concept of *mandala* was first developed and extensively exercised. The concept is generally understood as being a form of interstate diplomacy after a "multiplicity of centres" had been eliminated and the great Mauryan empire was emerging and firmly taking root.[11]

Within the broad framework of this arralysis, another interpretation has been proposed by I.W. Mabbett. In his *Truth, Myth, and Politics in Ancient India*, Mabbett seriously questions the existence of the Mauryan empire as a large and very highly organized state. He then suggests that "...the *mandala* theory also is not a prescription for regulating the whole of India beneath one's own sceptre. It is a conceptualization of an arena

full of petty kingdoms. All the kings in it are threats to each other because their claims are not limited by state constitution to particular defined areas of territory, so they are constantly jostling with each other, forming and re-forming alliances and enmities. The successful king is not the one who wipes out all the others in the *mandala*. He is the one who gets them to acknowledge him as overlord and give him tribute."[12]

Burton Stein is another scholar in the field of ancient Indian history who challenges the idea of imperial kingdom. He argues that medieval states of India, particularly the Chola kingdom, are unitary, more or less bureaucratized monarchies with a high degree of supposedly "decentralized" local authority.[13] Unlike Mabbett, Stein's concept of "state" is directly influenced by a descriptive model of "segmentary state" for African societies.[14] Questioning the existence of the Chola kingdom of South India understood as a centralized and bureaucratized state ruled by more than 20 powerful warriors from c. 846 to 1279 A.D., Stein borrows Southall's segmentary state model to re-examine the political structure of this kingdom. He tries to demonstrate the fact that in the South Indian historical context within the so-called "great kingdom", there existed a number of "little kingdoms" and "little kings;" a local ruler possessed "kingly" authority equal to that of any great king, but more limited in scope.[15] However, it would be wrong to conclude that the concept of "segmentary state" and *mandala* are interchangable. In fact, the *mandala* type of state has more than a passing resemblance to the "segmentary state" proposed by Southall especially in terms of ritual and spiritual connections, and if one invokes Wolters' concept of "soul stuff" between the ruler and the ruled and among the rulers who aspired to be a *cakravartin* (a universal monarch) and/or *rajadhiraja* (king of kings).[16]

It is Wolters who first emphasized the concept of *mandala* within the framework of Southeast Asian historiography. He broached the concept in his "Ayudhya and the Rearward Part of the World" (1968), where he explicitly applied the *mandala* theory to the interstate diplomacy of King Naresvara of Ayudhya (1555-1605). Wolters' concept of *mandala* at that time developed along conventional lines and was based primarily on Kautilya's diagram of interstate relations.[17] In his latest book *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective*, Wolters again used the term mandala to describe the political situation of early Southeast Asian polities, and he now broached a new idea. He suggested that the *mandala* had its origins in the socio-political nature of the prehistoric communities of Southeast Asia long before the emergence of all developed polities and the arrival of Hindu culture. *Mandala* was, indeed, a record of the political system rooted, inherited, and widespread in the Southeast Asian region since prehistoric times. Its significance attached to the personal achievement of each particular man of prowess and his connections with his clients in particular generations. It by no means signified the geographical size of early Southeast Asian polities; on the contrary, it reflected the networks of loyalties between the ruler and the ruled, and among rulers, all of whom aspired to be the highest lord of the area over which they claimed sovereignty.[18] *Mandala* history is also

a record of certain happenings inside the region. It projected into history and elaborated upon some widespread culture traits inherited from prehistory: cognatic systems of kinship, an indifference towards lineage descent, and therefore the significance attached to personal achievement in a particular period of time.[19]

Wolters's concept of *mandala* is generally described by those scholars who try to prove its accuracy as a type of state formation or phase which came into existence in a certain period of time. Hermann Kulke, for example, sees it as the second phase of the process of state formation; the regional state and early kingdoms whose political system could be characterized as a "multiplicity" of local political centres and shifting loyalties of leaders, particularly at the periphery of their system.[20] Jan Wisseman Christie, in different manner, equates Wolters' concept of *mandala* with Tambiah's idea of "galactic polity."[21] Tambiah primarily constructs the features of his "galactic polity" on the grounds of Robert Heine-Geldern's theory of "macrocosmos and microcosmos," a link between the cosmological levels of heavens of gods and the level of this world of humans.[22] Wolters, as I understand his concept, does not lay stress upon a parallelism between the suprahuman macrocosmos and the human microcosmos. Instead, he emphasizes the continuing networks of loyalties between the rulers and the ruled, and among rulers, as deeply rooted in the world of Southeast Asian politics long before the arrival of Indian civilization and religions.

To my knowledge, none of the historians and scholars in related fields who question the accuracy of Wolters' *mandala* concept have taken into account the relevance of the concept of *mandala* elaborated in chapter two (History Patterns in Intra-regional Relations) to the notion of loyalties and social mobilization as a local culture feature discussed in chapter one (Some Features of Cultural Matrix) of Wolters' *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective*. As previously mentioned, the concept does not signify an entity such as a "state structure" but instead it denotes networks of personal connections among rulers, all of whom aspired to the highest leadership, which, in fact, was a common feature of traditional Southeast Asian politics in which manpower was considered one of the most important resources.[23]

Within the context of the *mandala* system, the ambitious ruler on the one hand has to consolidate his previous ring of power and, on the other, has to contend with his independent neighbors whose polities are his new target for annexation. In actual practice, each ruler employs both militaristic and diplomatic means in incorporating nearby states into his domain. The construction of kinship networks, however, is one of the best known methods employed to serve this specific purpose. After the ambitious ruler has successfully consolidated his *mandala*, he subsequently looks in all directions in order to influence his new neighbors whom he considers his new targets. The early kings of Ayudhya, after annexing the multiplicity of centres in the Lower Chao Phraya Basin, gradually moved up north to incorporate the state of Sukhothai.[24] The other side of the Tenasserim Range presents another similarly

interesting example in the rise of the Toungoo dynasty during the 16th century. After defeating the Mons and establishing a new center in Lower Burma, both Tabinshwehti (r. 1531-1550), and Bayinnaung (r. 1551-1581) began to look beyond the *mandala* of previous Burmese kings and finally decided to attack Ayudhya, a polity which had never before had the status of a vassal of the Burmese.[25]

It would be wrong to understand O.W. Wolters' *mandala* concept as the rejection of the geopolitical aspect. Indeed, the geopolitical dimension was raised in the unstable "circle of kings" in a vaguely definable geographic area. Viewed in this light, the term *mandala* would indicate "something like a political system of obscure extension, ramifying from its center, porous at its periphery, diffusely administered throughout, but precariously unified by charismatic leadership and ritual display."[26] Wolters also does not deny the existence of "state structure;" however, his primary concern is to describe the abstract pattern of relations between the "High King" and his provincial lords and governors which not only formed the "body of state" but also could dissolve it.[27]

