

FORCED RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGNS IN NORTHERN THAILAND DURING THE EARLY BANGKOK PERIOD *

1. Introduction

In pre-colonial indianized Southeast Asia the control of manpower, not the conquest of land, was the crucial factor for establishing, consolidating and strengthening state power. Thai, Burmese and Cambodian chronicles provide ample evidence of how Southeast Asian rulers launched successful attacks against weaker neighbours in order to seize large parts of the population and to resettle the war captives in their own realm. At the same time, the victorious side was very often content to establish a loose tributary relationship with the former enemy whose resources of manpower had been reduced.

The victors derived many benefits from this kind of traditional warfare in demographic, political, economical and cultural terms. The losers, on the other hand, suffered severely from massive depopulations resulting in the devastation of cities and rural areas and, in consequence, a decrease in agricultural production. Sometimes it took centuries until population losses and its concomitants, such as the devastation of rural areas and the decrease in agricultural production, could be overcome. The rulers of the Burmese Konbaung dynasty, for example, used systematically large-scale deportations of war captives as an underlying means of strengthening and expanding state power. In 1757, King Alaungphaya defeated

the resurgent Mon kingdom of Pegu. Numerous Mon were resettled in Upper Burma, others fled across the Salween into Tenasserim province (Martaban) or even sought shelter in Siamese territory. Fifteen years later, Burmese maltreatment of the Mon provoked a new exodus to

* This article is a revised version of my paper presented at the "5th International Conference on Thai Studies—SOAS, London, July 1993." In a different form, the article was first published in *Oriens Extremus* 1 (1994). I am indebted to Saraswadee Ongsakul (Chiang Mai) and Aroonrut Wichienkeo (Chiang Mai) who shared generously their profound knowledge and expertise in discussions of the contents of some important sources. I am further obliged to Harald Hundius (Passau), Hermann Kulke (Kiel), Ronald Renard (Chiang Mai), and Baas Terwiel (Hamburg) for making valuable suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. However, the responsibilities for the statements contained in it remain with the author. Jeff Boone (Chiang Mai) took great pains in polishing the English, at the same time adding valuable suggestions. The maps were skilfully drawn to my specifications by Günther Moosbauer (Passau), Walther Kaspar-Sickermann and Wolfgang Düchting (Hamburg). Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the German Research Association (DFG) for financially supporting my research in Thailand and the U.K. in 1992, and to the National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT), which supported my research in Thailand.

Siam. Lower Burma began to recover from the ravages caused by warfare, forced resettlements and voluntary emigration only in the second quarter of the 19th century.¹

The structural backwardness of Laos can at least partially be explained by the drastic measures taken by the Siamese in suppressing the rebellion of King (*cao*, เจ้า) Anu of Vientiane. The ruthless victors not only destroyed the Lao capital completely; in numerous mopping-up operations Siamese troops depopulated Vientiane and its hinterland. Furthermore, they raided Central Laos between the Kading river and Savannakhet. The massive resettlements of Lao populations across the Mekong to the Khorat Plateau and even to the Central Plain (e.g., Lopburi, Suphanburi, Chachoengsao, Prachinburi) continued until the early 1850s.² Within a few decades after the suppression of the Cao Anu rebellion the demographic centre of gravity of the Lao country had moved from the trans-Mekong territories (i.e. present-day Laos) to the Khorat Plateau. "In the 30 years after the Cao Anu rebellion more than 100,000 people were deported from the left bank. The present fivefold disparity between the populations of Laos and Thailand's Isan region is a result of the deportations in the aftermath of the Cao Anu rebellion."³

The Siamese campaigns in Laos, as well as in neighbouring Cambodia, during the 1830s and 1840s were primarily directed against Vietnamese political expansion. As Kennon Breazeale has pointed out, "Thai notions behind the restructuring of human resettlement to suit political ends rather than local geography were based in the time of Rama III on the idea that a depopulated region would serve as a physical barrier against enemy attack." However, the Vietnamese did not engage in the same sort of depopulation efforts as the Thai did. Hué was primarily concerned with acknowledgements of suzerainty by Lao rulers and did not envisage a depopulation campaign either practical or desirable. Generally speaking, "there was never any question of rounding up villagers and resettling them in Annam."⁴ Conditions in the densely populated Red River basin and the central Vietnamese coastal zones did not favour an eastward flow of people from the Mekong basin. During the short-lived conquest of

Cambodia by Hué (1834–47) considerable numbers of Vietnamese settlers were sent into the new province of Tran Tay Thanh, as Cambodia was renamed by Emperor Minh Mang. This attitude was in sharp contrast to the Siamese strategy of raiding Cambodia to assemble manpower.

The esteem in which a strong population base ("manpower") was held and the relatively minor importance of land, with the notable exception of Vietnam, can certainly be explained by the chronic underpopulation of Southeast Asian river basins since ancient times. The control of land was apparently not the decisive factor for state power. The political status of a Thai *müang* (เมือง) depended on the patrimonial ties of the population living in that territory. For example, the district of Phan, now a part of Chiang Rai province, was until the beginning of the 20th century an enclave of Lamphun. Settlers from that *müang* founded Müang Phan in the 1840s but maintained their allegiance to their old overlord, the *cao muang* (เจ้าเมือง) of Lamphun. Old patrimonial bonds clearly proved to be stronger than geographic or economic considerations, which would have favoured political relations to Chiang Mai rather than to Lamphun.⁵

The primacy of manpower can be best exemplified by the following conflict between Nan, a Northern Thai tributary state of Siam, and Chiang Khaeng, a small *müang* in Sipsong Panna, which became a part of French Laos in 1896. In 1866, the ruler of the small Lü principality of Chiang Khaeng sent some of his subjects to neighbouring Müang Sing, at that time virtually unpopulated and covered with deep forests. Nan regarded Müang Sing as a dependency, because it had once deported the inhabitants of Müang Sing. When the ruler of Chiang Khaeng claimed his exclusive rights to exploit Sing's rich natural resources, the ruler of Nan threatened his rival that he would launch a punitive campaign and deport the illegal settlers to Nan.⁶ Chiang Khaeng complied with Nan's demand, at least temporarily. Two decades later, in 1884, Cao Fa Sali Nò, the then ruler of Chiang Khaeng, made a second, this time successful, attempt. More than 1,000 settlers were moved from Müang Yu, the provisional capital of Chiang Khaeng situated northeast of

Müang Yòng on the right bank of the Mekong, to settle permanently in the fertile plain of Müang Sing that was situated on the east bank.⁷

Forced resettlement campaigns were an important aspect or even the main rationale of wars in traditional Thailand and Laos and have considerably shaped the linguistic and ethnographic map of these countries. Khmer villages in Ratchaburi, Phuan settlements in Lopburi and Lao enclaves in Saraburi originate from deportations of war captives during the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods. Suffice is to say that the existence in the Siamese heartland of large non-Siamese ethnic groups, though partially assimilated today, are of relevance for political scientists and social anthropologists doing fieldwork in those areas. In this paper I examine the impacts of forced resettlements on state and society by using Thailand's upper north, the historical region of Lan Na, as a case in point.

Kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang, (เก็บผักใส่ซ้าเก็บข้าใส่เมือง) is an old Northern Thai (Yuan) saying, rendered by the late Kraisi Nimmanhaeminda as "Put Vegetables into Baskets, put People into Towns."⁸ This saying refers to one of the most extensive deportations in Thai history. The two centuries of Burmese domination was interspersed with various Lan Na rebellions and short periods of autonomy. Large parts of the Ping-Kuang basin, the agricultural heartland of the country, were laid waste. The population had either been deported to Burma or had fled into the jungles to escape the hardships of war. The liberator of Chiang Mai, Phaya (King) Kawila (r. 1782–1816) launched numerous campaigns against various petty Shan states to the North deporting large parts of their populations and resettling them in Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang. Kawila's policy of *kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang* contributed to the political, economic and cultural revival of these three Northern Thai principalities. Each was a tributary state (*müang prathetsarat* เมืองประเทศราช) of Siam, but Chiang Mai played the leading role. Nan and Phrae, two other Northern Thai tributary states, were ruled by their own dynasties and launched resettlement campaigns likewise, partially in coordination with Chiang Mai, partially on their own account. In this study I will use the following questions for the sake of

conceptual clarity: *First*, can we determine the geographical and ethnic background of the war captives? *Second*, is it possible to quantify the extent of the forced resettlements? *Third*, where were the deportees resettled in their new homesteads? *Lastly*, what were the political, demographic and economic implications on Lan Na society as the whole?

2. Sources

To reconstruct the history of Lan Na, especially the period of its restoration under Kawila, the historian has to make use of a wide range of different source materials. They can be classified into four categories:

1. Local chronicles (*tamnan*, ตำนาน) written in Dharma script (*tua tham*, ตัวธรรม or *tua müang*, ตัวเมือง) and kept in the numerous monastery libraries of the region;
2. royal chronicles (*phra-ratcha phong-sawadan*, พระราชพงศาวดาร) and reports of the Siamese government (*cotmai het*, จดหมายเหต) on relations with its Northern Thai principalities;
3. contemporary reports of British officials about their visits to Northern Thailand;
4. interviews with knowledgeable informants in communities of Lü, Khün or Tai Yai (Shan) background.

Among the different sorts of source materials, the research into the local chronicles seems to be the most promising and useful. However, in cases of direct Siamese involvement Siamese sources are often more precise and reliable.⁹ During recent decades when public and scholarly interest in Thai local history has grown dramatically, many of the most important *tamnan* have been transliterated into modern Thai script.

The Chiang Mai Chronicle (*CMC*) is regarded as one of the key sources of Northern Thai history. The surviving copies of that chronicle, in general, comprise seven or eight fascicles of palm-leaves. In 1971, one copy consisting of eight fascicles was published by the Prime Minister's Office (*samnak nayok ratthamontri*, สำนักนายกรัฐมนตรี) in Siamese transliteration under the title *Tamnan phün müang chiang mai* (ตำนานพื้นเมืองเชียงใหม่ *TPCM*).

Thereafter, this version (*TPCM-SN*) became the most widely-used original source of Lan Na history among Thai historians. Before that, non-readers of Dharma script had to consult Camille Notton's French translation, published in 1932, which is rather reliable but based on a copy of only seven fascicles carrying the record up to 1805/06.

Well aware of the fact that the *TPCM-SN* version contained many transliteration and other errors, the Social Research Institute, Chiang Mai University, began publishing another version of the *CMC* based on a seven-fascicle manuscript from Wat Methangkharawat in Phrae. This manuscript had the title *Tamnan sip ha ratchawong* (ตำนานสิบห้าราชวงศ์ *TSHR*). Finally, on the occasion of the 700-year celebrations of Chiang Mai (1996), two further versions of the *CMC* were brought to the public. First, David K. Wyatt and Aroonrut Wichienkeo translated into English a manuscript of eight fascicles that was provided to them by Hans Penth (*CMC-HP*). The manuscript is said to have come from Chiang Saen and probably dates from 1926. Wyatt regards it as "more complete, more legible, and [having] fewer mistakes than the others."¹⁰ The second version is an eight-fascicles manuscript from Wat Phra Ngam (Chiang Mai) that is now kept in the Thai National Library. Udom Rungruangsri used this manuscript, dated C.S. 1216 [A.D. 1854/55], to reconstruct the "archetype" of the *CMC* by comparing it with nine other versions including *CMC-HP*.¹¹

The Yonok Chronicle [*Phongsawadan yonok*, พงศาวดารโยนก – *PY*], written in 1898/99 by Phraya Prachakitkòracak, a high-ranking Siamese official in Monthon Phayap, makes extensive use of various Northern Thai chronicles including the *CMC*. Since *PY* was first published in 1907, long before any Northern Thai chronicle had been transliterated into modern Thai, many Thai scholars used it as an authoritative source on Northern Thai history. Although *PY*'s account of developments in Chiang Mai during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries follows *TPCM* very closely, there are several errors or misunderstandings of the Chiang Mai Chronicle. *PY* is, however, a useful secondary source, though one which should be taken with caution.

The authorship of the *CMC* is unknown. Wyatt believes that the eight-fascicle versions derive from a manuscript written not long after the last recorded event (1828). Northern Thai experts, however, are convinced that more than one author was involved in the composition of the chronicle, which may have been revised and rewritten several times over the centuries. Saraswadee Ongsakul suggests that the first part of the chronicle was composed not long after the reign of Phaya Tilok (r. 1441/42–1487), for starting with the reign of Tilok's predecessor, Sam Fang Kaen (r. 1402–1441), *TPCM* contains an increasing amount of detailed material on political events. Unlike the religious *tamnan* of the early 16th century, such as the *Jinakāāmālī-pararaṇaṃ* (ชินกาลมาลีปกรณ์) and *Cāmadevīvaṃsa* (จามเทวีวงศ์), the author of the *CMC* might not have been a monk but a member of the king's entourage. Starting with events in the mid-1550s, the chronicle changes style and scope. The two centuries of Burmese rule are dealt with only in a cursory manner. There are large gaps, especially for the first quarter of the 17th century. The condensed style of writing resembles that of an astrological calendar emphasizing the exact years of events.¹² As for the late 18th century, when the anti-Burmese struggle gained momentum, the style changes again. The liberation of Lan Na and its restoration under Kawila and his brothers is described in remarkable detail. It seems that this final part of the *CMC* was written by a person who was in the service either of Kawila himself or of his younger brother Thammalangka, and became, as *uparat*, directly involved in the resettlement campaigns. We may assume that this knowledgeable person compiled the Chiang Mai Chronicle by using a wide range of older texts and adding the record of those events he himself had witnessed.

The various versions of the *CMC* glorify Kawila's policies and give no space for the victims' point of view. Therefore, I will make much use of the Yòng Chronicle [*Tamnan müang yòng*, ตำนานเมืองย่อง – *TMY*], which Thawi Sawangpanyangkun transliterated into modern Thai script. The version of *TMY* used by Thawi describes the resettlements of people from Müang Yòng and Chiang Tung during the early 19th century. The name of the chronicle is a

little misleading, for *TMY* deals more with events in Chiang Tung than in Müang Yòng itself; it is thus also a good supplement to the Jengtung State Chronicle. Obviously written by survivors of the deportations, it describes with empathy events from the victims' perspective. Thus, I was able to use *TMY* and the *CMC* for obtaining both corroborating and complementary evidence.

Apart from transliterated editions of Northern Thai chronicles, there are numerous manuscripts still unpublished and awaiting scholarly attention. So far I have made only limited use of this rich and promising material. Thus, in some instances, my conclusions might be revised after a thoroughgoing analysis of all materials available. In 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese war, Tenasserim fell under British rule. Three years later, the British colonial office in Moulmein sent Dr. David Richardson, a high-ranking official, to explore the state of politics, society and economics in Lan Na and the Shan states further to the north. The main intention of the British was to establish cattle trade with Chiang Mai and, further, to explore trade routes leading to southern China. Two years later, W.C. McLeod, assistant to the governor of Tenasserim, made another tour to Chiang Mai and other parts of Lan Na. The reports of the two Englishmen provide much insight into the society of Lan Na during the early 19th century.¹³ Moreover, Richardson and McLeod make interesting observations about the size and ethnic origin of the population in various *müang*, observations that are missing elsewhere.

The use of oral history as a further category of source materials needs a brief explanation. As the events I am dealing with occurred 150–200 years ago, it was not surprising that even old villagers of Lü or Khün origin could seldom give any clear account of resettlements that had taken place five to seven generations ago, all the more so since no village records have been kept from that early period. However, as an additional source to improve my general understanding of the geographic and social environment the interviews were helpful. In a few monasteries, such as Wat Phraphutthabat Tak Pha (Pa Sang district, Lamphun), the abbots were able to provide valuable details on the history of communities founded by former war captives. On the whole, interviews were used to

gather additional information and for conceptualizing purposes rather than to fill gaps in the chronicular evidence.

