

PREFACE.

The subject matter contained in this number of the Siam Society's Journal is a continuation of what was published in Vol. VIII, Part II of the Society's Journal, on the intercourse between Siam and Burma, as given in the Hmannan Yazawindawgyi of the Burmese. It brings the narrative to the fall and destruction of the Siamese capital at Ayudhya. The concluding portion of this series of translations from the Burmese history is in hand, and will probably be published in another number of the Society's Journal in the near future.

The translator begs to tender his thanks to Mr. W. H. Mundie, M.A., for kindly looking over the proofs and making corrections where necessary.

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CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA.

- Page 2, line 6 of last para, for 'Kyaing-ton' read 'Kyaing-tôn.'
- „ 4, first line of last para, the first word in the bracket should
be 'Siri.'
- „ 4, last line of last para, for 'Kyankmyaung' read 'Kyaukm-
yaung.'
- „ 4, foot-note 1., delete 'l. c.'
- „ 5, line 10 from top, for 'Mitayagyi' read 'Mintayagyi.'
- „ 9, line 6 from top, put period after the word 'rest.'
- „ 11, line 3 from end of para, for 'Tha Yaik' read 'Ta Yaik.'
- „ 12, line 5 from top, for 'Thalan' read 'Talan.'
- „ 17, second line, for 'Siri Sudhammaraja' read 'Siri Sudhammarājā.
- „ 22, first line, for 'Tunyin' read 'Tuyin.'
- „ 23, line 4 from end of para, for 'Udain,' read 'Udein.'
- „ 28, line 19 from top, insert comma after the words 'under him.'
- „ 30, line 6 from bottom, for 'A. D. 1765' read 'A. D. 1766.'
- „ 54, end of foot-note 2 on page 53, for 'characteristies' read
'characteristics.'
- „ 58, serial No. 13 remarks column for 'ဘုဒ္ဓဘိက္ခု' read 'ဘုဒ္ဓဘိက္ခု.'

INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BURMA AND SIAM, as recorded in Hmannan Yazawindawgyi.

I.

The last paper on the subject of the intercourse between Burma and Siam as recorded in the Hmannan Yazawindawgyi ended with an account of the capture of Ava, the capital of the Burmese, by the Talaings, and the taking away to Hanthawadi of the Burmese King, the last of the dynasty founded by the famous Bayin Naung Kyawdin Nawrata. It was also hinted there that the success of the Talaings was only temporary, and that a new Burmese hero arose in the person of Maung Aung Zeya,¹ who subsequently founded a dynasty.

What is contained here is the account of the intercourse between Burma and Siam during his reign and those of his successors.

Within a brief period of five years from the beginning of the year 1114 (A. D. 1752), when he first raised the standard of revolt against the Talaings, to the beginning of the year 1119 (A. D. 1757), Maung Aung Zeya, a native of Mòksobo,² a town to the north of Ava, or Alaung Mintayagyi,³ as he was subsequently known in Burmese history, had made himself master of both Burma proper and Hanthawadi. He had not only driven away the Talaings from the whole of Burma proper, but had invaded the Talaing country, captured their capital and deposed their king. Since that time the Talaings lost their national power, their feeble attempts to overthrow the Burmese sovereignty being promptly and rigorously suppressed.

In spite of the great distance between Hanthawadi and Zimmè (Chiengmai) and the lack of facilities of communication in those days, news of the rise of Alaung Mintayagyi and his success over the Talaings reached Zimmè. One of the Kings of Hanthawadi known

1. ย่องไยยะ. พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ พระราชหัตถ์ เลขา เต็ม ๒ หน้า ๒๓๓