The publication of *History, Culture, and Region is Southeast Asian Perspective* provoked a wide response and some criticism from scholars in the field of earlier Southeast Asian history. One of those was Hermann Kulke, who suggested a new analytical study of the actual structure of the early states in Southeast Asia, a subject which I have suggested above falls outside the discussion of the *mandala* concept and its application for the study of history. In "The Early and Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History" Kulke argues that the conventional school represented by L.B. Briggs and G. Coedès and the contemporary school represented by C. Jacques, Bennet Bronson and O.W. Wolters ascribe very different positions to the early state in a continuum of governance formations from a tribal or " 'stateless' form of government to a unitary centralized 'empire state.' "[28] In short, Kulke believes that "the conventional school places the early state in the final position of this continuum of pre-modern state formation," while the contemporary school ascribes a position to the early state down to the period in which, according to Kulke, the structural feature of "multiplicity of centres" no longer existed and was totally replaced by another phase of development—the era of the "Imperial Kingdom," which was able to last longer than the lifetime of "men of prowess."[29] Briefly, Kulke suggests that the process of state formation usually passed through three successive phases, i.e. the local and/or chieftaincy phase, the regional and/or the early kingdom phase, applicable to Wolters' *mandala*, and finally the imperial phase. The significant feature of the new "Imperial Kingdom" was that "the empire was based territorially on the forcible unification of two or even several core areas of former independent Early Kingdoms. And it was no longer a matter of subordination of the former regional leaders of these annexed areas but their complete extinction as autonomous authorities. Usually they were replaced by members of the central dynasty or by deserving persons from the administrative or military staff."[30]

The primary aim of this essay is not only to bring to view the debate on *mandala* theory concerning the problem of state formation in Southeast Asia, but also to employ Wolters' concept of *mandala* and Southall's model of "segmentary state," which follow contemporary lines of analysis on the position of ancient states and statecraft, and to examine the politics of centralization in medieval Ayudhya, the polity generally accepted as a successional kingdom of Angkor (9th-early 13th centuries).[31] As to Wolters' concept of *mandala*, it suggests, to my knowledge, a network of unrestricted loyalties between the leader and the led, and among rulers all of whom aspired to be the absolute ruler in their circle of power. Accordingly I find that Wolters' idea of *mandala* is not only applicable to the period between the 9th and 14th centuries in Southeast Asia but is also a useful model for analyzing the later mainland valley states. I think it provides a more plausible fit of politics with the broad cultural aspects of medieval Ayudhya life than conventional explanations in which the image of centralized government and unitary "empire state" are emphasized.

I also find Southall's concept of the "segmentary state" applicable to the political system of medieval Ayudhya. In the so-called "Imperial Kingdom of Ayudhya," like the Chola kingdom, there existed "little kingdoms" and "little kings," all of which exercised actual political control over a part or segment of the system encompassed by the Ayudhya state. These "little kings" possessed "kingly" authority equal to that of the great Ayudhya king at the center, but more limited in scope.[32]

The major features of the "segmentary state" are defined by Southall in the following manner:[33]

1) Territorial sovereignty is recognized but is limited and essentially relative, forming a series of zones in which authority is most absolute near the centre and increasingly restricted towards the periphery, often shading off into a ritual hegemony.

2) There is centralized government, yet there are also numerous peripheral foci of administration over which the centre exercises only a limited control.

3) There is specialized administrative staff at the centre, but it is repeated on a reduced scale at all the peripheral foci of administration.

4) Monopoly of the use of force is successfully claimed to a limited extent and within a limited range by the central authority, but legitimate force of a more restricted order inheres at all the peripheral foci.

5) Several levels of subordinated foci may be distinguishable, organized pyramidally in relation to the central authority. The central and peripheral authorities reflect the same model, the latter being reduced images of the former. Similarly, powers are repeated at each level with a decreasing range; every authority has certain recognized powers over the subordinate authorities articulated to it,

and formally similar offenses differ in significance according to the order of authorities involved in them.

6) The more peripheral a subordinate authority is the more chance it has to change its allegiance from one power pyramid to another. Segmentary states are thus flexible and fluctuate, even comprising peripheral units which have political standing in several adjacent power pyramids which thus become interlocked.

In the case of Ayudhya, like medieval South India, the terms "centralized" or "bureaucratized" are widely and inappropriately applied. After all, in Ayudhya and ancient Southeast Asia as opposed to China, where the rule of polical succession was governed by law, the continuity of state depended mainly upon the personality of the monarch. In Sir Edmund Leach's words written 30 years ago, "every monarch had a successor, but succession must create a new state from his own personal endeavours,"[34] Shortly after the death of King Ramakhamhaeng, a strong king of Sukhothai, this northern Thai state fell apart.[35] The Toungoo dynasty faced the same destiny after the great Bayinnaung passed away.[36] Under these political conditions, there existed a number of practically independent principalities spread out all over mainland Southeast Asia, such as the states of Arakan, Pagan, Pegu, Thaton, Angkor, Ava, Manipur, Assam, Sukhothai, Ayudhaya, Chiengmai, Vientiane and Champassak. This general pattern continued until the arrival of the colonial powers.

III

Ayudhya has usually been characterized by Thai and foreign historians as a great "kingdom" in the sense of being a major military state controlling a large area from a single dominant center. Charnvit Kasetsiri in *The Rise of Ayudhya* suggests that the foundation of Ayudhya after 1351 gave the Lower Chao Phraya Valley a powerful center for the first time and simultaneously ended the era of fragmentary states which had existed since the Dvaravati period.[37] In "The Early and the Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History" Kulke regards the greatness of Ayudhya as equivalent to that of Angkor in its later period: "a new development began which changed this political map considerably during the first centuries of the second millennium. During this period a small number of supraregional powers emerged which dominated the whole area. This process began in the early 9th century in Angkor which dominated large parts of continental Southeast Asia from the 11th to the early 13th centuries. About a hundred years later this role was taken over by the Thai kingdom of Ayudhya."[38]

In this essay my concern is not to argue that within the process of state formation in early Thai history many different types or various sizes of polities did not exist in the Chao Phraya Valley. Later on Ayudhya was the only center of the Thai world in the Lower Chao Phraya. Nevertheless, I do not believe that in Ayudhya and her neighboring states, and especially Toungoo and Ava, the king ruled an "imperial court" and was effectively and continuously able to impose political control over provincial governors through the channel of a centralized bureaucratic system. This, however, was not owing to the absence of an administrative mechanism; it was a result of the malfunction of the bureaucratic system invented by the king in order to stabilize his power and authority. As a result, this period of Thai and Burmese history witnessed constant oscillations of administrative power between the throne and high-ranking officers inside and outside the capital. David K. Wyatt[39] in his "Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand" suggests that the Thai political system was based upon, and the social system revolved around, a monarchy which in theory was absolute. However, in practical reality, according to Wyatt, power shifted and was distributed between the king and noble families who were in charge of three major departments of government; *kalahom* (the Ministry of Military Administration, which later became the Ministry of the Southern Provinces), *mahatthai* (Ministry of Civil Administration, later the Ministry of the Northern and Eastern Provinces), and *phrakhlang* (Ministry of Finance, which controlled the conduct of foreign trade and foreign relations)." Lorraine Gesick, in her doctoral dissertation, *Kingship and Political Integration in Traditional Siam 1767-1824*, has described the structure of political control of the state of Ayudhya state in this manner:

"Thus, we see that the dialectic between the idea of centralized empire and that of a confederation of many small 'kingdoms' was never fully resolved in the four hundred years of Ayudhya's existence. When central leadership was weak, outside pressure on the kingdom could start a chain reaction of political fragmentation. The process of political disintegration that accompanied the conquest of Ayudhya was well under way before the capital city had fallen (1767). One thus should not see it as a result of that conquest but rather as one of its causes."[40]

The problem of fluctuations in royal power and the absence of a strong bureaucratic system were also typical historical phenomena of pre-colonial Burma. Victor B. Lieberman in his *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest c. 1580-1760* suggests that during approximately 180 years of Burmese history the king at the core area was insufficiently stable to control the administrative elites at the center and at peripheral parts of the state. This brought about the collapse of each Burmese dynasty.[41]

Three assumptions about Ayudhya have been responsible for the view that it was a strong centralized state. These assumptions are as follows: the cessation of political struggle between the two leading families in the lower Chao Phraya Valley (the Uthong and the Suphanburi), the Reforms of King Trilok (Borommatrilokanat, 1448-1488), and the political and military expeditions of the Ayudhya kings from the early 15th century onward.

First, the origin and the growth of Ayudhya as a dominant state are generally regarded as a result of a successful incorporation of the two independent riverine principali-

ties of the Chao Phraya Valley, Lopburi and Suphanburi. It was through the kinship relations between leading members of the two principalities that Ayudhya had its birth. Yet, kinship and marriage ties were not effective mechanisms for permanent political control. During the first sixty years or so of Ayudhya's existence there was a series of struggles for power between members of the house of Uthong, whose political base was at Lopburi, and that of Suphanburi, which were waged with the aim of winning control over the city of Ayudhya.[42] Not surprisingly, this usually occurred after ther death of a strong king of Ayudhya. It was not until the early 15th century that the fragmentation of early Ayudhya polity slowly diminished when Uthong's political domination in the Chao Phraya Plain declined and total victory was achieved by rival Suphanburi.[43]

Nevertheless, the extinction of the Uthong house did not suddenly result in the political unity of Ayudhya. Leading members of the Suphanburi family still competed among themselves to obtain absolute control over the city of Ayudhya. Moreover, the king at the capital never successfully annexed distant principalities as a part of his political domain. At the rim of the Ayudhya kings' *mandala* a number of semi-independent local rulers existed, each with a considerable degree of autonomy. On the one hand they built up their own networks of alliances with nearby strong kings in order to stabilize their authority and protect themselves from Ayudhya, and, on the other, accepted the sovereignty of the Ayudhya king. The governors of Phitsanulok in the north, Tavoy in the west, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, Pahang and Kedah in the south were in this category. Tomé Pires, a Portuguese pharmacist who came to Malacca during the reign of King Ramathibodi II (1491-1529), described the kingdom of Siam (Odia or Ayudhya) thus:

> Beginning from Pahang (Pahāao) and Trenggan (Talimgano), Kelantam (Clamtam), Say, Patani (Patane), Likon (Ligor), Martarā, Callnansey, Bamchha, Cotinuo, Peperim, Pamgoray, are all ports belonging to lords of the land of Siam, and some of these are kings. They all have junks; these do not belong to the king of Siam, but to the merchants and the lords of the places; and after these is the river of Odia, where they go up to the city— a river where boats can go, wide and beautiful... The Siamese have not traded in Malacca for twenty-two years. They had a difference because the kings of Malacca owed allegiance to the kings of Siam, because they say that Malacca belongs to the land of Siam. They say that it is theirs and that twenty-two years ago this king lost Malacca, which rose against this subjection. They also say that Pahang rose against Siam in the same way, and that, on account of the relationship between them, the kings of Malacca favoured the people of Pahang against the Siamese, and that this was also a reason for their

> disagreement...Pahang (Paham), Trengganu (Talimgano), Chantansay, Patani, Lakon (Lagou), Maitaram, Calnasey, Banqa, Chotomuj, Pepory, Pamgoray and other ports all have lords like kings, some of them Moors, some of them heathen. And in each port there are many junks and these navigate to Cambodia, Champa, Cochin China (Cauchij), and to Java and Sunda, and to Malacca, Pase, Pedir and to those of Indragiri (Andarguerij), Palembang (Palimbao), and from these places to Patani. They have up to seven or eight hundred bahars of pepper every year, and every one of these ports is a chief port, and they have a great deal of trade, and many of them rebel against Siam...[44]

The second assumption about Ayudhya as a successful centralized kingdom is a consequence of conceptualizing the reforms of King Trilok as a watershed in the Ayudhya political system in the second half of the 15th century. Trilok's famous rearrangement of the Ayudhya administration has been understood as a tremendous attempt by a central Thai king to establish the first centralized bureaucratic system in order to put an end to the weakness of the previous system in which kinship connection and marriage alliances were the major ingredients. H.G. Quaritch Wales, for example, believed that King Trilok, with the help of Khmer officials, captured and brought back to the Siamese court by his father, Boromracha II, after the sack of Angkor Thom in A.D. 1431, could strengthen his power by changing "the basis of the feudal system from a territorial to a personal one...and by evolving a centralized and functionally differentiated system of administration for the area now placed under the direct control of the capital."[45]

King Trilok's *Phra Aiyakan Tamnaeng Na Phonlaruan, Phra Aiyakan Tamnaeng Na Thahan Huamuang* and *Kot Montienban* (Law of the Civil Hierarchy, the Laws of the Military of 1454 and the Palatine Law of 1458) are commonly used by historians as blue-prints to characterize the pattern of the administrative system of ancient Ayudhya and to evaluate its degree of centralization from the 15th century onward. Trilok's pattern of provincial hierarchies and Palatine Law has been understood to mean that regional rulers whose ancestors had ruled over independent principalities were unwillingly replaced by members of the central dynasty sent by the king after their region had been annexed and made part of Ayudhya. As a result their autonomy completely perished as in the case of Sukhothai. In my opinion, the reforms of King Trilok did not remove the autonomy of the regional governors. In actual practice, the king at the capital often had to make a compromise by selecting provincial governors from the family or families of their own *muang* (city). In the latter half of the 17th century La Loubère, the French ambassador to King Narai's court, observed that the governorships of *muang* tended to be hereditary and because of this "it is no difficult matter for some of these Governors, and especially the most powerful, and the

most remote from Court, to withdraw themselves wholly or in part from the Royal Authority."[46]