3. Anti-Burmese Resistance Efforts in Lan Na

In 1558, Chiang Mai capitulated to Burmese troops without offering any serious resistance. King Bayinnaung of Burma regarded Lan Na as a rear-base where manpower and provisions of food and ammunition could be assembled for the approaching attack on Ayutthaya. Although the Burmese eventually had to retreat from Ayutthaya and the Siamese heartland which they dominated for about 15 years (1569–1584), they were determined to integrate Lan Na into an outer belt of vassal states. According Dr Aye Gyaw (formerly Rangoon University), the Burmese kings thought Chiang Mai was strategically more essential to their survival than Ayutthaya because it gave them access to all those Tai peoples north and east of the Ping valley.¹⁴

The Burmese pursued a policy of “divide and rule” in Lan Na. After the death of Phranang (Queen) Witsutthathewi in 1578, Chiang Mai and other important *müang* were mostly ruled by Burmese noblemen. The rulers of former dependencies of Chiang Mai, such as Nan and Chiang Rai, were directly appointed by the Burmese kings. The Northern Thai (Yuan) élite were strictly controlled by Burmese or Mon civilian and military officials. By rotating the high state positions in Lan Na frequently, the political power of the old nobility was further reduced. This aggravated rivalries among the Yuan elite along regional lines, eventually resulting in the political fragmentation of Lan Na.¹⁵ None of the Burmese-dominated and mutually suspicious Yuan *müang* was able to regain independence for long. Some *müang*, such as Chiang Rai, in 1600, succeeded in throwing off the Burmese yoke for a couple of years when Burma, facing a challenge by a resurgent Siam under King Naresuan, had fallen into chaos. But Anauk-hpet-lun (r. 1606–1628) not only restored Burmese rule over Lan Na, he and his immediate successor, Talun-min (r. 1628–1648), easily suppressed further revolts in Nan (1625), Chiang Mai (1631) and Fang

(1632), for the rebels were inferior in arms and did not coordinate their actions.¹⁶

Burmese retaliatory measures had always been decisive and harsh. Campaigns were followed by mass deportations to Burma. In 1615, after having won a military victory against Chiang Mai the year before, Burmese king Anauk-hpet-lun (Yuan: "Mangthara") deported numerous inhabitants of Chiang Mai to Lower Burma. We know details of this event from the "Poem on Mangthara's War against Chiang Mai" (*Khlong riang mangthara rop chiang mai*, โคลงมังฆราวาญเชียงไหม – *KMCM*).¹⁷

The large-scale deportations of Yuan to Pegu were obviously a response to heavy population losses in Lower Burma during the late 16th century. According to Victor Lieberman, "Anauk-hpet-lun may have settled Tai prisoners around Pegu between 1616 and 1624, but these deportations could hardly compensate for the losses of the late sixteenth century."¹⁸ However, deportations were not always the lot of the entire population. It appears that some groups of people, such as commoners who were already attached to monasteries for life (*phrai wat*, ไพร่วัด), were able to escape forced resettlement. This seems to be evident from two documents found at Wat Ratchawisuttharam in the village of Ban Pae (Còm Thòng district, Chiang Mai Province). The first document is engraved on two thin silver-plates bearing the seal of Phranang Wisutthathewi. The queen vested to the villagers of three hamlets, which make up present-day Ban Pae, the right to stay permanently in their settlements. They had to pay an annual ground-rent of 500 baht; in exchange, the villagers were exempted from corvée labour and military service.¹⁹ When some 60 years later the Burmese king, Tha-lun ordered a campaign against recalcitrant Chiang Mai, he tried to deport the inhabitants of Ban Pae to Ava. The villagers, already rounded up, submitted, but when the Burmese generals were shown the silver-plates, the villagers were finally allowed to stay.²⁰

Tha-lun's campaign against Chiang Mai is briefly mentioned by the Chiang Mai Chronicle. *TPCM* states that the Burmese took prisoner the *cao müang* of Chiang Mai, bringing him to Pegu in 1631. One year later, Fang was retaken

by Burmese troops.²¹ The chronicle, which discusses events of the 17th century only cursorily, fails to mention the large-scale deportations of Northern Thai (Yuan) populations to Burma, but Burmese sources confirm the resettlement of Tai-speaking peoples, including Yuan, in Lower Burma between 1616 and 1632 and in Upper Burma after 1635.²² In 1635, King Tha-lun transferred the royal capital from Pegu to Ava. Preparations for this transfer had begun in 1627/29, as Victor Lieberman convincingly demonstrates.²³ In 1628, the Burmese centre of power in Lan Na shifted from Chiang Mai to Chiang Saen. I believe that the growing importance of Chiang Saen has to be seen in connection with the transfer of the Burmese capital. Communication between Pegu and Chiang Mai was comparatively easy when the route described in *KMCM* was taken. Seen from Ava, situated in the heartland of Upper Burma, routes of communication to Lan Na were shortest via the eastern Shan states and Chiang Saen. Moreover, the transfer of the Burmese capital was motivated by a shift from maritime to overland trade in Burma and neighbouring regions. The new trade-routes favoured not only Ava, but also Chiang Saen, which controlled the trans-Mekong trade deep into present-day Laos. During the second half of the 17th century Burmese rule in Chiang Mai and other parts appeared to have been relatively stable, although the Siamese under King Narai managed to conquer Chiang Mai for a short period (1661–1663). Occasional Siamese raids, such as the assault on Tak in 1677, which resulted in the deportation of some of its inhabitants,²⁴ do not alter this assessment.

In 1701, Chiang Saen was separated administratively from Chiang Mai and put under the direct control of Ava. Twenty-six years later, a popular uprising in Chiang Mai under Thep Sing, a "man possessing magical powers" (*phu wiset*, ผู้วิเศษ), occurred. The Burmese garrison was expelled, and Chiang Mai regained its independence for three decades. Because they had lost Chiang Mai, the Burmese decided to turn Chiang Saen into their military, political and economic base in Lan Na. In 1733/34, all the important *müang* in the north and east of Lan Na were placed under the direct supervision of Chiang Saen: Phayao, Chiang Rai, Chiang

Khòng, Fang, Thoeng, Phrae, Nan and Sat. Thus, by the mid-18th century Lan Na had split into two contending spheres of influence: a Burmese controlled zone with Chiang Saen as its centre and a “Free Lan Na” around Chiang Mai and Lamphun.²⁵

The temporary Burmese withdrawal from the Ping-Kuang basin resulted from a severe power crisis in Burma during the second quarter of the 18th century. To the north the state of Mogaung had gained independence with help from Manipur in 1734/35. Some years later, the Mon in Lower Burma revived their own state and dared to challenge even the Burmese heartland around Ava. The Burmese Kon-baung-zet Chronicle explains the precarious situation of that time as follows: “Day by day and month by month, the great tributary states that made up the empire—the crowned swabwas and [Thai] myo-zas—broke away and deserted the king. Each withdrew and fortified himself within his own principality.”²⁶

After his decisive victory against Pegu in 1757, Alaung-hpaya, the founder of the Kon-baung dynasty, tried to win back Chiang Mai and other former vassals. In 1762, nine Burmese armies laid siege to Chiang Mai. After one year the city fell, together with Lamphun, into Burmese hands. The victors did not only deport the urban élite, but also large parts of the rural population to Ava.²⁷ *PY* puts the situation in the following words: “The Burmese controlled all communes of Lan Na. The oppression of the population caused much suffering all over the country. Some people fled into the jungle. Others flocked together and formed gangs killing each other. The country had no ruler.”²⁸ However, like two centuries before, Chiang Mai was once again not the ultimate target of Burmese war strategy. The seizure of Chiang Mai paved the way for encircling Ayutthaya from the north.

When, after the victories of Tak Sin in 1767/68, the fortunes of war turned in favour of the Siamese again, troops of the Siamese king hurried northwards. The signal for a general uprising against the Burmese was given. But in the forthcoming struggle the surviving members of Lan Na’s old élite no longer played the leading role. The initiative was taken by the ruling family of Lampang. In 1732, a hunter (*phran pa*, พระพันนา) called Thip Chang expelled the despotic

ruler of Lampang. He did so with broad popular support, including the moral encouragement of the local Saṅgha. Thip Chang who ascended the throne under the title Phraya Sulawalüchai (r. 1732–1759) tried to maintain good relations to Ava by accepting Burmese suzerainty. His policy of maintaining relations with the superior regional power was supported by his son Chai Kao (r. 1759–1774). Lampang seemed to have been spared the devastations and mass deportations Chiang Mai suffered in 1763. Chai Kao’s eldest son, Kawila (*1742/43), helped his father in the day-to-day administration and also proved to be an able military commander.²⁹

The conciliatory attitude towards Burma began to change when the Burmese were taking drastic measures to assimilate the Yuan culturally. *PY* reports that in 1770, “the Burmese issued an order that in all parts [of Lan Na] males had to tattoo their legs black and females to pierce their ears and insert a rolled palm leaf, according to Burmese fashion.”³⁰ It seems probable that, as Saraswadee and Penth suggest, this change in Burmese cultural policy was due to the gruff and uncompromising character of (Po) Moyakhamani, the new Burmese governor in Chiang Mai.³¹ Moyakhamani, also called “General Whitehead” (*po hua khao*, โปหัวขาว)³² by the Yuan, had succeeded the relatively humane general Aphaikhamani a year before.

A few years later, Kawila secretly plotted with Ca Ban, the Yuan ruler of Chiang Mai, against the Burmese occupiers. Ca Ban was appointed by the Burmese king and had as his trusted attendant organized stiff resistance against the troops of Tak Sin (in 1770/71). But evidently in direct response to the arbitrariness of the Burmese forces, which was becoming increasingly unbearable, Kawila and Ca Ban secretly plotted against the Burmese. Realizing their own forces were too weak to launch a successful war of liberation, they changed their loyalty to the Siamese side. By a ruse, Ca Ban escaped with his followers from Chiang Mai and finally joined Siamese troops south of Thoen.³³ Kawila, for his part, attacked the poorly guarded Burmese garrison in Lampang causing carnage among the Burmese and Tai Yai troops stationed there.³⁴

The events that led to the defeat of the Burmese troops and their withdrawal from

Chiang Mai within three years are described by *TPCM* in detail. The Chiang Mai Chronicle emphasizes the prominent role of Kawila in the liberation of the city. According to *TPCM*, Kawila commanded a small, but audacious, army. Possessing great tactical skills, Kawila contributed decisively to the victory of the main Siamese army under the command of Phraya Chakri, later King Rama I.³⁵ Siamese sources do not agree. In his pioneering work on the wars between Siam and Burma [*Thai rop phama*, ไทยรบพม่า] Prince Damrong Rachanuphap portrays the liberation of Chiang Mai as the work of Phraya Chakri with the support of Ca Ban and 5,000 volunteers from the Chiang Mai region.³⁶ Damrong's appraisal of events is corroborated by a palm-leaf manuscript from Wat Phumin in Nan which reports on "Historical Events in [Lan Na], A.D. 1728–1854." The text written in the form of a *cotmai het* states: "On the 14th day of the waxing moon in the fourth month of C.S. 1136 [Sunday, 15 January 1775] the 'people from the South' [*chao tai*, ชาวใต้, i.e. the Siamese] conquered Chiang Mai. The Burmese under General (*Po*) Hua Khao fled. [Later] General Tò Maeng Khi raised troops and laid siege to Chiang Mai from the fifth until the eleventh or twelfth month [February–August/ September]. Many people died of famine. But Phraya Ca Ban resisted the Burmese and with the support of the people of Chiang Mai he repulsed them."³⁷ The major role of Kawila is not mentioned in this Northern Thai source. By contrast *TPCM* tends to eulogize Kawila's later achievements in the restoration of Lan Na; it does not seem to reflect adequately his subordinate role in 1774/75.

The marriage between Kawila's younger sister, Si Anocha, and Phraya Surasi, younger brother of Phraya Chakri paved the way for Kawila's career. When in 1782 Phraya Chakri ascended to the Siamese throne, Phraya Surasi became vice-king (*uparat*, อุปราช), and Kawila was appointed to the high-ranking position of *cao phraya* (เจ้าพระยา) ruling Chiang Mai as a vassal of Bangkok. The decisive role of Si Anocha in suppressing the so-called Phraya San rebellion, which had led to Tak Sin's assassination,³⁸ should have smoothed Kawila's rise to power. Moreover, there was no real alternative to Kawila, since after a Burmese

counter-attack on Chiang Mai later in 1775,³⁹ Ca Ban had finally retreated with most of the city's inhabitants to areas in the present-day province of Lamphun. There he probably placed himself and his followers under Kawila's protection.⁴⁰

4. The Restoration of Lan Na: Forced Resettlements and Kawila's Population Policy

Though in 1782 King Rama I had bestowed on Kawila the honorific title of "Phraya Mangra Wachirapakan Cao Müang Chiang Mai", Kawila's effective sphere of power barely reached beyond Lampang. Chiang Saen and the *müang* in the northern and eastern areas of Lan Na were still under Burmese rule. Chiang Mai, the symbolic importance of which as Lan Na's political and cultural centre had survived the vicissitudes of the preceding two centuries, was in complete desolation, as is described by *TSHR*: "At that time Chiang Mai was depopulated and had become a jungle overgrown by climbing plants, it turned into a place where rhinoceroses, elephants, tigers and bears were living. There were few people living in groups. Everything was overgrown leaving out the eaves of the houses and the roads to facilitate communication with each other, as there were no opportunities for clearing [the jungle]."⁴¹

Under these circumstances an early return to Chiang Mai, a virtually uninhabited city surrounded by a devastated countryside without any viable rural infrastructure, could hardly have been realized. Kawila therefore decided to establish his headquarters at Pa Sang, a community situated at the confluence of the Ping and Li rivers and roughly 40 km to the South of Chiang Mai. Together with 300 soldiers and other able-bodied men from Lampang, Kawila made Pa Sang into a fortified and moated settlement (*wiang*, เวียง). 700 other able-bodied men from the vicinity of Pa Sang settled in Kawila's new headquarters.⁴² The choice for Pa Sang as provisional capital may have been motivated by the following considerations:

1. Pa Sang was situated halfway between Lampang and Chiang Mai. In the event of a Burmese attack from Chiang Saen, prompt support from Lampang could be brought. If Kawila was menaced by

a large-scale invasion, he could devise an orderly retreat to Lampang.

2. Pa Sang was situated in the centre of the Ping-Kuang river basin, a potentially fertile rice-land. The surrounding countryside could support a large population.
3. Unlike nearby Lamphun, which had been destroyed after 1763,⁴³ Pa Sang had direct access to the Ping River that linked Lan Na with Siam.

The favourable geostrategic situation of Pa Sang may also have inclined Kawila to make this *wiang*, not just the temporary, but the permanent political centre of the Chiang Mai-Lampang region. But this theoretical option was not taken into consideration, for the complete liberation of Lan Na had not yet been achieved, and Chiang Mai was, in the long run, a better base for controlling the areas further to the north. But the decisive argument in favour of Pa Sang as only a temporary administrative centre was probably a question of legitimacy. Kawila and his family (*trakun cao cet ton*, ตระกูลเจ้าเจ็ดตน) were commoners, they could not trace their origin back to any line of the Mangrai dynasty that had ruled Chiang Mai and Lan Na until 1578. The chronicles do not tell us whether members of the old ruling house of Chiang Mai had survived. As Kawila obviously had in mind a revitalization of the pre-Burmese state tradition, he decided to rebuilt Chiang Mai, its monasteries, city walls and compartments. The official ceremony marking the reestablishment of the reconstructed capital took place on an auspicious day of the year 1796/97. On Thursday, 9 March 1797, 500 years after its founding by Mangrai, Kawila ceremoniously re-entered the city.⁴⁴

At the beginning of Kawila's reign, the weak population base was the biggest obstacle to the final expulsion of the Burmese from Lan Na and the reconstruction of Chiang Mai as the country's political and cultural centre. However, little by little people were returning from their jungle hideouts to their former villages in the deserted basins of the Ping, Kuang and Wang rivers. Kawila also persuaded a group of former Chiang Mai residents who had fled to Müang Yuam (Mae Sariang) in the early 1760s to come back.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the chronicle reports that

in early 1785 natives of Rahaeng (Tak) and Thoen, who had sought shelter in Siam some twenty years before, were given permission by the King to return to their places of origin.⁴⁶ King Rama I made Tak and Thoen dependencies (*müang khün*, เมืองขึ้น) of Chiang Mai.⁴⁷ However, the severe losses of population caused by war, famine and epidemics could hardly be compensated for by voluntary immigration and natural increases.