2. บ้าน มุกโซโบ. l.c. 3. พระเจ้าอดองพราญี ibid, page 234

as Singyashin Thamein Taw,¹ who had left Hanthawadi and found a refuge in Zinmè, must have heard of the achievements of Alaung Mintayagyi. He sent Daw Theikdi Yaza, Etga Pyinnya (Agga Paññā) and Eindā Thari (Inda Sārī) to convey a message of congratulation to the Burmese hero; they arrived while the latter was still engaged in the siege of Hanthawadi and about a month and a half before its fall. During the siege the messengers were left in the care of Minhla Mingaung, one of the commanders of the army. Six days after the capture of Hanthawadi, which took place on the 10th of waning of Kasôn 1119 (May A. D. 1757), they were sent back with a letter from the chief minister (lit: agga mahā senāpati) to Thamein Taw and the Governor of Zinmè. The letter recapitulated the successes attained by Alaung Mintayagyi, culminating in his capture of the capital of the Talaings and the submission of the Sawbwas and governors all over Burma and Hanthawadi. It then ended with an exhortation, and a threat, to Thamein Taw and the Governor of Zinmè to come over to His Majesty and swear allegiance to him, if they valued their dignity, position and life, and desired happiness both mental and physical. Should they fail to do so, mistrusting their armed strength, the fate which befel the King of the Talaings and his people would inevitably be theirs also.

A message similar to the one sent to Zinmè was sent on the same day to the Governor of Mōttama, and a reply was received from the Talaing nobles Binnya Thiri Gōnna Teza and Daw Eindā Bala Byama tendering their submission.

On the 9th of waxing Wazo 1119 (July A. D. 1757), there arrived at Hanthawadi representatives from the following Sawbwas of the Shan and Yun countries with messages of submission accompanied by presents. The Sawbwa of Anan sent his son Nan-hôn with three elephants; those of Maing-kyi and Kyaing-kaung (Chiengkong) one elephant each; the Sawbwa of Kyaing-ton (Chieng Tung) sent Paya Kaungbaing with two ponies complete with gold saddlery and trappings; those of Payaw, Lawin, Byè and Dalaing one pony each; the Sawbwa of Kyaing-thū sent one hundred and twenty men carrying many presents of cloths, musk, scented unguents, &c.

1. မင်းတု Vide Siam Society Journal Vol. VIII, Part II, pages 98-100.

Alaung Mintayagyi conferred upon Daw Zwèyaset, a Talaing nobleman, the title of Binnya Dala and commissioned him to keep watch and guard in the town of Mòttama. He then demolished the the town of Pè-gu (Pegu) so that it should not harbour rebels and afford them shelter and means of defence, and left Hanthawadi for Yangôn (Rangoon), the town built by him, and thence he returned to Upper Burma, going up the Eyawadi (Irrawady) in a big royal barge. He left Rangoon on the 12th of waning Wazo 1119 (July A. D. 1757) and, on the 10th of waning of the following Tawthalin (September), arrived at Yadana-Theinga¹ (Ratana Singha), the capital built by him.

Possessed of more than ordinary energy and elated with his recent success over the Talaings, Alaung Mintayagyi allowed himself only a year's rest at his own capital before he was up in arms again, this time against the Kathès, the people of Manipur. The Kathès were defeated, the Sawbwa together with the whole population of his capital fled and took refuge in the forests and mountains, and when the Burmese entered the town there was not a single soul in it. Attempts were made to secure the Sawbwa but without success. So Alaung Mintayagyi returned to his capital after appointing one of the ministers of the Sawbwa to look after the affairs of the State, and planting a stone inscription in the centre of the town to the effect that only rightful heirs by lineal descent should become the Sawbwa. The expedition lasted only three months from Tazaungmôn to Tabodwè 1120 (November 1758 to February 1759).

It may not be out of place to mention here that Alaung Mintayagyi's treatment of the conquered people was such as to strike terror into their hearts. Over 4000 Manipuris were ordered to leave their native village and go to a place called Tamu, but as they did not like to go they attempted to rise in rebellion, and the punishment meted out was the wholesale slaughter of the entire body of men, not a soul escaping death.

About five months after his return from the expedition to Manipur, he left his capital for Rangoon with the object of dedicating a "zayat" (sālā) which he had built within the precincts of the famous Dagôn pagoda. Although the object of the journey was the

1. เมืองรัตนดิศ, พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ ๒ หน้า ๓๓๔,

peaceful one of performing a religious ceremony, he was nevertheless accompanied by a big army both by land and water; and the reason for that was, probably, he thought it unsafe to go into Talaing country without a large armed force at his back, or he still wanted to quench his thirst for conquest by encroaching on Siamese territory.