Throughout the history of Ayudhya, the kings had to make continuous attempts to minimize and, if possible, abolish the authority of the regional governors. For example, as Lorraine Gesick observes, the position of *yokkrabat* (royal inspector) was created by the rulers of Ayudhya in order to monitor the activities of the governors (*chao muang*) and to retain a degree of influence in distant cities. In short, a *yokkrabat*, who ranked with the highest members of the *chao muang's* council, "was a person of trust appointed by the king and his chief duty was to act as the king's agent in keeping watch on the *chao muang*."[47] Apart from *yokkrabat*, Ayudhya kings, with the intention of eliminating the autonomy of regional governors and improving the dysfunctional bureaucratic system of the kingdom, introduced the position of *phuran* (commissioner-governors) to the stage of Ayudhya provincial politics. Lorraine Gesick cites La Loubère on this subject: "The king of Siam names the *Pouran* [or phuran] upon two accounts, either when he would have no *Tchaou Meuang* [or *chao muang*] or when the *Tchaou-Meuang* is obliged to absent himself from his Government."[48] This observation sheds light on the fact that Trilok's administrative system did not function successfully; therefore the medieval kings of Ayudhya after him had to improvise new methods again and again to enforce their control. Royal authority continued to be influenced by the relative might or weakness of each king. In reality, regional governors near and far never hesitated to shift their loyalty from one patron to another in order to protect their own political interest. The authors of the *Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma (Hmannan Mahayazawindawgyi*, 1829) revealed that sixteen of nineteen governors of major provincial cities of Ayudhya transferred their loyalty to the Burmese commanders-in-chief, Nei-myou-thihapatei and Maha-naw-ra-hta, in order to protect their lives and status when the Burmese army approached their city (1766). Among these turncoat governors, one (the governor of Suphanburi) fought to his death for the Burmese against Ayudhya.[49]

The degree of self-government in peacetime, however, varied as the distance increased between the capital, which is the core of power, and each particular locality. The situation would not be far from that described by Bendict Anderson in "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture:" "As we shall see, the gradual, even diminution of the radiance of the lamp with increasing distance from the bulb is an exact metaphor for the Javanese conception not only of the structure of the state but also of center-periphery relationships and of territorial sovereignty. While the undifferentiated quality of the light expresses the idea of the homogeneity of Power, the white color of the light, itself the 'syncretic' fusion of all the colors of the spectrum, symbolizes the unifying and concentrating aspects of Power."[50]

The third historical assumption leading to Ayudhya's being understood as a strong centralized state derives from a misapprehension concerning the significance of the numerous military operations of the early Ayudhya kings in neighboring territories. The best known case is the invasion of Angkor in

A.D. 1431 by Boromracha II (1424-48), who was the father of Trilok.[51] Even though the rulers of Ayudhya from time to time exerted their military power in all directions (Sukhothai and Chiengmai in the north, Cambodia in the east, Tavoy in the west and Malacca in the south) they could not, with the exception of Sukhothai, incorporate these remote principalities into the Ayudhya political and administrative domain. Most of these areas maintained their independence and only some were regarded as tributary states. However, at any time when Ayudhya rulers were weak or the kingdom was captured and reduced to a lower rank by a victorious rival, as in the reign of Phra Mahachakkraphat [or Chakkraphat] (1548-69), and Phra Mahathamracha (1569-90), the former tributary kings usually took the opportunity to declare their complete independence and sometimes waged war against Ayudhya.[52] Thus, the invasions by early Ayudhya kings of close and distant regions alike are not a convincing standard for evaluating the centralized strength of Ayudhya. As happened in Burma, shortly after the death of strong and warlike rulers the vast but loosely organized kingdom started to fall apart. Van Vliet, in *The Short History of the Kings of Siam* written early in 1640, describes the political situation after the death of King Naresuvara (1605), a powerful and war-minded king of Ayudhya: "Many countries and cities which the king conquered and seized remained in subjection till the end of his life, such as Cambodia, Champa, various cities in Muang Hang, Lan Chang, Chiengmai, the cities Chiengmai, Lakhọn, Lao, and Kreng. but because no occupation or military force was left in these places (as in the European manner), these places broke away from the Siamese kingdom after His Majesty's death and were never again brought back to obedience, except for the cities Lakhọn and Lao, as will be seen in what follows."[53]

IV

It is evident that King Mahachakkraphat of Ayudhya and his successor, Phra Mahin, were challenged and overthrown by a member of the provincial elite, Mahathamracha, 219 years after Ayudhya was founded by King Ramathibodi I (1351) and 90 years or so after the reforms of King Trilok. The successful opponent was one of Chakkraphat's sons-in-law and the governor of Phitsanulok, the city that once in the past was the political center of the state of Sukhothai. This episode sheds light on the fact that the attempt of Trilok to centralize by means of a bureaucratic system did not function successfully, especially in remote areas; the same episode shows that networks of personal connections and kinship alliances, which were major ingredients of ancient Southeast Asian polities, still played a decisive role in medieval Ayudhya.

A sign of political weakness and of the disintegration of Ayudhya appeared shortly after the sudden death of the strong and warlike King Chairacha (1534-47), whose origins before his succession are unknown, though there is some reason to suppose that he was the governor of Phitsanulok. With the army under his command he overthrew his young nephew Prince Ratsada, who had held the throne for only five

months.[54] The death of Chairacha was followed by political unrest at the capital. David Wyatt has succinctly described what happened:

> "Chairacha had left two sons, both born of a royal concubine, Lady Si Sudachan, and also a younger half-brother, Prince Thianracha. The elder of the two sons, Prince Yot Fa (c. 1547-48), then eleven years old, was placed on the throne with his mother as regent, while his uncle, Prince Thianracha, sought refuge from the political storms by being ordained a Buddhist monk. The queen regent, meanwhile, pursued an infatuation with a minor palace official by whom she had a daughter, and she resolved to raise him to the throne. Nobles who dared voice their disapproval of these proceedings were executed. The queen regent finally had young King Yot Fa poisoned in June 1548, and her lover, now titled Khun Worawongsa, was placed on the throne. He lasted only six weeks. A conspiracy of the leading nobles assassinated the new king and recalled from a monastery Prince Thianracha, who became king of Ayudhya in late July 1548, taking the title Chakkraphat from the Pali-Sanskrit designation of the wheel-turning universal monarch, a king whose righteousness and might makes all the world revolve around him."[55]