Between 1782 (foundation of Pa Sang) and 1816 (Kawila's death) the ruler of Chiang Mai led a number of small and large raids and resettled war captives in his realm. There were at least three important waves of resettlement campaigns. The first wave began shortly after the building of Pa Sang and was designed to increase the manpower at Kawila's disposal for the reestablishment of Chiang Mai. The second, in which more people were captured than in the first wave, started in 1798 and culminated in the conquest of Chiang Saen in 1804. The last wave, around 1808–10, finally secured Kawila's goals. 1. Even before the founding of Pa Sang, a campaign was carried out that resulted in a significant number of war captives. When in May 1780 troops from Lampang won a victory against the Burmese near the confluence of the Kok and Mekong rivers (*sop kok*, สบกก) a decision was made not to advance further in what would have been a futile attack against Chiang Saen. Instead, the victorious troops retreated to Lampang carrying with them 1,767 inhabitants of the surrounding countryside.⁴⁸

In 1783, Kawila sent Sam Lan, his trusted assistant, to several Red Karen villages (Yuan: Nyang Daeng) in the territory of the present-day Burmese Kayah State. The Karen were given as presents various consumer goods, left their homes and settled in Pa Sang.⁴⁹ In the same year, Kawila raided villages on the western bank of the Salween. The chronicles designate the attacked settlements as *müang*, but it seems that most of them were rather small and unimportant. Their inhabitants were forced to march to Pa Sang.⁵⁰

In 1784, a Burmese army 40,000 men strong approached Lampang. This was the last large-scale Burmese invasion of Lan Na. Kawila was only able to repel the invaders with Siamese military support.⁵¹ On the Burmese side auxiliary

troops from several Shan states, including Müang Cuat, were involved in the fighting. Before the ruler of Müang Cuat and his defeated soldiers arrived home, Thammalangka, the *uparat* of Chiang Mai, was able to launch a lightning attack against the defenceless *müang* of Cuat and Naen. When the ruler of Müang Cuat saw his county depopulated, he hurried to join his family and people in Pa Sang, where he submitted himself to Kawila.⁵²

A further influx of immigrants into the areas around Pa Sang and Lampang occurred in 1786/87. Encouraged by Kawila, the rulers of Chiang Rai, Müang Yòng, Müang Sat, Fang and Phrao raised an insurrection against the weakened Burmese garrison of Chiang Saen. After initial successes and the capture of the Burmese governor, Arprakamani [Aphaikhamani], who was sent to Lampang and from there to Bangkok⁵³ the insurrection crumbled, and its leaders fled with their followers to the south, finally reaching Lampang.⁵⁴ In the same year also the rulers of Nan and Phrae who had joined the insurrection, placed themselves under Siamese protection.⁵⁵

In 1788 Kawila launched an attack against Chiang Saen in retaliation for a Burmese attack on Lampang the previous year. In both campaigns there was evidently only a small number of troops involved. Kawila, for his part, tried to raid areas to the northwest of Chiang Saen to cut Burmese supply lines to their last base in Lan Na. The ruler of Chiang Mai attacked the Shan state of Müang Pan and its dependency Tòng Kai, where many prisoners of war were taken.⁵⁶ Kawila's desire for manpower, however, was not yet quenched. Two years later, troops from Chiang Mai under the *uparat*'s command again raided areas west of the Salween. The chronicles mention "numerous war captives" from the villages (*ban*, บ้าน) of Om Chit, Satòì, Sòi Rai, Wang Lung and Wang Kat.⁵⁷

After these initial successes in applying his forced resettlement policy, in 1791, Kawila tried to rebuild Chiang Mai. The king of Siam had urged him to do so in order to strengthen the city's defences against Burma. After only one month Kawila returned to Pa Sang, because he controlled "too small a number of people. They were not enough to build a large city."⁵⁸ Only in 1796, after two years of intensive preparations,

did Kawila dare to move from Pa Sang to Chiang Mai.

2. After the transfer of his capital to Chiang Mai, Kawila engaged in several resettlement campaigns against various Tai Yai *müang*, most of them situated on the western bank of the Salween. In 1798, troops from Chiang Mai attacked Müang Sat. Over the following two years several other settlements in the Salween region were raided, too.⁵⁹ The continuous influx of war captives strengthened Kawila's resources of manpower so that by 1802 he could begin to organize his campaign to expel the Burmese from Chiang Saen. It should be noted, however, that Kawila did so not solely on his own account, but with the encouragement and active support of his Siamese overlord.⁶⁰ The campaign was carried out in two stages.

Stage 1 [1802]. Thammalangka, the *uparat* of Chiang Mai, campaigned against Müang Sat, Chiang Tung (Kengtung), Müang Pan and Müang Pu in the western and northwestern hinterland of Chiang Saen. Müang Sat and Chiang Tung were of vital importance for the survival of Chiang Saen, for two main supply routes to this Burmese stronghold passed through Müang Sat and Chiang Tung respectively. Moreover, the Burmese had fortified Müang Sat into a military base for attacking Chiang Mai via Fang. In 1798 or 1799, shortly after the raid of Müang Sat by troops from Chiang Mai, the Burmese king had sent Còm Hong, a former high official in Chiang Saen, to assemble manpower in order to rebuild the devastated *müang*.⁶¹ As Müang Sat was situated in a fertile valley, the Burmese expected that two or three good harvests would suffice to stockpile enough provisions to launch a full-scale attack on Chiang Mai and Lampang.⁶² Bodaw-hpaya, the king of Ava, obviously intended to regain the lost *müang* of Lan Na very soon and regarded Còm Hong as a key figure in that struggle. The Northern Thai chronicles report that in September 1801 Bodaw-hpaya appointed Còm Hong ruler of "the 57 *müang* of Lan Na."⁶³ More explicitly, Còm Hong was seen as a "rival king", ready to replace Kawila on the throne in Chiang Mai.⁶⁴ Siamese overlordship of Lan Na would also, of course, be replaced by Burmese overlordship, with Còm Hong as Ava's figurehead. In 1801/02, Còm Hong ("Phaya Sat") underscored his

claim to full power. He raided Nan and took prisoners of war to Müang Sat.⁶⁵

However, if we follow *TMY*, Bodaw-hpaya did not make a good decision when he chose Côm Hong as Ava's representative for Lan Na, for when, in 1802, Kawila's younger brother Thammalangka launched a preemptive strike and took Côm Hong prisoner, the ruler of Müang Sat was eager to join the Chiang Mai camp and, in expectation of a high position in Chiang Mai, to help Kawila fight the Burmese. "If Chiang Mai wants to become a great and prosperous *müang*, it needs a large population. But it has [still] a very small population, not enough to be a powerful force in the future."⁶⁶ Aware that the lack of manpower might cause Chiang Mai much trouble in the long run, Côm Hong urged Kawila to resettle yet more people in the Chiang Mai-Lampang core area. He recommended Chiang Tung as an ideal target for a raid, because the population there was suffering under Burmese oppression and would readily surrender to Chiang Mai.⁶⁷

According to the Jengtung State Chronicle (*JSC*), "in the year Tauseḍ Sakkarāja 1164, Month Seven waxing 3rd night, citizens of Jenghmai brought up an army and attacked Jengtung and captured the person of the prince, members of the royal family, and subjects of the prince and took them all down to Jenghmai, with the exception of Prince Dōngsaeng, the younger brother, that is, Prince Mahākhanān, who escaped to stay with his subjects at Sip-eḍ Sip-hā Ban where, with his family, he took refuge at Pāng-keng. Having collected together his followers and subjects who had not been taken away, he [Mahākhanān] led them to establish themselves at Monghlōy and Mong-yāng."⁶⁸ *TPY* gives a very detailed, but slightly different account, agreeing that the date of the conquest and depopulation of Chiang Tung was in "the seventh month in the year *tau set* [May 1802]." However, there are doubts whether Kawila's victory against Chiang Tung was that decisive. *PPRI* emphasizes the complete success of the campaign against Sat, whereas Chiang Tung is only incidentally mentioned.⁶⁹ The *CMC* is even more distinct and says that the ruler of Chiang Tung, Sirichai, anticipating an attack by the Chiang Mai troops via Müang Sat and fearful of Burmese reprisals, evacuated

his capital in time. Thammalangka thus seized a virtually empty city.⁷⁰ The split between Mahākhanān and the rest of the Chiang Tung royalty is pointed out by the *CMC*, but put into the context of the second, more successful attack on Chiang Tung that was undertaken in 1804/05, after Chiang Saen had been liberated.⁷¹

It is difficult to decide which of the two different accounts one should follow. Kawila's military campaigns in 1802 were, on the whole, a success, both with regard to the number of people captured for resettlement (6,000)⁷² and the geo-strategic goals achieved. In recognition of these achievements Rama I gave Kawila the title of *cao phraya*, the highest rank for a ruler of a Siamese vassal state. Nevertheless, I am inclined to follow the Chiang Mai Chronicle for contextual reasons. Why should a chronicle of Chiang Mai, written in praise of its ruling house, conceal the victory against Chiang Tung, or why should it mention the failure to capture the ruler and the people of Chiang Tung, an inglorious end to an otherwise successful campaign, if this was not the truth? Furthermore, *JSC* and *TMY* indicate that, at the time of Kawila's campaigns against Müang Sat and Chiang Tung the Burmese had already been forced out of Chiang Saen.⁷³ That is not possible, for all sources agree that Chiang Saen fell two years later, in 1804.

Stage 2 [1804]. After one year of preparations, the united armies of Chiang Mai/Lampang, Vientiane, Nan, and Bangkok marched on Chiang Saen and laid siege to the city. Chiang Saen fell following a four-pronged attack. Its fortifications were torn down and its population deported.

Thiphakòrawong's *PPRI* describes the "fall" of Chiang Saen, the beleaguered city's will to resist being broken after seven months of siege:

"The Lao [Yuan] in Chiang Saen suffered from hunger. They killed buffaloes, elephants and horses until they were consumed, too. The Lao inhabitants [of Chiang Saen] left the city and surrendered to the troops from Müang Lao [i.e. Chiang Mai, Nan, Vientiane]. When the army of Krommaluang Thep Harirak had already withdrawn, the Burmese commander-in-chief, Po Mayu-nguan, saw the citizens hurrying in the

direction of the Lao troops. They were too large in numbers than to be stopped. Thereupon, Po Mayu-nguan fled with his army. The Lao troops pursued the fleeing Burmese army, and Po Mayu-nguan was fatally hit on the battlefield. The Na Khwa, whom the Burmese had installed as ruler (*cao müang*) of Chiang Saen, fled with his family across the Mekong into Burmese territory.

The armies [of Bangkok and its “Lao” allies] captured 23,000 people, destroyed the city wall and burnt down the whole city of Chiang Saen. Then they divided the families into five groups. One group was deported to Chiang Mai, another one to Lampang, others to Nan and Vientiane. The last group was handed over to Bangkok and resettled in Saraburi and Ratchaburi.”⁷⁴

The conquest of Chiang Saen was followed by military campaigns against Burmese vassals in the regions to the north and northwest of Chiang Saen, the so-called *müang fai nua* (เมืองฝ่ายเหนือ), which, like Chiang Khaeng, Chiang Khong and Müang Yòng had supported the Burmese in the battle of Chiang Saen.⁷⁵ However, the war of 1804 was very different from previous resettlement campaigns. It is revealing that the Chiang Mai Chronicle fails to mention any participation of troops from Nan, Vientiane and Bangkok, but instead portrays the seizure of Chiang Saen and the military operations in its aftermath as the work of Kawila. However, the Nan Chronicle (NC) corroborates the description of the royal chronicle. According to these sources, 20,000 troops from Siam, Vientiane and Chiang Mai, including also 1,000 soldiers from Nan, besieged Chiang Saen, but failed to take the city. The Burmese stronghold could only be taken when Nan, Chiang Mai and Lampang sent additional troops of 1,000 men each.⁷⁶ It seems that the surrender of the Yuan inhabitants of Chiang Saen to these (Yuan) troops from Lan Na was at least as decisive as the purely military operations. On the whole, we can draw the conclusion that Bangkok masterminded the war, mobilizing its own troops and those of various “Lao” vassals. Therefore, Rama I was able to put restraints on Kawila’s population policy of *kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang*.

The largest influx of manpower to Lan Na resulted from the conquest of Müang Yòng

which had surrendered in 1805 to Thammalangka’s troops without notable resistance. Kawila persuaded the ruler of Müang Yòng to resettle in Lamphun with “more than 10,000 people.”⁷⁷ Chiang Tung was also raided, and the bulk of its population was deported to Chiang Mai as well. But the other campaigns of pacification, directed against numerous smaller *müang* in Sipsong Panna and areas east of the Mekong (in present-day Laos), were obviously not a success for Kawila as far as assembling a large number of war captives was concerned. PPR1 reports that the campaign against “eleven or twelve small and large *müang*” in Sipsong Panna was carried out by troops from Nan and Chiang Mai: “40,000–50,000 men and women, old and young people” were captured. Attacks on the “40 small and large *müang*” east of the Mekong resulted in 60,000–70,000 captured people.⁷⁸ One should not be puzzled by these large numbers of war captives. The figures probably represent the total population then living in the subjugated territories, and thus indicate the *potential*, rather than the actual number, of prisoners of war. King Rama I, the royal chronicle goes on, demonstrated his mercy and broad-mindedness when the rulers of these *müang* came personally to Bangkok bringing with them the golden and silver trees as tokens of their submission. Rama I recognized that it was not possible to defend the subjugated territories with military support from Siam, because of their proximity to China and Burma and their relative distance from the Siamese heartland. He suggested a strategy of self-defence and concluded that it would be neither reasonable nor just to depopulate these areas and resettle the population in Siamese territory, for “they have not committed any crime, but surrendered without resistance. Therefore, [to resettle them] would be a serious crime and not justifiable.”⁷⁹ Had the choice been left to Kawila, one may speculate, as to whether he would have made a similar decision. But, Siamese archival evidence suggests that Rama I ordered Kawila to send 300 soldiers to persuade “displaced persons” (*phu khon rasam rasai*, ผู้คนระส่ำระสาย) in Sipsong Panna “to return to their original homes.”⁸⁰ However, in 1807/08, troops from Lampang led by the Cao Wang Na attacked Sipsong Panna again and deported a number of

Lü families from that region to Lampang and Chiang Mai.⁸¹

3. After the fall of Chiang Saen there were no longer any problems regarding security. The Burmese had lost their ability to regain even partially their lost positions in Lan Na. Burma at that time was in a state of social disruption and, moreover, was affected by a great famine which began in 1802, reached its peak by 1809/10 and gradually subsided after 1812.⁸² The eastern and southern Shan states had lost large parts of their population owing to Kawila's ruthless resettlement campaigns. They were not completely depopulated, but the people who took refuge in forest areas were too unorganized to maintain important irrigation networks in the valleys. Although the local chronicles do not explicitly mention widespread famine in the early years of the 19th century, there are some clear hints indicating disruption of agricultural production. *TMY* reports that the reservoir in Chiang Tung (*nòng tung*, นอนตุง) had fallen into disrepair by 1804/05; its water could not be used any longer.⁸³ The desolation of the town, similar to that of Chiang Mai before 1796, is mystically portrayed by *TMY*: "In all the monasteries tears were running down from Buddha statues, and the Phrabat Mai Si Mahapho relic was emitting smoke. Wild animals—pigs, bears, rhinoceroses, elephants and deer—were entering the *müang*. Barking deer (*fan*, ฟาน) came barking in the outskirts of the town. Forest-chickens were living in the ruler's palace (*hò kham*, หอคำ)." ⁸⁴

Social chaos and political anarchy prevailed in many *müang* of the Lü, Khün and Tai Yai. It should have been in Kawila's self-interest to prevent the political destabilization of the northern border regions of Chiang Mai which were depopulated, such as Chiang Saen (in 1804), or from which the local population had partially fled, such as Chiang Rai and Phayao (in 1787). But by the end of Kawila's long and eventful reign memories of the "Burmese menace" were still fresh, and the ruling circles of Chiang Mai and Lampang still deemed it necessary to strengthen the population in the Ping-Kuang and Wang river basins. In 1809, Kawila used the discontent in the Shan states, caused by intolerably high Burmese tax collections, to launch another expedition. The

forces from Chiang Mai came to "rescue" a large number of inhabitants of Müang Yòng and Chiang Tung who had decided to leave their deserted homesteads. In 1809/10, with the consent of King Rama II, they were resettled in Chiang Mai and Lamphun, where many of their fellow countrymen, including the rulers of both *müang*, had already been living since 1805.⁸⁵

After 1810, there is no chronicular evidence of any further resettlement campaign initiated by Phaya Kawila. By the time of his death in January 1816,⁸⁶ the policy of *kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang* had come to an end. This does not mean that Kawila's immediate successors completely abstained from raiding neighbouring territories in search of manpower. Small-scale raids against Karen territories west of Mae Hông Sòn occurred occasionally during the 1820s and 1830s. A Northern Thai source reports such a raid that probably occurred not long after Thammalangka ascended to the throne in Chiang Mai:

"The *uparat* [Thammalangka] became the new ruler of Chiang Mai. He ordered Phaya Phan, who had the highest rank, and Thao Sili to gather more than 100 troops in order to attack the village of Chiang Koe on the west bank of the Salween (Khong River). They won and carried away families and weapons. The king [of Bangkok] was asked to hand them over to Müang [Chiang Mai].

One day the ruler of Chiang Mai ordered Nai Kham Mun and [Nai] Kaeo Müang to gather 200 troops in order to attack the Burmese at Tha Sop Pu. Three or four persons were captured. Nai Kham Mun returned, crossed the Salween and seized Ban Tòng Kai but captured only few families. Thus he returned, crossed [the river at] Tha Pha Daeng and captured five further persons whom he handed over to the king.