The following Shan Sawbwas had to accompany him, each with his contingent of fighting men, namely, the Sawbwas of Tilin, Yaw, Teinnyin, Thaung-thut, Kale, Mo-nyin, Mo-gaung, Ban-maw, Mo-meik, Thibaw, Nyaung-ywe, Mo-nè and Mo-byè. This Shan contingent consisted of 13 regiments each commanded by its own chief and numbered 3,000 horse and 25,000 men. It formed the land forces and marched via Toungoo. The forces by water consisted of the following. The vanguard, composed of 10 regiments under the command of his second son Thiri Damayaza (Siri Dhammarājā), Prince of Myedu,¹ was 10,000 strong with 300 big war boats. Then came His Majesty Alaung Mintayagyi, surrounded by a force of 24 regiments of 24,000 men in 600 big war boats, the disposition being 6 regiments each in front and rear and 6 regiments each on the right and left. This division was under the command of Alaung Mintayagyi himself, Minguang Nawrata being appointed as his lieutenant. There was also a body-guard of Kala Panthes (Portuguese) in their national uniform. The rear guard consisted of 10 regiments, five of which with 5,500 men and 100 big war boats were commanded by his third son Thado Minhla Kyaw, Prince of Amyin,² and the remaining five of the same strength were led by his fourth son Thado Minsaw, Prince of Badôn.³

Leaving behind his eldest son Thiri Thudamayaza⁴ (Siri Sudhammarājā), the Crown Prince, in charge of the capital, he embarked together with his chief queen and his younger children at the town of Kyankmyaung on Thursday the 10th of waning Wazo 1121 (July

1. มังระ ราชบุตร ที่ สอง ผู้ครอง เมือง บิดุ. l. c. พระราชพงษาวดาร
เล่ม ๒ หน้า ๒๕๕.

2. มังไป ผู้ครอง เมือง ขเมียง. l. c.

3. มังเวง ผู้ครอง เมือง ปดุง. l. c.

4. มังตอก ราชบุตร ผู้ใหญ่ ผู้ครอง เมือง ตีเปะเยียง. l. c.

A. D. 1759). On arrival at Rangoon he had the Dagôn pagoda gilded from top to bottom. The three "zayats" and the ornamental structure sheltering the pathway leading up to the pagoda, all built by him, were also superbly gilded, and the religious ceremony of dedicating them for public use was solemnly performed. Various other shrines such as the Kyaik-kauk pagoda at Than-lyin (Syriam) and the famous Shwe Mawdaw at Pegu were visited by the chief queen and the royal family.

The dedication ceremony and the pilgrimages being over, Alaung Mitayagyi was contemplating a return to his capital, when news reached him that the Siamese had encroached into Dawè (Tavoy) district; that three ships on their way to Rangoon had been seized and detained, and that a sea-going boat sent by him to Dawè had been captured by the Siamese. Incensed at this insult to his might and dignity, he said he would himself march to Yodaya and capture the capital. His followers tried to dissuade him, saying that calculations of his horoscope prognosticated evil and that the direction in which he would march was also unpropitious according to certain beliefs; that if he would persist in the march, illness might overtake him. But he would not be dissuaded, and accordingly sent back his chief queen and the royal family by water in charge of his two sons Thado Minhla-Kyaw and Thado Minsaw.

A portion of the army together with the regiment of Kala Panthes were sent on to Dawè in five ships. Alaung Mintayagyi and his son Thiri Damayaza together with 40 regiments left Rangoon on the 3rd of waxing Pyatho 1121 (January A. D. 1760) and went by boats up the river to Hanthawadi. Thence they went overland to Môttama, and, on arrival in the town, Alaung Mintayagyi became aware that the Talaing noble Daw Zwèyaset, whom he had appointed Governor with the title of Binnya Dala, had been conspiring with Talaban¹, the famous Talaing general, to rise in rebellion. Daw Zwèyaset was executed, and another Talaing by the name of Daw Talut was appointed Governor. From Môttama a portion of the army was again despatched to Dawè by means of sea-going boats, and the remainder was taken across to Mawlamyaing (Moulmein) by means of rafts and boats. The Burmese Monarch went from Mawlamyaing