Prince Thianracha, who was to assume the title King Mahachakkraphat, was not a powerful and capable ruler like Chairacha. Instead of confronting Khun Worawongsa, who was a usurper, he chose to take shelter in a monastery. It was Khun Pirentorathep, or Mahathamracha, whose mother was a relative of Chairacha and his father a descendant of the kings of Sukhothai, who killed the usurper, brought Chakkraphat back from his monkhood and placed him on the throne (1548). King Chakkraphat rewarded Mahathamracha by giving him his eldest daughter in marriage and conferring on him a semi-royal rank as virtual viceroy of the northern provinces based on Phitsanulok.[56] It is quite obvious that Chakkraphat could not exercise direct control over the northern provinces; he therefore built up kinship ties with Mahathamracha, who had not only installed him on the throne but also commanded manpower from all over the northern region. According to the Ayudhya chronicles, the military officials whom Mahathamracha had recruited to seize the throne from Khun Worawongsa were northern men of rank—the governors of Sawankhalok and Pichai.[57] In addition, when King Tabinshwehti of Burma gathered an enormous army and crossed the mountain chain through Three Pagodas Pass in order to sack Ayudhya (1549), it was again Mahathamracha who organized a large army from the north which consisted of troops from Phitsanulok, Sawankhalok, Sukhothai, Pichai and Pichit to rescue the capital.[58]

Mahathamracha probably realized the weakness of Chakkraphat and knew that with him on the throne the northern region would be safe from intervention by Ayudhya. There is also a good reason to believe that Chakkraphat was not a popular ruler among the high-ranking officials (khunnang) of Ayudhya. In the year 1561 a serious rebellion occurred. This rebellion was led by Prince Sri Sin, who was a younger son of Chairacha and had been compelled to become a Buddhist novice for many years. It is interesting that there were a number of high-ranking military men such as Phraya Decho, Phraya Tainum, Phraya Phitchainarong, Muan Pakdisuan, Muan Painarit and the supreme patriarch of the Buddhist forest monk sect, Phra Pannarat Wat Pakao, who joined the rebellion. The king had to escape by boat and left behind his sons, Prince Ramesuan and Prince Mahin, who assembled their forces and attacked Prince Sri Sin's adherents. The rebellion was suppressed and the young prince was killed. Most of his followers were arrested and executed.[59] Political conflict at Ayudhya owing to the weakness and the unpopularity of the king provided Mahathamracha with the opportunity to establish his own independent sphere of influence in the northern region without fear of disturbance from the capital.

Networks of loyalties based on political kinship relations never lasted long. In the case of Mahathamracha and Chakkraphat, the conflict probably grew first between Mahathamracha, a senior man of state, and Chakkraphat's sons, Prince Ramesuan and Prince Mahin, the "young Turks" of Ayudhya, who, unlike their father, did not possess any personal connection with the ruler of Phitsanulok. The Burmese invasion in the year 1564, however, brought this underwater wave to the surface.

In the year 1564 Bayinnaung, after having put down numerous uprisings among his kinsmen and Mon partisans and having successfully reunited the Burmese state, suddenly invaded Ayudhya. Burmese troops quickly captured the northern cities with little effort and, more important, seem to have gained an influential supporter in the Siamese camp in the person of Mahathamracha, who, from now on, slowly tranferred his loyalty to the king of Burma.[60] It may be mentioned that Chakkrapat and his sons also suspected Mahathamracha's remarkable propensity for being influenced by the Burmese. According to the Burmese chronicles, Mahathamracha, at the outset, asked permission from Bayninnaung to send a message to Chakkraphat to recommend that he should surrender to the Burmese. Permission being accorded, the message was sent. However, Chakkraphat did not accept Mahathamracha's recommendation and sent the messenger to prison. He also ordered his son, Phra Mahin, to intercept the Burmese army on the way.[61] The interception was not accomplished. The Burmese army reached Ayudhya in early 1564 and after a short ineffective resistance Chakkraphat surrendered. Burmese chroniclers record that he and his elder son, Phra Ramesuan, were delivered up as hostages to Burma. His younger son, Phra Mahin, was installed as king of Ayudhya by the victorious king. Mahathamracha still retained his former position and dignity as the governor of Phitsanulok.[62] Thai sources are silent about

Chakkraphat being taken as a Burmese hostage but support the view that later on the throne passed to Phra Mahin by agreement with his father, who had decided to spend the rest of his life in a Buddhist monastery.[63] From this moment, Mahathamracha began to realize that the time had come for him to seek a new patron. Not surprisingly he transferred his loyalty to the Burmese king at Pegu, the person whose prowess had been consistently and effectively proven at the expense of the polities from the west side of the Tenasserim Range to the Upper Mekong Valley.

The new king, Phra Mahin, was a man of little ability and quite incapable of dealing with the difficult problems facing him. Above all, unlike his father, he could not obtain any recognition from his brother-in-law, who ruled over the northern region. According to the Ayudhya chronicles, Mahathamracha in Phitsanulok interfered with every detail of the king's administration; furthermore, he forced the young king to obey his orders and instructions sent from the north.[64] There is no doubt that in this period the king of Ayudhya lost complete control over the northern provinces, either by means of the bureaucratic system or through personal connections. Mahathamracha, who was originally an officer in the palace guard of King Chairacha,[65] now became virtually an independent king with full autonomy within the Upper Chao Phraya Valley and more.

Realizing that his position and reputation as the king of Ayudhya was shaky, Phra Mahin managed to regain control over the northern provinces and terminate Mahathamracha's political challenge. He clandestinely contacted his father's old ally, King Setthathirat of Vientiane, and persuaded him to join him in attacking Phitsanulok in 1567. Nevertheless, the plan was not kept secret. High-ranking military officers, Phraya Sriharatdecho and Phra Tainum, whom Phra Mahin sent in advance to capture Mahathamracha by surprise, disclosed their clandestine mission to the ruler of Phitsanulok. This is another example of Phra Mahin's inability to control his own men and exhibits the way in which a man of prowess such as Mahathamracha was able to overwhelm the mechanism of Ayudhya's administrative system. Mahathamracha, on the one hand, managed to outwit the kings of Ayudhya and Vientiane by releasing burning rafts to drift from the upper part of the river down to the area where his rivals' fleets were gathered, and on the other, sent for help from his new patron, Bayinnaung.[66] The Burmese king immediately mobilized a large army under six Shan Sawbwas to rescue Phitsanulok. Hearing the news, Phra Mahin and King Setthathirat gave up the siege and withdrew to their respective capitals.

The Ayudhya king's attempt to attack Phitsanulok caused Mahathamracha to move quickly to the political shelter of the Burmese king. In 1568 he presented himself at the court of Hanthawaddy in order to inform Bayinnaung that King Chakraphat had abandoned his yellow robes and had consulted with his son with the intention of regaining independence. The Burmese king was overjoyed to received Mahathamracha as a faithful vassal, honored him with the title Sawbwa Thaungkyi, and conferred on him the privilege of wearing a coronet and using a white umbrella.[67] Moreover, Mahathamracha was not the only provincial governor who shifted his loyalty from the weaker king, Chakraphat, to the stronger one, Bayinnaung. According to the *Hanthawaddy Hsinbyushin Ayedawpong*, the governor of Kanchanaburi also appeared at the Burmese court for the same reason as Mahathamracha.[68]

King Chakkraphat took advantage of Mahathamracha's absence in Burma to march to Phitsanulok and brought back the daughter whom he had given to Mahathamracha shortly after his succession. Chakkraphat also attempted to capture the city of Kamphaengphet but failed.