The ruler of Chiang Mai ordered Nai Nòi Kawila and Nai Phom to gather more than 100 troops in order to attack the Suai Kabang⁸⁷ and to take them captive. They [the Suai Kabang] were handed over to the King who gave permission to resettle them in Müang [Chiang Mai]." ⁸⁸

In 1823, a raid was launched even into Mon areas north of Martaban.⁸⁹ However, more important with regard to captured manpower was an assault on Müang Tuan, Müang Pu, and

Müang Sat in 1838/39. Nearly 2,000 persons went to Chiang Mai as captives.⁹⁰ Of the 1,868 prisoners Chiang Mai reported to Bangkok 1,000 were distributed among troop commanders. The Siamese king who was offered the remaining 868 captives thanked Chiang Mai but allowed it to use the people to strengthen its population base. K.W. Melchers convincingly argues that the successful raid against Müang Sat not only bolstered the courage and self-confidence of the Chiang Mai leaders but also made them and their superiors in Bangkok believe “that a more formal invasion into the heartland of Kengtung [Chiang Tung] state would result in many more captives.”⁹¹

In fact, during the first war against Chiang Tung in 1850, the Yuan invaders were mainly occupied to gather war captives in Müang Phayak, Müang Len, Müang Yòng and—once again—in Müang Müang Sat to resettle the captured population in the Ping-Kuang basin. Up to 5,000 captives were forced to march to Chiang Mai. As all these *müang* combined had, in 1853, a total population of probably less than 15,000 inhabitants (or 2,100 households), according to contemporary Siamese sources, the deportations caused a serious drain on manpower for the affected region.⁹²

The last deportation to Chiang Mai I have been able to trace so far occurred in 1869 under Kawilorot (r. 1856–1870). Mòk Mai was attacked after its ruler, Fa Kolan, refused to resettle his *müang* voluntarily in Phrao in Chiang Mai territory.⁹³ These “post-Kawila” raids were motivated by considerations of security along the country’s western border, not by a search for manpower. However, one speaks easily of Chiang Mai as *pars pro toto* for the whole of Lan Na, overlooking the principalities of Phrae and Nan which were not ruled by members of the Kawila clan. Of these two *müang*, Nan was the larger and was able to conceive its own population policy.⁹⁴

5. The View of the Victim

The hardships concomitant with forced resettlement campaigns remain unmentioned in the Northern Thai chronicles. The *CMC* eulogizes Kawila’s political and military skills, but fails to record the pain and suffering of the

war captives. Written by those who escaped deportation, *TMY* does not report details on how the deportations were planned and executed. One can imagine that the displacement of people over large distances caused physical hardships and psychological traumata, especially if no proper preparations were made to provide the deportees with sufficient food and decent shelter on the way. There is a unique report of a British witness of deportations of Phuan from Chiang Khwang (Plain of Jars) to Central Thailand. The report is cited in the private correspondence of a British official in Chiang Mai in 1876:

“The captives were hurried mercilessly along, many weighted by burdens strapped to their backs, the men, who had no wives or children with them and were therefore capable of attempting escape, were tied together by a rope pursed through a sort of wooden collar. Those men who had their families with them were allowed the free use of their limbs. Great numbers died from sickness, starvation and exhaustion on the road. The sick, when they became too weak to struggle on, were left behind. If a house happened to be near, the sick man or woman was left with the people in the house. If no house was at hand which must have been oftener the case in the wild country they were traversing, the sufferer was flung down to die miserably in the jungle. Any of his or her companions attempting to stop to assist the poor creatures were driven on with blows . . . Fever and dysentery were still at work among them and many more will probably die. Already, I was told, more than half of the original 5,700 so treacherously seized are dead.”⁹⁵

Perhaps, the conditions of those captured by Kawila were relatively more “tolerable.” However, the choice of “resistance or submission” was not an easy one for those being raided. *TMY* describes discussions among members of the ruling house of Chiang Tung and other high-ranking noblemen about how to negotiate with Thammalangka, who had laid siege to the city in 1805. Should they surrender to the *uparat* of Chiang Mai or fight the enemy until the end? The arguments ran as follows:

“Cao Mòm Luang and his three [younger brothers], being altogether four brothers, were the leaders of

the nobility. They all came together. [Cao Mòu Luang] said: As soon as we side with the Burmese, the 'southern people' [*chao tai*; here: Yuan] will come and defeat us. As soon as we side with the 'southern people', the Burmese will come and defeat us. The 'southern people' are now approaching. If we stay in the Burmese camp, we will be destroyed very soon. If we go over to the 'southern people', they will seize and carry us away. What shall we do?' The younger brothers (*cao nòng*, เจ้าน้อง) responded: 'If we side with the Burmese, Kawila would come again [to bother us], every year and every month. . . . As long as we remain Burmese servants, we will be surpressed by the Burmese and have to pay them cowrie shells, silver and gold. Our people will suffer enormously. Up to now, Kawila has not yet seized and carried us away, but he will try to do so again and again. We should become [servants of the] 'southern people' and go to their country [i.e. Chiang Mai], abandoning our country.'"⁹⁶

In reality, the noblemen of Chiang Tung could have exchanged arguments just in the way the chronicle describes. They appear plausible and would further explain why a relatively small force of 300 soldiers from Chiang Mai could "conquer" Chiang Tung, which is quite well protected by high mountains surrounding the city. Consider, some forty years later, that much superior forces from Bangkok and the various Yuan principalities failed several times to take Chiang Tung.⁹⁷

Cao Mahākhanān, a younger brother of Sirichai, at that time only 24 years old, did not join the exodus to Chiang Mai. He fled to Mueang Yang, situated north of the old, now deserted capital of Chiang Tung, and led protracted wars against the Burmese. Finally, he and his followers withdrew to Chiang Saen without surrendering to Chiang Mai.⁹⁸ However, some "pro-Burmese" noblemen thought it would be better to accept Burmese overlordship, since it was the lesser evil. They argued:

"When they [Kawila's troops] gained victory our people were deported and our country was devastated again. We are all ready to submit now and ask the mighty King [of Ava] to become his servants. The reason is that whenever the Burmese came, they never deported us to their

own country. We could stay in our homeland and continue a normal life. We did not lose our homesteads, our monasteries, and our religion. So long as we do not enter their camp, the Burmese will be displeased and will attack us again and again, every year. Thus, there is no chance left to restore our country. Water [peace] is distant, fire [danger] is near. Therefore, we should be ready to surrender to them, and the future will certainly be bright."⁹⁹

Burmese emissaries were sent out to persuade Mahākhanān to return home and accept vassalage to Burma. As *TMY* tells it, Mahākhanān realized that without a legitimate ruler the remaining population would become subject to a vicious cycle of further raids and yet more destruction.¹⁰⁰ In 1813, Mahākhanān was invested with the full insignia of a vassal by the king of Ava.¹⁰¹ Six years later, in 1819, Mahākhanān refounded the devastated town of Chiang Tung. "The work was finished three years later, and its completion was celebrated by a great festival, at which offerings were made to the monasteries and sacrifices offered to the guardian spirits."¹⁰² Mahākhanān ruled Chiang Tung for more than forty years until he died in 1857. During his long reign the Khün principality gradually recovered both politically and economically. However, this recovery could hardly be foreseen in 1813 when Mahākhanān had made his bold decision to resist the Chiang Mai forces. In the final consequence, the unpleasant dependence on Burma appeared less forbidding than the destructive raids by the Yuan troops.

Yet even the best organized campaigns of forced relocation hardly depopulated the raided territories completely. By fleeing into the jungles and mountainous areas or retreating to safe enclaves, large parts of the population could escape. For this reason, the armies sent out to raid a *mueang* had to apply a politico-military strategy that concentrated on capturing its ruling families. If the ruler (*cao mueang*) and his relatives consented to resettlement, sooner or later this subjects would follow them. Many inhabitants of Chiang Saen who escaped captivity in 1804 returned thereafter to their destroyed *mueang*. But they failed to revive agriculture. Several consecutive bad harvests

persuaded them that by the deportation of its ruler Chiang Saen had become an ill-fated place in which to live. Thus the returnees decided to give up Chiang Saen and to follow their ruler to Chiang Mai.¹⁰³

* * *

In conclusion, the influx of immigrants from the Shan states and Sipsong Panna to Lan Na during the late 18th and early 19th centuries resulted from forced deportations as well as from more or less voluntary migrations of those who had managed to escape. Even some of the forced resettlements could only be carried out with the consent of the captives who sometimes accepted deportation as the lesser evil. The willingness of the Lü and Khün to cooperate constructively with the invading forces from Chiang Mai and Lampang may be explained in at least two ways:

1. *Escape from continuous warfare.* Throughout the second half of the 18th century political turmoil caused by Burmese attacks, Yuan raids and civil war was endemic in all the major eastern Shan states, including Chiang Tung and Müang Yòng. In 1748–50, when Ava's influence over the Shan states had been reduced, Chiang Tung experienced a murderous civil war. Several years later, a Chinese invasion shocked the Khün state. In 1765/66 Chiang Tung "could not cultivate rice. The following year . . . there was a great famine."¹⁰⁴

Around 1769/70 Chinese (Hò) troops raided first the principalities of Nan, then Chiang Tung and Upper Burma. Political uncertainty remained even after the Burmese restored their rule over Chiang Tung, Müang Yòng and Chiang Rung, the capital of Sipsong Panna. In 1775 the Burmese raised an army of roughly 40,000 soldiers from Burma proper and various Tai Yai, Khün and Lü müang (such as Chiang Khaeng, Müang Sat, Müang Len and Müang Yòng) to attack Phitsanulok. 1,500 soldiers from Müang Yòng participated in this attack, but it failed and they retreated with severe losses via Chiang Saen. The people of Chiang Tung and Müang Yòng increasingly felt Burmese rule to be oppressive.¹⁰⁵ But unlike their brethren further south, in Chiang Mai, Lampang and Nan, they did not succeed in expelling the Burmese troops

of occupation. In 1805, when shortly after the fall of Chiang Saen the army of Thammalangka approached Chiang Tung and Müang Yòng, the population and ruling classes of these towns probably now hoped to break the vicious circle of uprisings, conquest and suppression. Therefore, the alternative of resettling in Lan Na appeared to them to be not a bad one.

2. *Search for land.* Compared to the relatively small valleys of the Khün and Yòng rivers, the Ping-Kuang river basin was very fertile and comprised large tracts of arable rice-land. Whereas the areas under rice cultivation expanded in Chiang Mai after 1796, the Shan states and the Burmese heartland around Ava faced a severe drought from 1802/03. The year 1805 marked the beginning of a great famine in those areas. "The problem was further aggravated by starving tigers who made it unsafe to work in the fields. The general lack of food caused growing outbreaks of banditry and disorder, as villages fought each other for what little was still available. Tens of thousands starved to death, others fell prey to the tigers or bandits, and the remainder sought refuge in the larger towns and cities."¹⁰⁶ Thus one can understand that the prospect of resettlement in the comparatively fertile and politically stable region of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang looked promising. It helped break the fighting spirit of the Lü and Khün people to resist Thammalangka's troops.

6. The War Captives and Their New Homelands

The chronicles give hardly any information concerning the ethnic and social background of the war captives. We can guess from modern ethnographic data that most of the deportees were Lü (Müang Yòng, Sipsong Panna), Khün (Chiang Tung) and Tai Yai (Müang Sat, Müang Pan, Müang Pu). However, those who were deported from Chiang Saen and surrounding areas or who fled from Müang Yuam (Mae Sariang), are likely to have been of Yuan origin. That there was a massive exodus of Yuan from Mae Sariang is indirectly confirmed by palm-leaf manuscripts discovered some twenty years ago in the famous Red Cliff Cave (Tham Pha Daeng, ถ้ำผาแดง) near Mae Sariang. The most

recent of the Red Cliff manuscripts written in the Yuan language are dated 1792/93. After that year there is no trace in the area of any Yuan settlement. In the second half of the 19th century Tai Yai and Karen began settling in the depopulated valley of the Yuam River, where to this day they constitute the dominant population.¹⁰⁷

The Khün and Lü resettled by Kawila in territories within the present borders of Thailand were seen by the Yuan not at all as foreigners but as people belonging to a greater Lan Na cultural zone. Yuan, Khün and Lü speak mutually understandable dialects, and they use, with minor regional variations, the same “Dharma script.” Moreover, the majority of the cis-Salween *müang* raided by the Yuan forces, such as Chiang Tung, Müang Yòng and Müang Sat, were vassals of Lan Na (Chiang Mai) during most of the pre-Burmese period. As Kawila placed himself in the tradition of the great kings of independent Lan Na, he likely saw the relocation of people from those *müang* as a legitimate internal affair within the Yuan-Khün-Lü cultural zone.¹⁰⁸

There were also no small numbers of Karen, especially Kayah (*Nyang Daeng*, ยางแดง), and Lawa among the war captives. The chronicles mention *Kha* (ข้า, “slaves”) captured in the campaign of 1804/05.¹⁰⁹ These *Kha* living in the uplands of the Shan states, Sipsòng Panna and Laos were obviously various hilltribes speaking Mon-Khmer related languages. They were called *Kha* in Laos, *Wa* in Burma and *Lawa* or *Lua* in Thailand. Perhaps, some Karen were also among these *Kha*, for it is reported that, around 1804, Kawila established several villages settled by (Pwo) Karen war captives from the “Zwei Kabin Hills.”¹¹⁰

As to the areas of resettlement, the chronicles rarely mention any place-names. Specifications like “Müang Lamphun”, “Müang Chiang Mai” or “Müang Nan” are very vague, for the complex term *müang*, in the Western literature often wrongly translated as “city”, not only referred to the walled administrative centre—the *wiang*—but the outlying dependencies as well. Sometimes a large *müang* could comprise dozens of satellite *müang* (*müang khün*, เมืองขุ้, or *müang bòriwan*, เมืองบริวาร) and hundreds of villages. Müang Chiang Mai, seen in this wider sense,

comprised in the early 19th century a larger area than the present-day province of Chiang Mai.¹¹¹ More important than the geographic extension of a *müang* was, however, its population.¹¹²

6.1. Areas of Resettlement

In which areas of Northern Thailand had the captive populations settled down immediately after their arrival, and how did their settlements spread in the course of the 19th century? To give convincing answers to these challenging questions is not easy and presents serious obstacles. First, unlike neighbouring Burma, the Siamese and Yuan have not kept reliable censuses which distinguish between social and ethnic backgrounds of a counted population. Second, source materials which might provide important clues have not been subjected to close examination by Thai scholars. As far as I know, local (Tai) dialects of Northern Thailand have not yet been systematically mapped, nor have village names been analyzed in depth with regard to any geographical or ethnic link with the Shan states or Sipsòng Panna. The research needed would involve cooperation among specialists of various disciplines: linguists, historians, geographers and anthropologists.

As a non-linguist, I will refrain from “creating” my own empirical data; but at this juncture I want to make an observation from a historian’s point of view. Persons dislocated in large groups very often give their new dwelling-places names that remind them of their native country. This is a well-known phenomenon in the European world.¹¹³

We can hunt up these phenomena in Northern Thailand, too. In the districts of San Sai and Dòì Saket (Chiang Mai) there are Khün villages (*ban*), such as Müang Wa, Müang Luang, Müang Phayak and Müang Khòn, all named after communities in the Chiang Tung region.¹¹⁴ The Lü of Müang Yòng settled mostly in present-day Lamphun Province where they founded villages such as Wiang Yòng, Thi, Yu, and Luai, likewise bearing the names of larger settlements in the Müang Yòng region.¹¹⁵ According to oral tradition, in 1805 the ruler of Müang Yòng was promised fertile land around Chiang Mai in which to resettle when he

surrendered—without fighting—to Kawila's forces. Since areas in the vicinity of Chiang Mai had already been occupied by other groups of war captives, the people of Müang Yòng were asked to clear the paddy fields around Lamphun which were still laid waste at that time. After a first survey the ruler of Müang Yòng and his advisors expressed their delight at the prospective areas of resettlement. Soil in Lamphun was of good quality, but more importantly, the geographical environment resembled that of Müang Yòng in many aspects. The course of the rivers and the location of the nearby mountain slopes was very much the same in Müang Yòng as in Lamphun. Thus the ruler of Müang Yòng decided to settle with his subjects on the eastern banks of the Kuang River, just opposite the still deserted city (*wiang*) of Lamphun. He named his chief village "Wiang Yòng", whereas smaller settlements nearby were named after former satellite *müang* of Müang Yòng. The villages of (Ban) Yu and (Ban) Luai were built on opposite sides of the Kuang River, corresponding exactly to the original locations of Müang Yu and Müang Luai.¹¹⁶

When the people from Müang Yòng (ethnic Lü) founded their first communities in present-day Lamphun, the areas occupied were not completely unpopulated as the chronicles suggest. However, the Yuan hamlets around Wiang Yòng were small and isolated. The Lü settlers formed the large majority of the population and very soon assimilated the old inhabitants of Wiang Yòng. As very few Lü from areas other than Müang Yòng settled in Lamphun, the people still called themselves *chao yòng*, "people of Müang Yòng." Starting from Wiang Yòng, Lü settlements spread to Pa Sang,¹¹⁷ only 12 km further to the southwest of Lamphun city, and later, to the districts of Ban Hong and Mae Tha.¹¹⁸ New waves of Lü settlers from Müang Yòng arrived in Lamphun in 1810, after Kawila's last expedition against Mahākhanān of Chiang Tung, and contributed to the rapid extension of Lü settlements in Lamphun. The largest Lü speaking area of Lamphun not settled by Yòng people was Ban Thi. It seems that the Lü villages in the semi-district of Ban Thi are of the same origin as the Lü settlements in neighbouring San Kamphaeng (Chiang Mai).¹¹⁹ Local informants estimate that more

than 80% of the population in present-day Lamphun Province are of Lü-Yòng origin.¹²⁰ Most of them still speak the language of their ancestors, are in fact trilingual (Lü, Yuan, Siamese), although in the last twenty years assimilation has accelerated. My own observations confirm these rough estimates. Apart from the city of Lamphun, which had been resettled by people from Lampang and Chiang Mai (in 1806 or 1814),¹²¹ some villages along the main road linking Lamphun with Saraphi (Chiang Mai) and the district of Li in the south,¹²² which was regarded as a relatively "safe area" during the 18th century, the whole province seems to be inhabited by people of Lü-Yòng descent.