to Dawè, and arrived there in thirteen marches. A rest of seven days was given to the army while waiting for the arrival of the detachments which were transported from Rangoon in ships and from Môtama in sea-going boats. When they arrived, the whole army marched from Dawè to Byeik¹ (Mergui). The advance guard consisted of 300 horse and 3,000 men under Mingaung Nawrata, and 500 horse and 5,000 men under the the Myedu Prince. Alaung Mintayagyi followed behind with the rest of the army. Byeik, then apparently Siamese territory, was captured, and two days later the Siamese port of Taninthari² was captured. There appeared to have been no serious fight in the capture of these two towns.

By that time news had reached the Siamese capital of the invasion of Alaung Mintayagyi. The Siamese Monarch³ despatched a force of five regiments, composed of 300 horse and 7,000 men under Bya Tezaw,⁴ and another force of fifteen regiments, composed of 200 elephants, 1,000 horse and 20,000 men under Aukhya Yazawunthan.⁵

The Burmese left Taninthari, and after five days march they were met by the Siamese forces under Bya Tezaw in a narrow defile⁶ between Kwibaung and the town of Kwi.⁷ A fight took place there between the Siamese and the Burmese advance force under Mingaung Nawrata, in which the Siamese were forced to retire. On the retreat of the Siamese, the Burmese did not encamp but by a forced march went on to the town of Kwi and captured it, and encamped in the town. The march was continued thence, encamping at the following villages, namely—Kaukmi, Byan, Paungthakayi, Thinman, and Naung-kyauk.⁸ From the last named place the town of Byat-pi⁹ was reached and it was captured on the same day. Here a rest of three days was given to the troops, after which they marched in the

1. เมือง มฤค

2. เมืองตนาหศิริ

3. สมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ ๓ (พระที่นั่งสุริยามรินทร์)

4. พระยาเดโช

5. พระยาราชวงศ์

6. แก่งตุม. พระราชพงษาวดารเล่ม ๒ หน้า ๒๖๑

7. เมือง กุยก—ibid, p. 262.

8. หนองจอก ?

9. เมืองเพ็ชรบุรี

direction of Ratbi¹ and encamped at Panmaw² village. They left the place the next day and arrived at the town of Ratbi, which was taken the same day. Apparently no attempt was made by the Siamese to hold these two towns.

The army rested for four days at Ratbi, and it then continued its march and encamped at Ban-Lwin³ village. When the Burmese had left that village and gone some distance towards the sea, they were met by the Siamese force under Aukbya Yazawunthan, which consisted of 15 regiments with 200 elephants, 1,000 horse and 20,000 men. The Burmese vanguard under Mingaung Nawrata and Minhla Nawrata engaged the Siamese and were getting the worst of the fight, losing heavily in killed and wounded. The Myedu Prince, Thiridamayaza, very opportunely came up with his forces, in time to turn the tide of battle and secure a success. The Siamese army was routed; about 100 elephants, 1,000 rifles, 180 guns and 2,000 men were captured. The commander-in-chief Aukbya Yazawunthan managed to escape on horse-back. That day the Burmese encamped at Ban-Kyin.⁴ On the next day they were again on the move and, after encamping at Ban-Tun⁵ and Ban-Kyauk⁶ on the way, they captured the town of Thapanbôn.⁷ Here they took rest for five days.

When His Majesty of Siam heard that the towns of Byat-pi and Ratbi had fallen, and that the Burmese had already captured Thapanbôn, he made elaborate preparations for the defence of the capital, mounting additional guns on the ramparts, commandeering elephants, horse, men and provisions, and taking them into the city. Then to try and intercept the enemy, a force of 300 elephants, 3,000 horse and 30,000 men, divided into six brigades, was sent to Talan river to oppose the crossing. The following were in command of the six brigades, viz., Bya Tezaw, Bya Seinda Mani,⁸ Bya Einda Thura,⁹ Bya Kamani,¹⁰ Aukbya Yazawunthan, and Aukbya Kalahôn,¹¹ and the last named was appointed commander-in-chief.