By the end of 1568, King Bayinnaung with his enormous army of Mon, Shan, Lu, Lao, and Lan Na soldiers made his way to Ayudhya via Tak and Kamphaengphet and was joined by Mahathamracha's forces from the northern provinces. King Chakkraphat fell ill and died late in January 1569 before his city was captured by the Burmese (August 8, 1569). Mahathamracha was then installed as the king of Ayudhya while the hapless Phra Mahin was taken to Pegu. Nevertheless, the prince died on the way before reaching his rival's kingdom.[69]

Mahathamracha knew from personal experience the danger of sending a prince to rule over a provincial area. He therefore introduced an important innovation by creating within the capital city the Palace of the Front (Wang Na) as the residence of the prince who was in line of succession. From this period the capital city became the symbol of the kingdom. The royal palace represented its capital and the palaces of the princes surrounded it as though they were the provincial towns. The most important of all these princes was the Upparat, who occupied the Palace of the Front (Wang Na).[70]

Nevertheless the practice of housing members of the royal family, i.e. sons and sons-in-law, within the walls of the capital did not mean that the king could exert more control over powerful princes and high-ranking officials in the city. The history of late Ayudhya is marked by a number of coups d'état undertaken by princes and high-ranking ministers coveting the throne. In addition, this practice was no guarantee of centralized government. Later Ayudhya kings still had to improvise special methods to minimize the power of regional governors. King Prasatthong (1629-56), for example, forced all the governors to remain in the capital where he could keep an eye on them instead of allowing them to reside in their localities. However, despite this precaution, Prasatthong had no means of controlling three important *muangs* at the rim of the Ayudhya *mandala*, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phattalung and Songkhla, whose governors remained resident in their *muangs*. These governors of the south were frequently referred to by foreign sources as "kings" of the cities they governed.[71] At the end of the 17th century, shortly after the death of King Narai (1656-88), the weakness of Ayudhya in the face of strong challenges from the more powerful *muangs* was again demonstrated by the difficulty with which it suppressed revolts by the governors of Nakhon Ratchasima and Nakhon Si Thammarat.[72]

The relationship between the king at the center and the provincial governors was not, however, always unstable. Almost all of the time both sides found their interests well served by compromise. When the king of Ayudhya appointed governors of *muangs* from the chief family or families of that *muang*, he was able to exert indirect control over the manpower in distant areas. The governors who came from local ruling families would already have ties of widespread patronage and manpower networks in their *muangs*, and this in turn enabled them to raise men at the king's request in time of war. As a reward, the king at the center could provide his regional governors with political protection, rank and regalia.[73] What is more important is that the king did not always aim to centralize the administration of these provincial rulers; he gave them independence in their internal affairs so long as they remained loyal and obligated.[74]

CONCLUSION

Ayudhya was a segmentary state. Within its *mandala* a number of little kingdoms existed and were designated by the Law of Provincial Hierarchy and the Palatine Law as subordinate *muang* within the boundaries of the Ayudhya kingdom proper. However some of these *muangs* (especially first and second class *muangs*—*Huamuang Aek* and *Huamuang Tho*) were frequently referred to in foreign records from the early 16th century onward as "cities" which "have lords like kings."[75] And we know that governors of the first and second class *muangs* had their own court of officials which replicated the situation in the capital but on a reduced scale; they even had their own subordinate *muangs*. They were, to this extent, "little kings" in the vast but loosely integrated territories of the Ayudhya kings.[76]

In the context of the Ayudhya polity, no fundamental change occurred in the direction of centralization. Lorraine Gesick has accurately described the evolution of the kingdom of Ayudhya throughout 400 years of its existence:[77]

> Four hundred years after its foundation the kingdom of Ayudhya had evolved from a confederation of relatively autonomous *müang*, in which there was little real difference between "provincial" *müang* and tributaries, to a centralized kingdom, composed of a rather extensive circle of "inner" *müang* under a great deal of central control, a more far-flung "outer" circle of traditionally powerful and autonomous *müang* which still retained much of their autonomy, and finally an even more distant circle of tributaries acknowledging the Ayhdhya king's superiority. To work, however, this system required consistently strong leadership at the center and a strong capital. When the central leadership was weak, the capital and

surrounding heartland were vulnerable while the kingdom's more distant *müang* and tributaries receded even further from the capital's control. Events surrounding the final destruction of Ayudhya clearly illustrate this.

In fact, it was not up until the last decade of the 19th century that the Siamese state was gradually changed from a loose conglomeration of states and provinces without clear boundaries and strong government to a smaller and more compact state with a clearly defined frontier and a forceful system of control imposed from the center. Before that period the central government directly administered only a small area of the country known as the *Wong Ratchathani* which stretched to Lopburi in the north, Nakhon Nayok in the east, Suphanburi in the west, and Phrapradaeng in the south. A period of great reforms slowly emerged in the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), who effectively implanted the actual centralized administration in the political history of the kingdom of Siam. In reality, King Chulalongkorn's achievement in uniting the Siamese state consumed a great deal of time and energy. It is evident that in 1891 the government directly administered only Prathumthani and Nonthaburi in the north and Phrapradaeng and Samutprakan in the south.[78]

In this respect I find that Wolters' concept of *mandala* and Southall's model of the "segmentary state" provide useful perspectives for studying the causes of instability in the Ayudhya political system. Obviously the growth of the Ayudhya polity in terms of the physical development of its capital and the body of its administrative system did not mean that the capital's influence dominated the territories over which the ruler claimed authority. In addition to the first and second class *muangs* already mentioned, there were others at the rim of the Ayudhya*mandala* ruled by those who could maintain political autonomy and would not hesitate to shift their loyalties from one party to another whenever circumstances persuaded them to do so. In actual practice, the king could not always replace provincial leaders with members of the Ayudhya court or with deserving persons from his administrative or military staff. Although some kings appointed their representatives to the regions, that did not mean that they were successfully imposing their will on those territories. The history of Ayudhya was punctuated by a number of uprisings and coup attempts by regional or provincial governors whom the king had carefully selected from his own adminstrative or military staff.