Lampang was another area which had been spared the worst of the destructions caused by war, pillage and mass deportations. Burmese influence was obviously much weaker than in the Chiang Mai-Lamphun area. During the last quarter of the 18th century numerous Yuan from other *müang* of Lan Na fled from the Burmese troops to unoccupied Lampang. When the anti-Burmese uprising of 1787 ended in failure, the rulers and inhabitants of Chiang Rai, Ngao and Phayao feared retaliation and sought refuge in Lampang. The refugees from Phayao settled, according to oral tradition, on the right (western) bank of the Wang River, while Wat Chiang Rai (in Lampang city) was built by former residents of Chiang Rai. Although these resettlements were related to Kawila's policy of *kep phak sai sa khep kha sai müang*, the ethnic Yuan from Chiang Rai or Phayao did not come to Lampang as war captives, but as people seeking temporary refuge. In fact, they stayed until 1843/44, when King Rama III ordered them to rebuild their deserted home towns. Most refugees obeyed the royal decree and returned, others stayed.¹²³

With regard to the resettlement of war captives in the present-day provinces of Chiang Mai and Lampang, I have collected only a small amount of data from oral history, barely sufficient to draw any definite conclusion as to where the war captives were resettled. A recent anthropological field-report, however, indicates a large concentration of Lü from Müang Yòng in the southern section of the *müang* district of Lampang. These communities (Ban Phae, Ban Kluai Klang etc.) were founded by a group of

Lü-Yòng war captives who did not go to Lamphun in 1805/06, but separated from the main group in Chiang Rai. From there they marched to Lampang where Duang Thip, the ruler of the *müang*, settled them on wasteland near the capital after ascertaining their loyalty.¹²⁴ One would expect some more resettlement areas in Lampang, for at least a part of the some 6,000 (ethnic Tai Yai) war captives from the Müang Sat, Müang Pu and Müang Pan were resettled in Lampang.¹²⁵ But unlike the Lü-Yòng in Lamphun, there seems to have been no single non-Yuan ethnic group in Lampang and Chiang Mai which settled in a large coherent territory. Their closeness to Yuan villages, both spatially and culturally, helps explain why they were assimilated more rapidly than the Lü-Yòng in Lamphun. This makes it difficult to reconstruct resettlement areas in these provinces mainly by using methods of oral history.

At this juncture I would like to point to a rather rare *phapsa* (พับสา) manuscript written in Yuan script and language with the title “List of Monasteries and Religious Groups in Chiang Mai” (*Rai chü wat lae nikai song boran nai müang chiang mai*, รายชื่อวัดและนิกายสงฆ์โบราณในเมืองเชียงใหม่).¹²⁶ In his study on “Ethnic Pluralism in the Northern Thai City of Chiangmai”, Michael Vatikiotis used this document to locate settlements of non-Yuan origin within the city walls.¹²⁷ One has to acknowledge his efforts to bring to scholarly attention the importance of an ostensibly “religious” document as an historical source with regard to ethnicity and population in traditional Lan Na society. However, Vatikiotis did not make full use of the document, as he overlooked its important statistical aspects. Furthermore, he did not investigate areas outside the city of Chiang Mai that was beyond the scope of his study.

The original manuscript found in Wat Cedi Luang was first transliterated by Aroonrut Wichienkeeo and edited by Sommai Premchit in 1975.¹²⁸ Twenty years later, Sanan Tham-mathi presented a revised and more readable transliteration that differs slightly from the previous one.¹²⁹ The *phapsa* manuscript is dated the “tenth day of the waxing moon in the fourth month, year of the cock, the ninth year of the decade, *cunlasakkarat* 1259 [1 January 1898].”¹³⁰ According to the colophon, it is a

detailed report on the organization of the Chiang Mai Saṅgha written by Cao Nan Unmüang, a high clerical official in Chiang Mai. “Cao Nan Unmüang . . . invited the five members of the Saṅgha council and all monks were praying for three days . . . because His Royal Highness, the king of Bangkok, will visit Müang [Chiang Mai].” It seems that the reason for writing this “List of Monasteries” was an official visit of King Chulalongkorn to Chiang Mai. Perhaps, on that occasion the highest Saṅgha authorities in Bangkok asked their counterparts in Chiang Mai for data on the size and organizational structure of the Buddhist order in the Upper North, a region which had only recently been integrated into the kingdom of Siam. The copy of the report by Cao Nan Unmüang was presumably sent to the Supreme Patriarch (*sangkharat*, สังฆราช) in Bangkok. Name, location, and number of monks and novices of each monastery are listed.

The analysis of the document that follows here is a joint effort by Aroonrut and myself. The document lists the names of 340 monasteries (*hua wat*, หัววัด) belonging to 23 clerical districts (*muat ubosot*, หมอวัดอุโบสถ). Of these, four clerical districts (nos. 1–4; 55 monasteries) were situated inside the inner, rectangular, city wall, two others (nos. 5+6; 23 monasteries) covered the space between the inner and the outer (circular) city walls. The clerical district of Wat Kao Tü (no. 7; region of Wiang Suan Dòk; 13 monasteries) extended from the Wat Suan Dòk Gate as far as Dòl Suthep to the west of Chiang Mai. There are 15 clerical districts (nos. 8–22; 235 monasteries) covering fertile rice-growing areas outside the present-day municipality of Chiang Mai. The last clerical district mentioned in the document (no. 23; 14 monasteries) comprised monasteries of both rural and municipal communities. Altogether 97 monasteries were situated in urban areas, i.e. inside or very close to the city walls, whereas 243 monasteries covered areas outside the town (*nòk wiang*, นอกเมือง).

As in Thailand each monastery marks either one compartment (in urban areas) or one village/large hamlet (in rural areas), the number of monasteries should represent roughly the number of major settlements in the city of Chiang Mai and the surrounding countryside by the end of

the nineteenth century. For various reasons it is difficult to determine the exact location of each monastery, especially in rural areas. Firstly, in Lan Na as in other parts of Thailand, names of monasteries and villages have frequently been changed over the last 100 years. Sometimes the old and the new names are completely different. Secondly, in times of famine villages were occasionally abandoned by their inhabitants, moving from rice-deficient to more fertile regions. However, we were able to locate with certainty the centres of all clerical districts, most of the urban monasteries and at least 77 rural monasteries, or almost one third of the total. As the monasteries under the supervision of a certain clerical district cover contiguous areas, we were able to map major settlements in Chiang Mai based on the "List of Monasteries" under discussion (see maps 2 and 3).

The monasteries covered the present-day districts (*amphoe*, อำเภอ) of Müang, Saraphi, Hang Dong, San Pa Tông, San Kamphaeng, San Sai and Dòi Saket. These districts are fertile, densely populated rice-growing zones situated within a radius of 40 km from the city of Chiang Mai. As to the more distant districts of Còm Thòng, Mae Rim and Mae Taeng, only very few monasteries are included. Outlying districts such as Hòt (southwest), Samoeng (west) as well as Chiang Dao, Phrao and Fang (north), it seems, were completely left out.

I believe that the reasons for this default were demographic as well as administrative. It is true that by the end of the nineteenth century the "new frontier zones" to the north and west were still sparsely populated. Phrao and Fang, for example, were resettled in 1870 and 1880 respectively.¹³¹ The majority of people in the frontier zones apparently lived in small dispersed hamlets comprising, perhaps, not more than a few houses each. Communities of that size lacked the economic resources necessary to sustain monasteries and to support monks or novices.

Apart from geographical remoteness and low population density, the outlying districts of Chiang Mai were also of marginal importance with regard to political integration. It seems that about the turn of the twentieth century the control exercised over the frontier zones by the secular and religious authorities in the capital was of only limited effectiveness. The Chiang

Mai Saṅgha was well established in the city and the surrounding countryside. As to the intermediate districts such as Còm Thòng, Mae Rim and Mae Taeng, which belonged neither to the core area nor to the frontier zone, only the largest and most important monasteries, like Wat Müang Win (no. 338; western, mountainous part of San Pa Tông) and Wat Müang Khòng (no. 340; southwest corner of Còm Thòng), were part of the Saṅgha organization. The "List of Monasteries" mentions them as monasteries under the supervision of Wat Si Phummin (*muat ubosot* no. 23) which is situated in the fertile rice-growing region of Mae Taeng (Müang Kaen) where large tracts of rice-land had been reclaimed during the Fifth Reign.

The manuscript mentions not only the names of monasteries, but also the affiliation of their abbots (*cao athikan*, เจ้าอธิการ) and vice-abbots (*ròng athikan*, รองอธิการ) to a certain *nikai*. However, the common translation of *nikai* (นิกาย, Skt./Pāli: *nikāya*) as "religious sect" is misleading in the context of this particular document, for "Nikai Chiang Mai", "Nikai Khün", "Nikai Lua", "Nikai Yòng" or "Nikai Chiang Saen" hardly reflects any sectarian disputes on religious issues. The names of the various *nikai* rather indicate different ethnic and descent groups. As the monks and novices had always to be supported by the local population, one would expect them to perform Buddhist ceremonies in accordance with local traditions that might have varied slightly in the different regions of Lan Na. Therefore, the religious affiliation (*nikai*) of the abbot of a monastery can be transferred to the geographic/ethnic origin (*chüa sai*, เชื้อสาย, "descent") of the respective village. "Nikai Khün", for example, would mean that the village or compartment to which the monastery belonged was founded by people from Chiang Tung. However, the meaning of the label "Nikai Chiang Mai" is still unclear. I suggest that it probably indicates have settlements either of ethnic Yuan or of a mixed ethnic population.

I tried to map the monasteries and their respective communities with regard also to ethnicity (see maps 2 and 3). The geographical distribution of settlements of the different ethnic groups reflects the situation in the late 19th century. As for the early decades of that century,

one can presume that, owing to assimilation into the Yuan (Khon Mūang) society, the relative size of captive communities was somewhat larger than in the 1890s. However, their geographical distribution was probably not much different. The maps show in detail:

1. Of the 56 monasteries situated inside the square (brick) city wall (1,400 m wide and 1,810 long), 54 monasteries were affiliated with Nikai Chiang Mai. Therefore, the large majority of people in the inner city were Yuan, descendants of the original population of Lan Na. As for the southern and southeastern suburbs, i.e. those compartments which were protected by an outer earthen wall (*kamphaeng din*, กำแพงดิน), the Yuan constituted only a small minority. 18 of 23 monasteries (almost 80%) in these “suburbs” belonged to *nikai* other than Nikai Chiang Mai. War captives from Chiang Saen were resettled in areas to the east and southeast (close to the Tha Phae Gate), in this area we also find two Mon settlements. The southern and southwestern suburbs were mostly inhabited by ethnic Khün, Lü, and Tai Yai. Michael Vatikiotis observes that the orientation of these suburbs “does, in fact, coincide with the two least auspicious corners [southeast, southwest] of the city. The land in this area was, and still is, subject to flooding, and was said to be inhabited by bad spirits. . . . The apparent location of these captive settlements both outside and at the least auspicious corner of the city walls [southeast], indicates the likelihood that they were settled by the Prince-ruler [Kawila].”¹³² In 1837, McLeod observed: “The outer fort is not in some parts inhabited, being swampy; it is the residence principally of the Kiang Túng, Kiang Then [Chiang Saen], and other Tsóbuas [*cao mūang*], with their followers.”¹³³

2. Concerning the rice-growing regions outside the city walls, the spatial pattern seems far more complex. The general picture appears to be that the rural areas in the immediate neighbourhood of the city (present Mūang district) were inhabited by a native Yuan population. There are no captive settlements recorded for that zone. The rice-growing areas to the south and southwest (Saraphi, Hang Dong and San Pa Tông) were predominantly settled by Yuan as well. With the exception of two Mon monasteries/ communities in Saraphi, we have not

found any reference to major captive settlements there. However, we know from oral tradition that today there are still a few Khün and Lü-Yòng villages in the districts of San Pa Tông and Hang Dong.¹³⁴ The “List of Monasteries” does not mention them, at least not under the label of their respective *nikai*. Furthermore, the concentration of Lua (Lawa) in Hang Dong district, a (wet-)rice-cultivating zone just to the west and southwest of Chiang Mai city, is surprising, because at present, one century later, the Lua are regarded as “upland people” who have survived only in two small mountainous areas of Hôt district (Chiang Mai) and Mae Hông Sòn Province. From pre-Mangrai times the region around Dòi Suthep (including Hang Dong) was an old Lua stronghold, and still today, the Yuan consider the Lua to be the original people of Chiang Mai. Until the early Bangkok period the Lua played an important role in the state ritual of Chiang Mai. They also held a strong economic position by controlling, for instance, the cattle trade. An inscription in Ban Kuan (Hang Dong district), dated “the fifth waning of the sixth month, C.S. 1192” (3 March 1831) specifies that Phutthawong, the then ruler of Chiang Mai, exempted the Lua from corvee.¹³⁵ And remember that after their temporary retreat from Chiang Mai, in 1775/76, the Yuan leaders heavily relied on food requisitions “from the Lua and the mountain people.”¹³⁶ However, it is not clear whether all of the Lua in Hang Dong were natives or whether some groups came from other areas, too. Numerous Lua villages are dispersed in the hilly areas surrounding the valley of Chiang Tung; it is possible that from there and other areas in the Shan states, some Lua villages were uprooted and deported to Chiang Mai by Kawila’s forces.¹³⁷

3. The fertile, irrigated rice-growing zones to the east and northeast of Chiang Mai (San Kamphaeng, Dòi Saket, San Sai) were obviously the most densely populated areas in Chiang Mai. More than two thirds of all rural monasteries/ communities were situated in that region. Of that number roughly 20% had a non-Yuan background. Khün settlements were scattered over all three districts. One finds Tai Yai villages in Dòi Saket and Lü communities in Dòi Saket and San Kamphaeng. The largest

concentration of war captives was in the southern part of San Kamphaeng where six monasteries of Nikai Yòng are reported. But nowhere did captives inhabit large coherent areas. Their villages were always interspersed among Yuan settlements.

6.2. The Numerical Strength of the Captive Population

How many war captives were deported to Lan Na during the era of *kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang*? How large was this population in absolute and relative numbers by the mid 19th century? The Northern Thai chronicles report in detail the numerical strength of various armies, but do not generally provide any figures on the people deported and resettled by these armies. Siamese sources are more precise here. The overall figures I collected for the various campaigns of forced resettlement (1782–1838/39) indicate that 50,000–70,000 war captives were deported during the late 18th and early 19th centuries to present-day Northern Thailand (appendix table 2). Furthermore, at least some 3,000 ethnic Mon fled after the last great Mon uprising in Burma (1814/15) to Chiang Mai, where they were settled in the eastern outskirts of the city and in Saraphi.¹³⁸ Since the forced resettlements were often followed by the more or less voluntary immigration of those who were left behind, and if a natural annual increase¹³⁹ of 0.5% for the “Pre-Bowring Period” is a reasonable supposition, the captive population would have doubled by 1840, eventually reaching a total between 100,000 and 150,000 persons. Taking the census results of 1919/20¹⁴⁰ and assuming an annual increase of 1.5% between 1840 and 1919/20 (including migration), I calculated the total population of Northern Thailand at roughly 0.4 million people. That means that by 1840, roughly 25–40% of the population in the five Yuan principalities of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Phrae and Nan were war captives or their descendants.

Contemporary British sources, however, indicate a far higher percentage of war captives than that derived from my own calculations. After his three journeys in 1829–35 to Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang, David Richardson estimated that “of the original inhabitants of

this country but a very small portion now obtains, perhaps not above one third of the whole.”¹⁴¹ In his diary of a journey five years later he wrote about the “captives of whom 3/4 of the people are composed.”¹⁴² Richardson explained the low numbers of native Yuan by the frequent deportations of the local population to Burma during the 16th to 18th centuries. W.C. McLeod, who visited Chiang Mai and Lamphun on his journey to Chiang Tung in 1837, agrees with Richardson that the large majority of the population were war captives from the “different states tributary to Ava.” McLeod estimates: “More than two-thirds of Zimmè [Chiang Mai], Labong [Lamphun] and Lagon [Lampang] are Talien [Mon] refugees, or persons from the Burman provinces to the northward, who had either voluntarily settled under the Siamese Shans [Yuan], having been inveigled to do so by specious promises, which were never kept, or seized and brought away during their former constant incursions into these provinces, chiefly Kiang Tung [Chiang Tung] and Muang Niong [Yòng].”¹⁴³

Should these figures, obtained by foreigners, be taken at face value? One has to be careful for the following reasons:

Firstly, judging from the routes Richardson and McLeod were travelling in the 1830s, it seems that they really did pass through areas with a high proportion of war captives: Lamphun (nearly completely populated by Lü-Yòng) as well as the eastern and southwestern parts of Chiang Mai (large concentrations of Khün). It is from observations in these regions that their conclusions were drawn. As for Lampang, visited by Richardson (in 1835) but not by McLeod, neither explicitly mentions any captive group. Lampang apparently suffered from the wars with Burma less than Chiang Mai and Lamphun, and was, therefore, not so seriously depopulated. Compared to Chiang Mai, the capital, Lampang was of minor strategic importance *vis-à-vis* the Burmese. Lastly, the Wang river basin was a traditional rice-deficit zone. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that Lampang received a considerably smaller number of war captives than the Chiang Mai-Lamphun region.