1. เมืองราชบุรี

2. บ้านหม้อ ?

3. บ้านหลวง ?

4. บ้านจัน ?

5. บ้านคันทัน ?

6. บ้านจอก ?

7. สุพรรณบุรี

8. พระยาจินตามณี ?

9. พระยาอินทสุระ ?

10. พระยาคามณี ?

11. เจ้าพระยา กดาโหม. ตาม พระราชพงษาวดาร

เจ้าพระยามหาเสนา เปน แม่ทัพ—*ibid*, p. 262.

The Burmese left Thapanbôn and, when the advance guard under Mingaung Nawrata and Minhla Nawrata arrived at Talan river¹, they found the opposite bank full of the Siamese forces. Finding they were greatly out-numbered they dared not commence the attack, but waited for the remainder of the army to come up. Before long the Myedu Prince arrived with the forces under his command. He wanted to attack the Siamese at once, but Mingaung Nawrata asked him to desist, saying that they were not very far from the capital, that the army then opposing them would not be like that they had already encountered, but would be composed, most probably, of Yodaya's picked forces especially chosen and sent by their Sovereign, and that the number of elephants, horse, and men appeared to be much greater than before. He said it would be advisable to strike a decisive blow and put the enemy to rout in one engagement, as the moral effect of such success would be to strike terror into the minds of the whole population of the capital. He added that His Burman Majesty was still at some distance, and they should therefore wait till he came within reach of the scene. While they were thus discussing, mounted messengers from Alaung Mintayagyi arrived ordering them to defer engaging the enemy till he himself should come up. Some time after the arrival of the messengers they saw at a distance the royal standard of their Sovereign usually carried on the elephant ridden by him, and heard the sound of drums and gongs of forces on the march. Then the Myedu Prince ordered a general attack, personally conducting the operations. Mingaung Nawrata was on the right, Minhla Nawrata on the left, and Minhla Thiri in the centre; they forded the river simultaneously to attack the Siamese on the opposite bank. The Siamese opened a heavy fire while the Burmese were still fording the river, and inflicted a severe punishment increasing the death roll of the Burmese. The invaders were temporarily held in check by the severity of the fire of the defenders from their vantage ground. Just then Alaung Mintayagyi with his forces arrived on the scene and joined in the fight. Thus reinforced, the three columns which went into the river first were able to gain the opposite bank and a severe fight ensued. The Siamese, having lost the advantage they at first had of being on dry land while their foes were in water, were defeated. Five brigade commanders, Aukbya

1. ^๕ตำน้ำเขกวา—ibid, p. 262.

Yazawunthan, Bya Seinda Mani, Bya Tezaw, Bya Linda Thura, and Bya Kamani were captured together with the elephants ridden by each of them. The commander-in-chief Aukbya Kalahôn escaped by abandoning his elephant and getting away on horse-back.¹ The Burmese encamped at Talan village and stayed there three days taking rest. They then marched on to the Siamese capital and arrived on Friday the 11th of waxing Tagu 1121 (April A.D. 1760). It took thirty-six marches from Dawè and eighty marches from Yadaua Theinga² to reach Dwayawadi the capital of Siam. The Burmese Monarch encamped at Naung Òntun³ to the north of the city, and the rest of the army encamped surrounding it. After their defeat at Talan the Siamese confined their activities to the defence of the capital.

The Burmese officers then sent a message to the Siamese nobles to the following effect:—

That as the religion of Buddha was not prospering in Siam, their Sovereign had come, as was the wont of Embryo Buddhas, to promote the welfare and prosperity of Buddha's religion; that the Siamese king had neither showed his submission by offers of elephants, horses and royal children, nor issued a challenge to fight in open battle; and that their Lord, having Buddhahood as his final aim, had released the Siamese nobles captured at Thapanbôn without doing them any harm.