In this short essay, I have noted a particular feature of the Ayudhya polity: the failure of centralized government based on kinship networks and spasmodic bureaucratic improvisation introduced by the Ayudhya kings. Under the seemingly smooth surface of what is known as "the Imperial Kingdom of Ayudhya," as Kulke describes it, the kings at the center had to make a continuous effort to introduce new methods of control: establishing the institute of inspector (*yokkrabat*), creating the position of commissioner-governors (*phuran*) and relocating

offices of governors in order to exert direct control over provincial men of rank. Nevertheless, the Ayudhya kings, as they are described in indigenous and foreign records, never successfully eliminated the hegemony of provincial governors.

Viewed in broader perspective, the political map of ancient Southeast Asia before the colonial period, like Ayudhya, was characterized by a multiplicity of political centers in which the connections of their leaders were primarily based on networks of loyalties and particularly on kinship relations and the ritual of *bannakan* (tributary expression of recognition). The rise and fall of political power, as suggested by Wolters, was a result of the achievements of the overlord or man of prowess in each particular *mandala* in competing and negotiating with the neighboring kings. At the death of each strong and warlike king the loosely integrated kingdoms would collapse, and, ironically enough, none of the administrative measures introduced by the dead king and his predecessors seemed to enable his young successor to uphold the reputation, recognition and controlling power of the kingdom.

ENDNOTES

1. Vaman Shivram Apte, *The Pracxtical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Poona, 1890) p. 833, and Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1888), p. 732. A more impressionistic depiction of the *mandala* concept is found in Peter Gaeffke's "Hindu Mandals" and E. Dale Saunders's "Buddhist Mandalas." See *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 9, Mircea Eliade, editor in chief (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987) pp. 153-58.

2. Adrian Snodgrass, *The Symbolism of the Stupa* (New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1985) pp. 104, 105.

3. Ernest J. Eitel, *Hand-Book of Chinese Buddhism, Being a Sanskrit-Chinese Dictionary with Vocabularies of Buddhist Terms in Pali, Singhalese, Siamese, Burmese, Tibetan, Mongolian and Japanese* (Hong Kong, 1888) p. 94. In a cosmological context, the *mandala* has also been perceived as a "schematized representation of the cosmos, chiefly characterized by a concentric organization of geometric shapes, each of which contains an image of a deity or an attribute of a deity. A symbol representing the effort to reunify the self." See Pearl S. Buck, *Mandala* (New York: John Day, 1970) p. 7; Renée Hagesteijn, *Circles of Kings: Political Dynamics in Early Continental Southeast Asia,* Ph.D. dissertation, Leyden State University, The Netherlands, 1985, pp. 14, 15.

Ernest J. Eitel, op. cit., p. 94; Adrian Snodgrass, op. cit., p. 104; see also Giuseppe Tucci, *The Theory and Practice of the Mandala* (London: Rider & Company, 1969) p. 23.

5. Vaman Shivram Apte, op. cit., p. 833.

6. Sarva Daman Sing, "The Early Development of Kingship in Pre-Muslim India," in *Patterns of Kingship and Authority in Traditional Asia,* edited by Ian Mabbett (London: Billing & Sons Limited, 1985) pp. 95, 96.

7. R. Shamasastry, *Kautilya's Arthasastra,* 4th ed., Mysore, 1951, pp. 290, 303-04, and 329-30; see also Dr. Pandurang Vaman Kane, *History of Dharmasastra* vol. 3 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973) pp. 217-22.

8. Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962) p. 267.

9. J. Gonda, *Ancient India from the Religious Point of View* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966) pp. 126-28; see also John W. Spellman, *Political Theory of Ancient India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) pp. 156-59.

10. Radhakrishna Choudhara, *Kautilya's Political Ideas and Institutions* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1971) p. 333.

11. Romila Thapar, *From Lineage to State: Social Formations in the Mid-First Millennium B.C. in the Ganga Valley* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 128-29; see also Romila Thapar, *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 94-136. Characterizing the Mauryan as a centralized empire, Romilar Thapa still accepts that the administration of the state contained a fundamental weakness which was inevitably to prove it unsuccessful. The bureaucracy was highly centralized, but with the ruler as the key figure, and all loyalty was directed to the person of the king. Romila Thapar, *A History of India I* (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1983) p. 89. For more information on the nature and the limitations of the administrative control of the Mauryan empire characterized as a "metropolitan state," see the same author in "The State and Empire," in *The Study of the State,* edited by Henri J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (The Hague, 1981) pp. 420, 422, and the same author in *From Lineage to State...,* pp. 160.

12. I.W. Mabbett, *Truth, Myth, and Politics in Ancient India* (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1971) pp. 54-66, and 20, 34-39.

13. Burton Stein, "The Segmentary State in South Indian History" in *Realm and Region in Traditional India* edited by Richard G. Fox (Duke University, Program in Comparative Studies on Southeast Asia, 1977), pp. 3-51.

14. Ibid., pp. 9, 10; see also Aidan W. Southall, "A Note on State Organization: Segmentary State in Africa and in Medieval Europe" in *Early Medieval Society* edited by Sylvia L. Thrupp (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1967) pp. 147-54.

15. Burton Stein, op. cit., p. 11.

16. O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982) pp. 6-8 and 101-104.

17. O.W. Wolters, "Ayudhya and the Rearward Part of the World", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland* 3 & 4, 1968, pp. 172-78.

18. O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture...,* p. 25.

19. Ibid., p. 31.

20. Hermann Kulke, "The Early and the Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History" in *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries* edited by David G. Marr and A.C. Milner (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1968) p. 7.

21. Jan Wisseman Christie, "Negara, Mandala, and Despotic State: Images of Early Java" in *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries* edited by David G. Marr and A.C. Milner (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1968) p. 7.

22. Stanley J. Tambiah, "The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia," in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* vol. 293, "Anthropology and the Climate of Opinion" ed. Stanley A. Freed, 1977, pp. 72-79, and the same author in *World Conqueror & World Renouncer*, pp. 108-119; see also Robert Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Data paper no. 18, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April 1956; see also H.L. Shorto, "The 32 Myos in the Medieval Mon Kingdom," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental & African Studies*, vol. XXXI, part 3, pp. 585-91; see also Kenneth R. Hall, *Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985) pp. 9 and 264n.

23. The situation is not far from what I.W. Mabbett has observed: "The difficulty is created by the assumption that the *mandala* is geographical and even cartographical. It is not. The units in the *mandala* are not areas but governments. The orientation implied is related to the dimensions not of space but of politics, and diplomacy, as the contexts of references to the theory suggest." I.W. Mabbett, *Truth, Myth and Politics...*, pp. 38, 39.

24. O.W. Wolters, "The Khmer King at Basan (1371-3)," *Asia Major*, 12: 1 (1966), pp. 44-89; see also Charnvit Kasetsiri, "Phuttasatsana kup kanruam anachak samai ton Ayudhya" (Buddhism and the Annexation of Sukhothai in Early Ayudhya History), *Warasan Thammasat*, June-September 1976, pp. 43-51; and Pises Jiajanpong, "Kanruam anachak Sukhothai kup Ayudhya" (The Annexation of Kukhothai into the Kingdom of Ayudhya) *Muang Boran Journal* vol. 1, no. 2 January-March 1975, pp. 30-37.