Secondly, Richardson and McLeod do not give any information about Phrae and Nan, regions

they obviously never visited. There were large numbers of people resettled in Nan province during the first decades of the 19th century, either as war captives or voluntary immigrants. But neighbouring Phrae is virtually left out by the chronicles and other contemporary sources. Perhaps this principality was too small to be worth mentioning. Or, perhaps Phrae had been far less destroyed during the 18th century than Nan or Chiang Mai and, was therefore not so eager to be engaged in the resettlement campaigns of the latter.

Finally, the British diplomats were probably excessively aware of the non-Yuan population, because they did not expect so many alien elements in Chiang Mai. Certainly, the increase of population in Lan Na during the late 18th and early 19th centuries was only partly due to the influx of war captives. The return of former residents from jungle and mountainous areas was important, too. An inscription of Wat Phrabòrommathat Si Còm Thong (Chiang Mai) mentions 21 families who had served the monastery as *phrai wat* (ไพร่วัด) then fled from the Burmese armies into the jungle and finally returned in 1779 to the monastery.¹⁴⁴ Various smaller valleys situated far off the major invasion routes were not abandoned by their inhabitants, but, on the contrary, provided shelter for refugees from areas ravaged by war. The district of Li in the far south of Lamphun, for instance, remained relatively untouched by the events of the 1760s and 1770s. Many Yuan people from Mae Hong Sòn sought refuge in Li during that time.¹⁴⁵

There is, however, little doubt that the war captives and their descendants formed a major part of the mid-19th century population of Lan Na. The results of a detailed analysis of the "List of Monasteries" (appendix, table 1) show: At the end of the 19th century the descendants of war captives comprised roughly 20% of the total population of Chiang Mai, 30–35% in the city and 15–20% in the countryside.¹⁴⁶ But these figures represent only the minimum margin, when the figures for half a century earlier are taken into consideration. There had certainly been more interaction among various ethnic groups during the 19th century than most Western observers tended to believe,¹⁴⁷ for the "List of Monasteries" mentions at least a dozen villages with "Nikai Chiang Mai" affiliation

whose names indicate, however, a non-Yuan background. Some captive groups, such as the Karen, were animists, not Buddhists; their villages are not represented by the "List of Monasteries." Moreover, one important group of war captives, some 8,000 residents of Müang Sat (ethnic Tai Yai),¹⁴⁸ were not conceded their own *nikai*. Their settlements, such as Ban Müang Sat Nòi and Ban Müang Sat Luang (near Chiang Mai city),¹⁴⁹ were obviously included in the category of "Nikai Chiang Mai." On the other hand, Yuan villages in the sparsely populated northern section of Chiang Mai (Fang, Phrao, Chiang Dao), are not included in the "List of Monasteries."¹⁵⁰ At a very rough estimate, I would guess that by 1840 perhaps up to one third of the population in Chiang Mai (whole province) was of captive origin, and probably between one third and two fifths in the whole of Lan Na.

6.3. Social and Political Status of War Captives in Lan Na

Nearly everywhere in the Yuan principalities, war captives and their descendants constituted so large a group, in some areas even the bulk of the populace, that their general enslavement as "second-class citizens" was not feasible. Moreover, the Khün, Lü, and Tai Yai (in this order) shared language, beliefs, customs, and basic way of life with the Yuan and with each other. From a historical point of view, Chiang Tung, Müang Sat and Müang Yòng were at least as strongly connected to Chiang Mai as Phrae or Nan used to be. All these *müang* belonged to the Yuan-Khün-Lü cultural zone, i.e. Lan Na.¹⁵¹ To sum up, there were no attitudes of any racial or cultural superiority by the Yuan (Chiang Mai) élite towards most of the war captives. In this respect the situation in Central Thailand, where many tens of thousands Lao and Khmer war captives were often badly treated, was fundamentally different. The captive villages in Siam were organized in special labour units (*kông*, กอง) under the supervision of Siamese lords (*nai kông*, นายกอง). Although in most cases they were not slaves (*that*, ทาส) but commoners (*phrai*, ไพร่), these non-Siamese populations were considered culturally inferior.¹⁵²

In the Yuan principalities the captive population lived in settlements under the control of their traditional village leaders. Sometimes the ruler of a captured *müang* agreed to follow his subjects to the south and was allowed to maintain his high status. Thus, nearly all the members of the ruling family of Chiang Tung settled in Chiang Mai city (1805), and Kawila regarded them as his “younger brothers.” Intermarriage between the Kawila dynasty and the Chiang Tung dynasty (both its Sirichai and Mahākhanān lines) occurred frequently during the 19th century.¹⁵³

Likewise, cordial relations developed between the ruling families of Müang Yòng and Lamphun after the principality of Lamphun was restored in 1806/14. The ruler of Müang Yòng settled in Wiang Yòng, opposite the city of Lamphun, on the eastern bank of the Kuang river. As was discussed earlier, Wiang Yòng and the surrounding villages were replicas of the old Müang Yòng in a geographic-ecological dimension. No less fascinating, however, is how the new settlements reflected and reinforced ritual power and social stratification. The main monastery in Wiang Yòng, Wat Hua Khua, shelters the four guardian spirits of Müang Yòng which the *cao müang* “resettled” along with the population. The four guardian spirits are each symbolized by a stone-cut white elephant.¹⁵⁴ Their installation in Wiang Yòng ensured the well-being of the people and reinforced the political authority of Müang Yòng’s former ruler, who had now become a “younger brother” of the ruler of Lamphun. His important position within the leadership of Lamphun is evident from the following incident: On the ninth waning of the second month, C.S. 1173 [9 November 1811], the king of Chiang Mai, Kawila, announced that the ruler of Lamphun and his deputy, the *cao upalat hò na* (เจ้าอุปราชหอหน้า), should rule together in harmony. In case of dispute, the councillors (*khun sanam*, ขุนสนาม) of Lamphun should be consulted first. If their mediation was unsuccessful the former ruler of Müang Yòng was asked to act as arbitrator before a final appeal would be brought to Chiang Mai. Holding the third highest rank in the political hierarchy of Lamphun and possessing the loyalty of its numerous Lü-Yòng population, the Cao Müang Yòng was badly needed to secure

the stability and prosperity of the principality of Lamphun.¹⁵⁵

While the noble families from Müang Yòng obviously lived in the main village of Wiang Yòng, architects and construction workers settled the adjacent village of (Ban) Tòng. The people of Ban Tòng are famous for their skills in constructing religious buildings such as *vihāra* (วิหาร) in the traditional Yuan-Lü style.¹⁵⁶ The villages of (Ban) Luai und (Ban) Yu were widely known for their specialization in cloth-weaving and poetry, respectively. Outside this cluster of four occupationally specialized villages, lived the bulk of the rice-growing peasants.¹⁵⁷ Both rulers in Lamphun, the *cao müang* in the city and his junior counterpart in Wiang Yòng, profited from this “cellular” organization of society.

This pattern of settlement, based on strict status and occupational divisions, was yet more distinct in Chiang Mai, where the various ethnic groups living in the outskirts of the city were highly specialized craftsmen. The Khün, settling south of the “Pratu Chiang Mai”, were well-known bell-founders and producers of lacquerware (still called in Chiang Mai *khriüang khoen*, เครื่องเค้น). Compartments occupied by ethnic Lü and Tai Yai were famous for silversmith’s work and tanning, respectively.¹⁵⁸ The community of Ban Chang Khòng, situated inside the outer city wall along the banks of the Mae Kha waterway, not far away from the present Mae Ping Hotel, was inhabited by descendants of Yuan war captives from Chiang Saen. They were highly specialized drum and gong makers (*chang khòng*, ช่างฆ้อง). Outside Chiang Mai City lived the peasant population, made up of various ethnic background, both native and captive.

Although the war captives were in general given fair treatment by the Yuan rulers, one would expect them to resent the loss of *heimat*. As paddy fields to cultivate were abundant, the new settlers did not fear for their material well-being; but the psychological effects of deportation were much more difficult to overcome, at least for the first and second generations. Richardson reports on an encounter with the last ruler of Müang Yòng, whom he met in 1834: “The rightfull *Tsobwa* of Mein Neaung stayed with me a great part of the day. He is a prisoner who was carried off by the

present Chow Tschee Weet [*cao chiwit*, เจ้าชื้อวิต] about 30 years ago, the year after he re-established this town [Lamphun]. He complained with little reserve of this situation here. He said he ate and drank and slept like other people. His natural part was here, but his spirit *cit* was in his own country."¹⁵⁹ Richardson's report is corroborated by McLeod, who, a few years later, had a similar encounter with the former ruler of Müang Yòng. The British official, having been instructed by his superiors to avoid sensitive political issues during his fact-finding mission,¹⁶⁰ describes an even stronger dissatisfaction with an unpleasant situation. "The Mein Neaung chief . . . said, he hoped the British would interfere and have him and his countrymen released, either to return to their own country or to settle under us in the Tenasserim Provinces; that they, with the people of Kiang Túng and other places to the northward were sorely oppressed; that to the known benevolence and humanity of the English all their hearts were turned." It seems, however, that this alleged statement by the "Müang Yòng chief" reflected McLeod's own wishful thinking (of British intervention in the future) rather than real expectations by the Müang Yòng chief. As if to dissipate such surmise, McLeod emphasized a sentence later: "I, however, gave him [the former ruler of Müang Yòng] no hopes of our interfering as they were not our subjects, and had voluntarily placed themselves under the Siamese Shans."¹⁶¹

The sentiments expressed in encounters with foreigners certainly did not reflect any intolerably severe grief or feelings of hatred against the Yuan rulers. McLeod's conclusion that the war captives were "disgusted with the treatment they receive" and "ripe for revolt,"¹⁶² is, to say the least, an exaggeration. Richardson's diary includes a brief but moving account of a discussion with a Lü-Yòng woman in Pa Sang, a sister of "the rightfull *Tsobwa* of Mein Neuang", in whose house the British diplomat had stayed one night. Richardson was told that the war captives were allowed "to live as much together as possible." As they amounted to 3,000 people in Pa Sang, the Yuan authorities of Lamphun did not "trust them together." Therefore, "they were distributed in small numbers about the different villages in this principality which the Birmans had then only

recently left and which was thinly peopled, they never made an attempt to escape."¹⁶³ It seems that the fear of the Yuan rulers that their captive subjects might try to escape to their native country¹⁶⁴ put restraints on exploitation and misuse of power.

7. Concluding Remarks

However, communication between the war captives and their original home-lands was never completely cut. On the contrary, the war captives seemed to have played a vital role not only in the revival of agriculture and of handicrafts in Lan Na, but certainly in the trade network, both intra- and inter-regional, as well. By the time of McLeod's visit to Chiang Mai (1837) this trade was already flourishing. The British diplomat observed that dried fish and meat were brought from Chiang Tung. "Quantities of betel nut, with which these territories [Chiang Mai/Lamphun] abound, are smuggled for sale to Keng Túng, where there is none, and the consumption great."¹⁶⁵ The re-establishment of Chiang Rai and Phayao as dependencies of Chiang Mai and Lampang respectively (1844),¹⁶⁶ accelerated the contacts between Lan Na and the regions further to the north. These contacts were only briefly interrupted by the Chiang Tung Wars (1850–1854).¹⁶⁷ The war captives and their descendants contributed to the forging of close relations, based on ethnic and cultural bonds, between Chiang Mai and the Chiang Tung-Müang Yòng-Chiang Rung region. This development was only interrupted after World War II as a result of developments in China and Burma.

The forced resettlement campaigns in Northern Thailand during the early Bangkok period gave rise to significant demographic changes including the ethnic composition and the regional distribution of the population. By 1840, the principal settlement areas of the Yuan principalities had contracted to the core areas in the south. The concentration of the bulk of the population near the seats of princely power and surrounding rice-growing area created the conditions for the accumulation of economic resources that were necessary to restore viable polities in Lan Na. The temporary depopulation of extensive, but now peripheral, settlement areas

in the north, particularly in the Kok-Ing basin, was accepted.

After a period of political, social and demographic consolidation, Bangkok and the Yuan rulers encouraged an influx of settlers back to the depopulated areas of the north. This remigration gained momentum in the 1840s when Chiang Khòng (1841/42), Chiang Rai, Ngao and Phayao (1843/44) were refounded. A second wave started in c. 1870 and led to the repopulation of deserted towns like Fang, Chiang Dao, Mae Sariang, and, finally, Chiang Saen.

Abbreviations

C.S.	Cūlasakarāja (“Little Era” = Christian Era minus 638)
CH	Cotmaihet
CHLN	Cotmaihet lan na
CMC	Chiang Mai Chronicle
HP	Hans Penth version
JSC	Jengtung State Chronicle
KMCM	Khlong rūang mangthara rop chiang mai
N	Notton version
NL	National Library
PLN	Prawattisat lan na
PMN	Phongsawadan müang nan
PPR1	Phra-ratcha phongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi 1
PCMLL	Phongsawadan müang nakhòn chiang mai nakhòn müang lampang müang lamphunchai
PY	Phongsawadan yonok
SN	Samnak nayok ratthamontri version
SRI	Social Research Institute
TMY	Tamnan müang yòng
TCCT	Tamnan cao cet ton
TPCM	Tamnan phün müang chiang mai
TSHR	Tamnan sip ha ratchawong
U	Udom Rungruangsrì version

Notes

¹ On the events in Burma see Koenig 1990:14–17.

² A good general description of the Siamese policy of forced resettlements in the Lao *müang* is given by Snit and Breazeale 1988:9–22; on the deportations of Lao war captives to Central Thai provinces see Bangòn 1986. Up to 50,000 Lao had been resettled in

The latter movement was, at least partially, a reaction to the challenges by European colonial powers Siam was facing during the last quarter of the 19th century. The old “Southeast Asian” idea of overlapping border zones, based on the primacy of manpower, was abandoned in favour of the “European” concept of a territorial state with clearly defined border lines.¹⁶⁸ However, this would have to be the starting point of a separate study focussing on the population history of Lan Na during the second half of the 19th and the first quarter of the 20th centuries.

Central Thailand by the mid 19th century. In Prachinburi, for instance, the Lao still outnumbered the Siamese at the turn of the century. Compare Bangòn 1986:99.

³ Chalòng 1986:149.

⁴ Snit and Breazeale 1988:21.

⁵ For details of Müang Phan see Hò cotmaihet haengchat, รายงานเมืองนครลำพูน ศก 112 (pp. 10–12 and 21–22), R.5 ม.58/187.

⁶ Hò samut haengchat, จดหมายเหตุสุโขทัยที่ 4, จ.ศ. 1170, เลขที่ 31.

⁷ Somsak 1986:69. The principality of Chiang Khaeng comprised territories on both sides of the Mekong. Its original capital of the same name was situated directly on the left bank of the Mekong and it at present the seat of a sub-district in Luang Nam Tha province (Lao P.D.R.). The principality’s population consisted mainly of Lü and Tai Nüa, living in the lowlands, and various hill-tribes such as Akha and Lahu. For details on the history of Chiang Khaeng see Grabowsky 1999.

⁸ Kraisi 1965 and 1978. Kraisi does not provide any written evidence for the saying. However, in the Nan Chronicle there is a passage that comes close to its wording. The chronicle states that in the early 18th century the Burmese king ordered the governor of Nan “to gather people and put them into villages and towns” (*kep hòm phai tai sai ban sai müang* เก็บรวมไพร่ไทยใส่บ้านใส่เมือง). Quoted from Social Research Institute, พันวงศ์ตามหากระสือครั้งหลาย . . . (SRI, 82.107.05. 043-043), f. 122/4-5. English translation in NC, Wyatt 1994:75.

⁹ See e.g. PPR1, Thiphakòrawong 1988. Prince Damrong Rachanuphap’s famous book “ไทยรบพม่า” (1977) is largely based on the royal chronicles of Ayutthaya and Bangkok.

¹⁰ Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:xxx.

¹¹ Udom (*TPCM-U* 1995) uses a method developed by the German classical philologist Paul Maas for the *archetype*, i.e. a text closest to the first perhaps lost—original manuscript by examining all available surviving manuscripts called “witnesses” of the original. Udom obviously believes that there exists just *one* original text of the Chiang Mai Chronicle from which all present-day versions derive. The Wat Phra Ngam-National Library manuscript is regarded by him as the least contaminated of all surviving manuscripts.

¹² Saraswadee Ongsakul, personal communication (Chiang Mai, 8 March 1993).