25. U Kala, *Mahayazawingyi* vol. 2, edited by Saya Pwa (Rangoon, 1960) pp. 222, 223, 339-41; see also, "Hanthawadi Hsinbyushin Ayedawpon" in *Ayedawpon* (6) *Saung twe Myanmaminmya Ayedawpon* (Rangoon, 1970) pp. 386-388; see also Victor B. Lieberman, *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest c. 1580-1760* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 29-32; G.E. Harvey, *History of Burma* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967) pp. 158-60 and pp. 167-69; E. Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965) p. 93.

26. Stanley J. O'Connor in a review of David G. Marr and A.C. Milner, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 9th to the 14th Centuries,* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, XVIII and 416 pp. (to be published).

27. O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture...*, pp. 14-33; see also O.W. Wolters, "Restudying Some Chinese Writings on Srivijaya", in *Indonesia* vol. 42, October 1986, p. 21n. See also I.W. Mabbett, op. cit. p. 39.

28. Hermann Kulke, op. cit., p. 4.

29. Ibid., p. 8.

30. Ibid., p. 8.

31. H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Adminstration,* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965) pp. 70, 71; Hermann Kulke, op. cit., p. 8.

32. Burton Stein, op. cit., p. 10.

33. Aidan W. Southall, loc. cit., pp. 149-50.

34. Edmund Leach, "The Frontier of 'Burma'," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* vol. III, no. 1, October 1960, p. 56.

35. A. B. Griswold and Prasert na Nagara, "Epigraphic and Historical Studies, No. 10: King Lodaiya of Sukhodaya and His Contemporaries," *Journal of the Siam Society*, 60: 1 January, 1972.

36. G.E. Harvey, *History of Burma*, pp. 179-184.

37. Charnvit Kasetsiri, *The Rise of Ayudhya* (Oxford University Press, 1976) pp. 16, 17, 93-106 and 119-31.

38. Herman Kulke, op. cit. pp. 7, 8.

39. David K. Wyatt, 'Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, vol., IX, no. 2, Sep. 1968, pp. 209-10: for detailed discussion of the differentiation between the power of pre-modern Thai kings in theory and in actual practice see Walter F. Vella, *The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955) Chapter I.

40. Lorraine Marie Gesick, *Kingship and Political Integration in Traditional Siam 1767-1824*, Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1976, p. 47.

41. Victor B. Lieberman, *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest c. 1580-1760*, p. 7.

42. Charnvit Kasetsiri, *The Rise of Ayudhya,* pp. 106-14.

43. David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (Yale University Press, 1984), p. 68.

44. Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires,* vol. I (London, 1944) pp. 105-10.

45. H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965) pp. 70, 103-105.

46. Lorraine Marie Gesick, op. cit. p. 36.

47. Lorraine Marie Gesick, op. cit. p. 30.

48. Ibid., p. 36.

49. U Aung Thein, "Intercourse between Burma and Siam, as Record in Hmannan Yazawindawgyi" JSS vol. XI, Bangkok 1914-15 (Kraus Reprint, Nedeln/Liechtenstein, 1969) p. 35; see also U Tin, *Konbaungzet Yazawindawgyi* vol. I (Mandalay: Reprint Rangoon, 1922) pp. 399, 431.

50. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, edited by Claire Holt (Cornell University Press, 1972) p. 22.

51. H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint, 1965) p. 16; see also David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983) p. 64.

52. W.A.R. Wood, *A History of Siam* (Bangkok, 1959) pp. 115, 129 and 130; "To Ayudhya's vassals who participated in the campaign with the Burmese of 1563-64 and had first-hand knowledge of their suzerain's inability to defend them there were two choices open: to pledge their renewed support—perhaps exacting a higher price for it, as the King of Lan Xang did by requesting the hand of the Thai king's daughter—or to rebel and cut their ties to Ayudhya. Patani chose the latter course. Immediately following the defeat, as the Burmese headed back to Pegu, the ruler of Patani, who had come with his boats and men to assist the Thai, rebelled and penetrated to the very heart of the royal palace compound before being driven off by a counterattack. This rebellion ended with the disappearance and presumed death of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah of Patani, who was succeeded by his younger brother, Manzur Syah,

probably in the same year, 1564...During the period from 1564 until the 1590s, when Ayudhya was struggling for its survival against both Burma and Cambodia, Patani appears to have been relatively more independent of Thai influence than she was earlier or later, a situation productive of mixed results." A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani: The Story of Patani*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 8, 9.

53. Jeremias Van Vliet, *The Short History of the Kings of Siam*, translated by Leonard Andaya and edited by David K. Wyatt) Bangkok, 1975), p. 87.

54. David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, p. 91.

55. Ibid., p. 91.

56. Ibid., p. 93.

57. *Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Sayam*, (Bangkok: Kaona, 1964) pp. 41-45.

58. Ibid., pp. 64, 65.

59. W.A.R. Wood, op. cit., pp. 115, 116.

60. David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, p. 93.

61. U Aung Thein, "Burmese Invasions of Siam, Translated from the Hmannan Yazawin Dawgyi". *JSS* vol. V (Bangkok: Kraus Reprint Nedeln/Liechtenstein, 1969) p. 24.

62. Ibid., pp. 27, 28.

63. H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, *Phraratchaphongsawadan chabap phraratchahatlekha* (Bangkok, 1962) pp. 516-18, 523. See also, W.A.R. Wood, op. cit., p. 122.

64. W.A.R. Wood, op. cit., pp. 121, 122.

65. H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, op. cit., pp. 532, 533.

66. *Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Sayam.* pp. 99-103.

67. U Aung Thein, "Burmese Invasion...," p. 50.

68. "Hanthawadi Hsinbyushin Ayedawpon," see note 19, pp. 386, 387.

69. H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, op. cit., pp. 530, 531.

70. Akin Rabibhadana, *The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873*, Data Paper: Number 74, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, July 1969, pp. 27, 28.

71. Lorraine Marie Gesick, op. cit., pp. 32, 33.

72. *Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Sayam*, pp. 500-17.

73. Lorraine Marie Gesick, op. cit., p. 28.

74. Tej Bunnag, *The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915: A Study of the Creation, the Growth, the Achievements, and the Implications for Modern Siam, of the Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong Rajanubhap*, Ph. D. dissertation, the University of Oxford, 1968, p. 33.

75. For detailed discussion regarding the provincial administration of Ayudhya see Lorraine Marie Gesick, op. cit., pp. 33, and Tej Bunnag, op. cit., pp. 31, 32.

76. Ibid., p. 41

77. Ibid., p. 41

78. Tej Bunnag, *The Provincial Administration of Siam...* pp. 1, 31-34.