¹³ Richardson, “Journal of Missions” (British Library, Western Manuscript Department; “A Journal kept by Captain W.C. McLeod” (British Library, India Office & Oriental Collections). These sources are cited hereafter as “Richardson’s Journal” and “McLeod’s Journal” respectively. McLeod’s Journal of 1837 is due to be published and edited by Andrew Turton and the present author.

¹⁴ I am grateful to Dr Ronald Renard for this information.

¹⁵ For the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of the impact of Burmese rule on the Lan Na polity see Saraswadee 1996:228–258.

¹⁶ *TPCM-SN*:80–81; *TPCM-U*:98–99; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:125–126.

¹⁷ This poem, comprising more than 300 stanzas, is one of the oldest travel poems (*nirat*, นิราศ) of the Thai and among the most important pieces of Lan Na literature. Singkha Wannasai (1979) transliterated the poem into modern Thai script and also published a translation into the Siamese language. *KMCM* describes the deportation of the Yuan war captives from Chiang Mai to Hongsawadi (Pegu). Able-bodied men, women, old people and children had to set out on a long, difficult journey. The poem’s author was probably a high-ranking Yuan officer whose task was to personally accompany a princess of Chiang Mai (*cao ying*, เจ้าหญิง) to Pegu. An in-depth analysis of *KMCM* is made by Chomrom lan na khadi Chiang Mai 1990.

¹⁸ Lieberman 1984:59; see also Lieberman 1980.

¹⁹ Chomrom lanna khadi Chiang Mai 1990:15.

²⁰ Chomrom lanna khadi Chiang Mai 1990:16–23.

²¹ *TPCM-SN*:81; *TPCM-U*:99; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:126.

²² Lieberman 1984:59, 97–98.

²³ See Lieberman 1980.

²⁴ Sommai 1975a:37.

²⁵ *TPCM-SN*:82–83; *TPCM-U*:101–102; see also *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:408–411.

²⁶ Quoted from Lieberman 1984.

²⁷ 3,000 inhabitants of Chiang Mai were obviously deported and resettled in the Shan State of Mòk Mai. The *müang* of Mòk Mai was at that time depopulated. The ruler of Ava decided to reestablish it as a Burmese vassal state. See Hò samut haengchat, จดหมายเหตุรัชกาลที่ 4, จ.ศ. 1228, เลขที่ 126.

²⁸ *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:436.

²⁹ *TPCM-SN*:92; *TPCM-U*:112–113; *TSHR-SRI*:16

³⁰ *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:438.

³¹ See Saraswadee 1996:252–253; Penth 1993: 115–116.

³² He was so named because he used to wear a white cloth around his head; this was not unusual for Burmese officers. See Penth 1993:116.

³³ *TPCM-SN*:93; *TPCM-U*:113–114 *TSHR-SRI*:16; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:199.

³⁴ *TCCT*, Sanguan 1968:21–22; *TSHR-SRI*:16–17; see also *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:441.

³⁵ *TPCM-SN*:93–94; *TPCM-U*:114–115; *TSHR-SRI*:17–18; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:200–202.

³⁶ Damrong 1977:483–485.

³⁷ จดหมายเหตุล้านนา บันทึกเหตุการณ์ประวัติศาสตร์ พ.ศ. 2271–2397, f. 11, in: Saraswadee 1993:20. This document is available on microfilm in the archives of the Social Research Institute (SRI), Chiang Mai University (CMU) under the code SRI 82 107 05 048–048.

³⁸ *TCCT*, Sanguan 1968:35.

³⁹ A Siamese army repelled the Burmese, who besieged Chiang Mai for eight months. During that time the inhabitants of the city faced starvation. One Northern Thai chronicle even reports cases of cannibalism in the beleaguered city. The victims were captured Burmese soldiers. See *TCCT*, Sanguan 1968:28.

⁴⁰ *TSHR-SRI*:20; *TPCM-SN*:96; *TPCM-U*:117; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:143.

⁴¹ *TSHR-SRI*:20.

⁴² *TPCM-SN*:98; *TPCM-U*:120; *TSHR-SRI*:25. *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:452 gives only 200 able-bodied men from the vicinity of Pa Sang. This could be the result of a misreading, for the ciphers 2 and 7 have a similar shape in Northern Thai script (here: *lek hora*, เลขโหระ). However, according to *TPCM* and *TSHR*, Pa Sang had around 1,000 able-bodied men or, including family members, roughly 5,000 inhabitants in 1782.

⁴³ Before the Burmese conquest of Lan Na the city

of Lamphun was still situated along the Ping River. At some time after 1558, the Ping changed its course, probably as a result of a great flood. Thereafter, the new course of the Ping was c. 5 km to the east.

⁴⁴ *TPCM-SN*:106; *TPCM-U*:129; *TSHR-SRI*:35; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:226.

⁴⁵ See *TPCM-SN*:100; *TPCM-U*:122; *TSHR-SRI*:28; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:217.

⁴⁶ Kawila needed royal consent to the recall of the Yuan refugees who had settled in Ban Pòm near Ayutthaya ("Krung Kao"). See *TSHR-SRI*:28; *TPCM-SN*:100; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:215-216; *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:455.

⁴⁷ Tak was ruled by Chiang Mai until the reign of Rama III, when it was handed back to Siam. Tak (Rahaeng) was until the end of the 19th century predominantly inhabited by Yuan. Holt S. Hallett writes: "The province of Rahaeng is mainly occupied by descendents of the Zimmé Shans [Yuan], owing to its having formerly been part of the kingdom of Zimmé. Even in the the city, more than half the people are Zimmé Shans and Peguans [Mon]." Lilian Curtis 1903:58 makes a similar observation: "The city is made up of a native huts, crowded with people. The latter form a most interesting study, for the population here is about half and half Siamese and Lao." Compare also Penth 1973.

⁴⁸ จดหมายเหตุล้านนา . . . , f° 13/2-14/1, in: Saraswadee 1993:21.

⁴⁹ *TPCM-SN*:99; *TPCM-U*:121; *TSHR-SRI*:26; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:152.

⁵⁰ Both *TSHR-SRI*:27 and *TPCM-U*:122 mention the village of Ban Tha Fang on the west bank of the Salween as the main target of Kawila's forces. After the conquest of Ban Tha, the leaders (*phò*, พ่อ, "father") of Müang Yan and Müang Thu (*TSHR-SRI* Thuk) surrendered, too. *TPCM-U* records the village of Kiti as a further target of forced relocation.

⁵¹ Following the successive Burmese defeats of 1784-86, Burmese offensive capacities dwindled. "The scale of the conflict was much reduced", Koenig 1990:20 concludes.

⁵² *TSHR-SRI* 28; *TPCM-SN* 100; *TPCM-U*:122; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:215-216; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:153-154.

⁵³ The Northern Thai sources are not explicit on the events leading to the popular uprising in Chiang Saen and its brief occupation by Yuan forces (see *TPCM-U* 124; *TSHR-SRI* 29). One may speculate that the Chiang Mai centred chronicles were not inclined to report the seizure, even if only temporary, of Chiang

Saen by forces other than Kawila's. But the Siamese royal chronicles do report the events in detail. See *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:48; compare Damrong 1977:628-629. The Siamese sources are largely based on the testimony of the captured Burmese general who confessed: "I had spent a year with 10,000 men [?], cultivating the paddy fields at Cheingsen [Chiang Saen] when Pya (governor) Prè [Phrae] and Phya Yong marched a Siamese force [Yuan force] against us. I slipped out of the town and surrendered to Phya Chiengrai, who sent me to the Siamese forces [Yuan forces] at Lakon [Lampang]. The governor of Lakon sent me on to Ayuthia [Bangkok] where I have been maintained until now." Quoted from Phraison Salarak, Phra and Thien Subindu (U Aung Thien) 1957: 53. was the main source for the Thai version of the Mon-Burmese Chronicles [*Phongsawadan mòn phama*, พงศาวดารมอญพม่า].

⁵⁴ *TSHR-SRI*:29; *TPCM-SN*:101; *CMC-U*:124; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:218; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:155-156.

⁵⁵ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:48-49.

⁵⁶ *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:458.

⁵⁷ *TPCM-SN*:103; *TPCM-U*:126; *TSHR-SRI*:32; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:158. As Wyatt and Aroonrut (*ibid.*, fn. 31) observe, "the Ban Satòì people founded a new village with the same name east of Chiang Mai. The Wang Lung people now have a village called Ban Wang Lung in Hòt district of Chiang Mai."

⁵⁸ *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:459.

⁵⁹ *TPCM-SN*:107; *TPCM-U*:130; *TSHR-SRI*:37; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:228; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:163. Among the raided settlements were Müang Caet, Müang King and Müang Kun, all dependencies of the Burmese stronghold of Müang Sat.

⁶⁰ See "ร่างตราถึงเมืองเชียงใหม่นำส่งพระสุพรรณบุตริ ขึ้นไปราชการพระเจ้าเชียงใหม่", in: *Rüang song tang cao prathetsarat krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi 1* 1971:33-38.

⁶¹ *TSHR-SRI*:39; *TPCM-SN*:109; *TPCM-U*:132-133. According to other Northern Thai sources, Còm Hong fell already two years earlier, in 1796, into Burmese hands. See *Cotmai het lan na* . . . , f° 20, in: Saraswadee 1993:23.

⁶² Hò samut haengchat, จดหมายเหตุรัชกาลที่ 1, จ.ศ. 1165, เล่มที่ 1.

⁶³ *TSHR-SRI*:39; *TPCM-SN*:109; *TPCM-U*:133; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:231-232; *CMC-HP*, Aroonrut and Wyatt 1995:166

⁶⁴ The Northern Thai chronicles call the ruler of Müang Sat “*Racha* [King] *Còm Hong*” (ราชาจอมหงส์).

⁶⁵ *Tamnan mangrai chiang mai chiang tung* (1993:) records: “สุนัมน้างถึงคราวได้ 1163 ตัว ปีรวงเล่า พญาสาตไปเอาคนหัวเมืองน่าน ...” *Còm Hong*’s attack on Nan is not mentioned by neither the Nan Chronicle nor the Chiang Mai Chronicle.

⁶⁶ *TMY*, Thawi 1984:57 (original: f• 69).

⁶⁷ *TMY*, Thawi 1984:57 (original: f• 70).

⁶⁸ *JSC*, Saimoeng Mangrai 1981:258.

⁶⁹ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:87.

⁷⁰ *TPCM-SN*:110; *TSHR-SRI*:41; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:233; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:167.

⁷¹ *TPCM-SN*:114; *TSHR-SRI*:45; *CMC-N*, Notton 1932:238–239; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:171.

⁷² *Hò samut haengchat*, จดหมายเหตุรัชกาลที่ 1, จ.ศ. 1164, เล่มที่ 1.

⁷³ See *JSC*, Saimoeng Mangrai 1981:258; *TMY*, Thawi 1984:62 (original: f• 80); Scott 1901:407.

⁷⁴ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong: 94. As for other descriptions of the conquest of Chiang Saen see *TPCM-SN*:112; *TPCM-U*:136; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:169–170; Damrong 1977:686–688; *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:467–469.

⁷⁵ See *TPCM-SN*:112; *TPCM-U*:136; *TSHR-SRI*:43.

⁷⁶ *NC*, Wyatt 1994:99.

⁷⁷ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:97; see also *TPCM-SN*:114–115; *TPCM-U*:139–140; *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:173; *PY*, Prachakitkòracak 1973:472. *Thammalangka*, the *uparat*, used Müang Yòng as his main base for further military operations.

⁷⁸ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:98.

⁷⁹ *PPRI*, Thiphakòrawong 1988:98.

⁸⁰ *Hò samut haengchat*, จดหมายเหตุรัชกาลที่ 1, จ.ศ. 1170, เล่มที่ 1.

⁸¹ จดหมายเหตุล้านนา . . . , f• 26–27, in: Saraswadee 1993:25.

⁸² For details concerning the great famine in Burma and the Burmese controlled “Shan States” see Koenig 1990:33–35.

⁸³ *TMY*, Thawi 1984:61 (original: f• 78).

⁸⁴ *TMY*, Thawi 1984:60/61 (original: f• 77).

⁸⁵ Northern Thai sources differ on the year of resettlement. Whereas จดหมายเหตุล้านนา . . . , f• 27 (in: Saraswadee 1993:25) mentions C.S. 1171 (A.D. 1809/10), the Chiang Mai Chronicle gives C.S. 1172 (A.D. 1810/11).

⁸⁶ According to the Chiang Mai Chronicle, Kawila died on the fourth day of the waning moon in the fourth month of C.S. 1177 [18 January 1816]. See,

e.g., *TPCM-U*:152; compare also Penth 1993:128. This date is confirmed by other Northern Thai sources. See, e.g., จดหมายเหตุล้านนา . . . , f• 29, in: Saraswadee 1993:26; ประวัติศาสตร์ล้านนา (SRI, 80.047.05.028-028), f• 22. However, most historians of Lan Na have so far followed the dating of *PY* (Prachakitkòracak 1973:481), a secondary source, and accepted the year C.S. 1175 (A.D. 1813/14) as the year of Kawila’s death. But as all sources agree that Thammalangka’s accession to the throne took place in A.D. 1816, one would have to explain the long and quite improbable-interregnum of three years.

⁸⁷ *Suai Kabang* is an ethnonym that probably refers to the Pwo-Karen. See Renard 1980:160.

⁸⁸ Social Research Institute, ประวัติศาสตร์ล้านนา (SRI, 80 047 05 028-028), f• 22/4-23/2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, f• 23/6-7.

⁹⁰ For a Thai chronicular account see *PCMLL*: 102–103.

The deportations from Müang Sat are analyzed by D. Richardson, who visited Chiang Mai shortly afterwards (in 1839). He wrote in his report to E.A. Blundell, British Commissioner of Tenasserim, that he had been told by “the son of a man who is himself prisoner here, who took the account of captured property” that “there were 1,815 miserable captives of all ages, from a few days up to 70 or 80 years old, and about 500 cattle. He also stated that some 30 years ago, about the time his father was made prisoner, the Zimmay people had destroyed these towns in the same way they had done now.” Quoted from “Extract from the Journal relative to the invasion of the Birman frontier towns by the Laos people”, *The Burney Papers* 1971:46.

⁹¹ Melchers 1986:197.

⁹² *Cotmaiher rüang thap chiang rung* n.d.:99. The population estimate includes Müang Phayak, Müang Sat, and Müang Yòng as well as seven other *müang* but excludes Müang Len.

⁹³ *PCMLL*:118.

⁹⁴ As for details concerning the resettlement campaigns that were undertaken by the rulers of Nan during the Early Bangkok Period, see Grabowsky 1996:260–266.

⁹⁵ Gould, “Letter to Knox, 4.8.1876” (Public Record Office, London).

⁹⁶ *TMY*, Thawi 1984:61 (original: f• 79).

⁹⁷ The second invasion of Chiang Tung, for instance, involved a total of 30,000 men, 449 elephants, 152 horses, 400 guns, and nine pieces of heavy and medium-weight artillery. See Ratanaporn 1988:313.

- ⁹⁸ JSC, Saimoeng Mangrai 1981:259.
- ⁹⁹ TMY, Thawi 1984:63 (original f. 83).
- ¹⁰⁰ TMY, Thawi 1984:63–64 (original: f. 84–85).
- ¹⁰¹ See JSC, Saimoeng Mangrai 1981:259. The Khün tradition says: “Sao Kawng Tai was the 33rd chief [of Chiang Tung] in 1802, when the Siamese invaded that State. The invaders stormed through the 15th century wall constructed by Alaungpaya, and sacked the city. The country was laid waste. Families including that of the chiefs were carried away and forced to settle at Cheinshen [Chiang Saen] in Northern Siam. Of the chief’s family thus carried away, Maha Khanan, younger brother of the chief, was the only one to escape. One version says that he made good his escape by wearing a monk’s robe. The chief Sao Kawng Tai had died in 1804 and the commander of the town garrison sent by Bodawpaya refused to accommodate Maha Khanan: The country was in utter chaos, Maha Khanan went north to Mongyang area and made a plan to regain his state. He wiped out a force sent to capture him and maintained himself gallantly amid[s]t vicissitudes for some years. In 1813, he was called to the capital [Ava]. He went boldly and presented his justification in fighting his right. King Bodawpaya heard him and in consideration of his courage, ability and the correctness in the line of succession, recognized him as chief of Keng Tung.” Quoted from *The Working People’s Daily* (Rangoon), 7 February 1974.
- ¹⁰² Scott 1901:408.
- ¹⁰³ Nithi 1991:270.
- ¹⁰⁴ JSC, Saimoeng Mangrai 1981:254–256.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Phama rop thai* 1989:7–9.
- ¹⁰⁶ Koenig 1990:34.
- ¹⁰⁷ Keyes 1970:232 concludes: “... it is reasonable to assume that the Burmese-Yuan wars were responsible for the end of the production of the manuscripts in the area. It would seem probable that some of the Yuan subjects living along the Salween would have evacuated their villages when they realized they were on the route of the Burmese armies. One could well conjecture, further, that villagers in the area, having decided to escape from the threat posed by the Burmese attacks, had collected all of their religious texts and stored them in the cave pending their return.”
- ¹⁰⁸ Concerning the relations between Chiang Mai and its Lü and Khün vassal states (until 1558) see Saraswadee 1996:185–197; Usani 1988.
- ¹⁰⁹ *TPCM-SN*:115; *TSHR-SRI*:48; see also *PY*, Prachakitkōracak 1973:472.
- ¹¹⁰ Renard 1980:132.
- ¹¹¹ The province (*cangwat*, จังหวัด) of Chiang Mai comprises an area of 22,800 km².
- ¹¹² Wyatt 1984:7 describes the ambiguous meaning of *müang* as follows: “*Müang* is a term that defies translation, for it denotes as much personal as spatial relationship. ... We can imagine that such *müang* originally arose out of a set of political, economic, and social interrelationships. Under dangerous circumstances ... Tai villages banded together for mutual defence under the leadership of the most powerful village or family, whose resources might enable it to arm and supply troops. In return for such protection, participating villages rendered labor service to their *chao* or paid them quantities of local produce or handicrafts.”
- ¹¹³ It can be seen, for instance, in numerous village and street names in West Germany which are of Silesian or Pomeranian origin. If geography allows, immigrants/ refugees tend to build their new settlements in a geographical and ecological environment similar to that of their original home. Sometimes even the spatial relationship of one locality to another is preserved. In the former autonomous German Volga Republic, dissolved by Stalin in 1941, one finds the small towns of Basel and Schaffhausen situated a short distance from each other on the right bank of the Volga. If we substitute the Rhine for the Volga, we get a duplicate of northern Switzerland, the native country of these German settlers. See map in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 11/12 July 1992, p. 7.
- ¹¹⁴ For details see Sanguan 1972:166; see also Kraisri 1978:55.
- ¹¹⁵ Kraisri 1983/84:31.
- ¹¹⁶ Sangwòrayanprayut 1990; interview with Phrakhrū Wicitpanyakòn (Wat Ban Tòng, Lamphun), 8 March 1992.
- ¹¹⁷ The population of Pa Sang had been transferred to Chiang Mai in 1776. The spread of Lü-Yòng settlements in Pa Sang markedly increased after 1820. The wooden inscription of Wat Chang Khao Nòi Nüa, dated 1828, is a hint of that process. See Sawaeng 1991.
- ¹¹⁸ See Sangwòrayanprayut 1990.
- ¹¹⁹ Interview with Phrakhrū Wicitpanyakòn (Wat Ban Tòng, Lamphun), 8 March 1992.
- ¹²⁰ According to Cao Vimalatissa, abbot of Wat Phra Phutthabat Tak Pha, who claims that Lü-Yòng make up even 95% of the population in their stronghold Pa Sang. Interview, 17 April 1992.

¹²¹ In 1814, Rama II ordered the restoration of Lamphun as a principality formally independent of Chiang Mai and Lampang. Kawila's younger brother, Luang Kham Fan, was appointed ruler of Lamphun. See Damrong 1990:99. *TPCM-U*:143 reports that the re-establishment of Lamphun took place on Thursday, 27 March 1806. According to *TPCM-U*, "five-hundred" (i.e., in the language of the chronicle, a sufficiently large number of) people from Lampang and Chiang Mai each were settled inside the city walls. Perhaps the formal appointment of Lamphun as a self-governing polity by Bangkok occurred several years later. That may explain the gap of 11 years that exists between the Siamese and the Northern Thai accounts.

¹²² Li (ลี) means "to hide" (from perils). The location of Li on the periphery of Lamphun, some distance to the main invasion routes, would explain why the Yuan population of Li had probably not left their villages like people in other areas.

¹²³ See Srisakara 1984:128.

¹²⁴ Prachan 1987:10–11.

¹²⁵ Hò samut haengchat, จดหมายเหตุรัชกาลที่ 1, จ.ศ. 1164, เล่มที่ 1. Many people from Müang Pu and Müang Sat founded villages not far from Lampang city, such as Ban Wat Müang Sat. See Srisakara 1984:128.

¹²⁶ Sommai 1975b and Sanan 1996.

¹²⁷ Vatikiotis 1984.

¹²⁸ Sommai 1975b.

¹²⁹ Sanan 1996. Dr M.R. Rujaya Abhakorn planned to republish the text based on Sanan's new transliteration but it never happened. On several occasions over the past years I searched for the original manuscript in order to check both transliterations. However, investigations both at Wat Chedi Luang and at Dr M.R. Rujaya's office remained unsuccessful. It seems now that this valuable manuscript has disappeared which is highly regrettable as a complete verification of the text may no longer be possible.

¹³⁰ The dating probably follows the Northern Thai (Yuan) style calendar which is two months in advance over the Siamese calendar. According to the Siamese style calendar, the date would be 1 March 1898.

¹³¹ For details concerning the (late 19th century) population of Chiang Dao, Fang and Phrao see Hallett 1988:334–352.

¹³² Vatikiotis 1984:54–55 [Explanations are added in brackets].

¹³³ McLeod's Journal:36 [23.1.1837].

¹³⁴ Sanguan Chotisukharat 1972:167 reports that the

inhabitants from Ban Wualai and Ban Tòng Kai in Hang Dong district are descendants of war captives from Müang Ngualai and Müang Tòng Kai in the Shan States (dependencies of Chiang Tung). They were most probably ethnic Khün.

¹³⁵ Kritsana 1988:18.

¹³⁶ *CMC-HP*, Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995:148.

¹³⁷ There are still a large number of villages of Lua origin in the districts of San Pa Tòng and Còm Thòng. Te Yuan people of Mae Caem speak with a Lua accent and wear their *pha sin* with a Lua fold. See Kritsana 1988. As to the role of the Lua in Northern Thai society see Chonthira 1987.

¹³⁸ จดหมายเหตุล้านนา . . . , f. 28/3-5, in: Saraswadee 1993:26. Other sources give the numbers of Mon refugees as high as 5,000 (e.g., *TPCM-SN*:125). Concerning the mass exodus of Mon from Burma see Damrong 1990:106–107. More than 40,000 Mon fled to Siam, where most of them were resettled in areas around Bangkok. The Mon village Nòng Du in Pa Sang district (Lamphun) was also founded in c. 1815 or later, and not, as the present villagers—80% still speaking Mon—claim, by descendants of the Hariphunchai (pre-13th century) Mon. Interview with Phrakhrū Wichansatsanakhun, Wat Nòng Du, 14 March 1992.

¹³⁹ Natural increase = birth-rate minus death-rate.

¹⁴⁰ According to the census of 1919/20, more than 1,342,000 persons lived in Monthon Phayap. For details see le May 1986:85.

¹⁴¹ Blundell 1836:602.

¹⁴² Richardson's Journal:143 [17.2.1835].

¹⁴³ McLeod 1837:991.

¹⁴⁴ Penth 1970:161.

¹⁴⁵ See *Ngan không kao chao ban puang* 1993.

¹⁴⁶ To calculate the proportion of non-Yuan ethnic groups in Chiang Mai, I took the number of monasteries affiliated to different ethnic *nikai* as an indicator. First, I assumed that the size of each community was about the same. That is, of course, a simplification, as the number of monks and novices supported by each monastery varied in size. Therefore, I used the number of all ordained persons in religious service (*banphachit*, บรรพชิต), i.e. monks and novices, as a better indicator by assuming that the population of a community and the number of religious people supported by that community would be proportional (table 1). However, it can be argued that monks were not necessarily local people, but novices were. Perhaps, the size of the local population should be determined only by the number of novices.

The "List of Monasteries" provides the number of monks for two successive years, i.e. 1896/97 and 1897/98. Concerning the number of novices, figures are given only for 1897/98 and not for the previous year. The figures indicate an overall increase of monks of roughly 10% within a period of twelve months. At the village level the fluctuations were even greater because local (economic) conditions could vary considerably from one year to another. Moreover, one may also assume differences in the monastic discipline of various *nikai* influencing the ratio of *banphachit* to laypersons. However, I don't believe that these differences were significant.

¹⁴⁷ Holt S. Hallett wrote in 1890: "In Bangkok the inhabitants of the different quarters have gradually become amalgamated; but not far from the capital the colonies of former captives of war still retain their language and customs, and keep little intercourse with their conquerors. In the northern country [Lan Na] the separation is as complete, and the town of Chiangmai (Zimmé), for instance, is divided into numerous quarters, inhabited exclusively by people of a different race; and many of the villages in the provinces are also colonies of refugees or captives." Hallett 1988:352.

¹⁴⁸ From the campaigns in 1798, 1802 and 1838/39.

¹⁴⁹ Personal communication with Aroonrut Wichienkeo (22 April 1993). Furthermore, war captives from Müang Sat were resettled in Ban Nam Ton and Ban Saen Kantha (San Pa Tông district) where Anan (1984:44–45) made extensive field-studies.

¹⁵⁰ Although the *müang* in the northern part of Lan Na, such as Fang, Phrao, Chiang Rai and Phayao were considered as "depopulated" and "waste" (*rang*, ร้าง), at least until the early 1840s, the area was by no means totally uninhabited. On his journey from Chiang Mai to Chiang Tung in early 1837, McLeod passed regularly through villages in the Lao river basin (until reaching Pak Pong, south of Chiang Rai, called "a border village of Siam"). However, the areas north of Chiang Rai seemed to have been deserted. See McLeod's Journal:44–49.

¹⁵¹ Northern Thai as well as Burmese sources (from the 18th and early 19th centuries) often speak about the "57 *müang* of Lan Na", including Chiang Tung, Müang Yòng, Müang Sat and even Chiang Rung in Sipsong Panna.

¹⁵² The discrimination against Lao war captives ended after the French established a Lao protectorate on the east bank of the Mekong in 1893. The Siamese

authorities feared the French might claim control over Lao "subjects" resettled in central and northeastern Thailand as well. "The very existence of captive labour villages became an acute embarrassment. It was imperative that their identity be officially suppressed and their existence denied. An obvious first step was the abandonment of the 'captive labour' caste designation within the Thai legal system. It mattered little that the villages themselves remained intact and identifiable. It was important only that they became 'Thai' villages and that all traces of alien distinction be swept away. A second step was the formulation of a Thai nationality law in order to establish a legal definition for Thai citizens. The old habit of indicating ethnic origins in official papers was dropped." Quoted from Snit and Breazeale 1988:128.

¹⁵³ For a useful and readable discussion of political relations between Chiang Mai and Chiang Tung in the 19th century see Ratanaporn 1988.

¹⁵⁴ The Pāli-derived names of the four guardian spirits are *surana*, *pitthiya*, *lakkhana*, *thewada*. The monastery founded by the Lū-Yòng in 1805/06 was Wat Hua Nguang. Later in the 19th century the people left the old monastery and built Wat Hua Khua 200m distant. The small hall containing the guardian spirits had not been moved. It is situated just outside the compound of the new monastery. The elephant stone figures are still in good physical condition. The local population, however, no longer seems to take notice of the spirit hall.

¹⁵⁵ ประวัติศาสตร์ครองเมืองเชียงใหม่, f. 105/1-107/2, in: Saraswadee 1993:121.

¹⁵⁶ Even today in the Yuan enclave of Sao Hai (Saraburi) in Central Thailand, descendants of war captives from Chiang Saen (1804) order craftsmen from Ban Tông to construct religious buildings in the style of their ancestors. See my own interview with Phrakhrū Wicitpanyakòn (Wat Ban Tông, Lamphun), 8 March 1992.

¹⁵⁷ Sangwòrayanprayut 1990:2.

¹⁵⁸ For details see Sanguan 1972:166–167.

¹⁵⁹ Richardson's Journal:58 [1.4.1834].

¹⁶⁰ E.A. Blundell, Commissioner in Tenasserim Province, admonished his assistant "to make inquiries on the present state of cattle trade, and ascertain as far as practicable the probable continuance of supplies", but to "cautiously avoid all political subjects in your conversation with the chiefs, and if introduced by them, you will state at once that your object is solely that of extending trade, and that you are not

authorized in any way whatever to discuss other subjects with them.” Quoted from McLeod’s Journal:8.

¹⁶¹ McLeod’s Journal:22 [8.1.1837].

¹⁶² McLeod’s Journal:33 [21.1.1837].

¹⁶³ Richardson’s Journal:59 [1.4.1834].

¹⁶⁴ Richardson’s Journal:142 [17.2.1835].

¹⁶⁵ McLeod’s Journal:36 [23.1.1837].

¹⁶⁶ Pritsana 1973:169–176.

¹⁶⁷ Good summaries of the Chiang Tung wars are provided by Melchers 1986. Saraswadee 1996:313–327; Ratanaporn 1988: 311–319.

¹⁶⁸ This change of concept is extensively discussed by Thongchai 1994.

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
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Map 1: Lan Na and neighbouring regions




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
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Map 2: Ethnic groups in Chiang Mai City



Map based on data provided by Aroonrut 1996:112-115.

Map 3: Ethnic groups in Müang Chiang Mai (outside the city walls)



Map drawn from an outline made by Aroonrut in July 1993.

Appendix

List of “Nikai” in Chiang Mai

Nikai Chiang Mai
 Nikai Chiang Saen
 Nikai Nan
 Nikai Phrae
 Nikai Len
 Nikai Yòng
 Nikai Luang
 Nikai Luai
 Nikai Ngualai
 Nikai Khün
 Nikai Ngiao
 Nikai Khong
 Nikai Mae Pa
 Nikai Tai
 Nikai Man
 Nikai Mon
 Nikai Lua

Ethnic Groups

Yuan (in Chiang Mai)
 Yuan (from Chiang Saen)
 Yuan (from Nan)
 Yuan (from Phrae)
 Lü (from Len)
 Lü (from Yòng)
 Lü (from Luang)
 Lü (from Luai)
 Khün (from Ngualai/Wualai)
 Khün (from Chiang Tung)
 Tai Yai
 Tai Yai (from the Salween)
 Tai Yai (from Pa river)
 Tai Yai
 Burmese
 Mon
 Lua

Table 1: Number of Monks and Novices in Müang Chiang Mai in C.S. 1259 (A.D. 1897/98)

Name of <i>nikai</i>	Inside the city		Outside the city		Total	
	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %
Chiang Mai	572	64.3	2637	80.9	3209	77.3
Chiang Saen	63	7.1	11	0.3	74	1.8
Nan	38	4.3	4	0.1	42	1.0
Phrae	—	—	9	0.3	9	0.2
Len	5	0.6	—	—	5	0.1
Yòng	—	—	93	2.9	93	2.2
Luang	—	—	67	2.1	67	1.6
Luai	—	—	38	1.2	38	0.9
Ngualai	13	1.5	—	—	13	0.3
Khün	52	5.9	196	6.0	248	6.0
Ngiao	35+	3.9+	—	—	35+	0.8+
Khong	19	2.1	—	—	19	0.5
Mae Pa	—	—	47	1.4	47	1.1
Tai	24	2.7	—	—	24	0.6
Man	17	1.9	13	0.4	30	0.7
Mon	36	4.0	32	1.0	68	1.6
Lua	—	—	65+	2.0+	65+	1.6+
<u>Unknown</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Total	890	100.0	3259	100.0	4149	100.0

(Note: Table adaptated from Sommai 1975b and Sanan 1996.)

+) Numbers incomplete

Table 2: Resettlement of War Captives from the Shan states, Sipsòng Panna and other Areas to Lan Na (1780-1840)

Year of campaign	Area of target	Area of resettlement	Number of war captives	Source
1780	Chiang Saen	Chiang Mai, Lampang	1,700-1,800	CHLN
1783	Kayah State	Chiang Mai	< 1,000*	TPCM
1784	M. Cuat	Chiang Mai, Lampang	1,000-2,000*	TPCM
1788-1791	Salween region	Chiang Mai, (Lampang)	2,000-4,000*	TPCM
1790	M. Yòng	Nan	2,500-3,500 (505 families)	PMN
1791	Chiang Khòng	Nan	3,000-4,000 (585 families)	PMN
1798	M. Sat	Chiang Mai	1,000-2,000*	TPCM
1802	M. Sat, M. Pu, M. Pan, Chiang Tung	Chiang Mai, Lampang	> 6,000	NL-CHR1 1/1164
1804	Chiang Saen	Chiang Mai, Nan, Lampang	c. 15,000	PPR1
1805	M. Yòng, Chiang Tung, Sipsòng Panna	Lamphun, Lampang	10,000-20,000	PPR1
1807/08	Sipsòng Panna	Lampang, Chiang Mai	?	CHLN
1809/10	M. Yòng, Chiang Tung	Chiang Mai, Lamphun	2,000-4,000*	TPCM
1812	Chiang Khaeng, M. La, M. Phong	Nan	6,000	PMN
1823	Salween/Tenasserim region	Chiang Mai	?	PLN
1827/28	Wiang Can	Nan	600	PMN
1838/39	M. Sat	Chiang Mai	1,800-1,900	PCM-LL

*) rough estimate