To this the Siamese nobles replied that in the present cycle of the world only five Buddhas were to appear of whom four, namely Kakuthan,⁴ Gawnagôn,⁵ Katthapa⁶ and Gawtama⁷ had already appeared and entered Neikban (Nibbāna), and there was only Miti Buddha⁸ to appear, but he was still at Tôtthida (Tussita), heaven; they sarcastically asked what Embryo Buddha was the Lord of the Burmese, as it was five Buddhas at the most that appeared in any one cycle, and never was there any precedent in which a sixth Buddha appeared.

1. According to พระราชพงษาวดาร it was พระยา รัตนาคี เบก who escaped on horse-back. Vide *ibid.* p. 263

2. เมือง รัตนคังค, *ibid.* p. 259.

3. According to พระราชพงษาวดาร ที่ บ้าง กุ่ม บ้าน กระ เต็ง *ibid.* p. 263.

4. Kakusandho.

5. Konagāmano.

6. Kassapo.

7. Gotamo.

8. Metteyya.

His Siamese Majesty consulted his generals Abya Yaza,¹ Abya Muntri and other nobles and princes as to the action to be taken to drive the enemy away. Then Abya Yaza told his sovereign that as it was already the beginning of May the rains would soon break and the whole country round the capital would then be inundated when, not only the elephants and horses of the enemy would be in great trouble, but even the men would find it hard to discover a dry spot on which to cook their food; that they would then be obliged to raise the siege and retrace their steps, and the Siamese could choose to attack or not as they pleased, but that it would be mere waste of energy to try and dislodge the Burmese from their positions and force them to retreat, when such retreat was a matter of certainty if the Siamese would simply guard the capital from capture, and issue orders to the governors of the towns round about the capital to do likewise; and that they should in the meanwhile send some conciliatory message to the Burmese Monarch. The princes and the nobles were unanimous in seconding the opinion expressed by Abya Yaza. His Siamese Majesty approved of it and accordingly reinforced the defences of the capital, both on the walls of the city and in the boats and ships in the river; orders were also sent to the surrounding governors to redouble their energies in the defence of their towns. Then the nobles Bya Theikdi,² Bya Thupawadi³ and Bya Thurakanma⁴ were sent to the camp of the Burmese with a message that His Siamese Majesty would make presents of elephants and horses and acknowledge the suzerainty of the Burmese Monarch. The three Siamese nobles were taken to the camp of Mingaung Nawrata, who sent them on to the camp of the Myedu Prince. There they were closely questioned by the Prince, and having learnt the object of their visit he reported the fact to his father. His Burman Majesty had orders conveyed to the Siamese messengers that the object of his march to Yodaya was not to depose her King but to advance the cause of Buddhism, especially as Buddhism had been established in Siam, but had not been progressing; and that the Siamese Monarch should come out and meet him. The Siamese nobles, duly apprised of His Burman Majesty's orders, left the Burmese camp.

1. เจ้าพระยาอภัยราชา?

2. พระยาสิทธิ

3. พระยาสุภาวดี

4. พระยาสุรกา

About ten days after that event, Alaung Mintayagyi felt indisposed. He summoned his son and the generals and officers to a council to discuss their future plan of action. He said that the Siamese would not come out and fight, and, although messengers had arrived to say that their sovereign would acknowledge Burmese suzerainty, no further steps were taken to come to a final understanding; that the rains were approaching and they must therefore decide on what they were to do. The Myedu Prince then said that there was no sincerity in the Siamese King sending his message of submission, it being only a ruse to gain time till the rains properly set in, when it was said that the people of the country were obliged to keep even their cattle on raised platforms; that as the rains were about to break and as His Majesty himself was not in the best of health, they should betake themselves to their homes, and when the rains were over they could come again. Mingaung Nawrata agreed to all that the Myedu Prince had said and adduced further reasons why they should raise the siege and return. He said that the walls of the city were very strongly built and very extensive; that it was surrounded by numerous rivers, streams and canals, and in every one of them there were ships and war-boats armed with guns and manned by Kala Panthes; that as the city had never before been completely destroyed and the reigning king and family captured and removed, it still possessed abundance of war material and a strong and well equipped army of elephants, horse and men; however, he said, nothing could withstand His Majesty's might and the fall of Yodaya was certain if His Majesty would only attempt to take it, but the principal question for consideration was His Majesty's health, especially as the sooth-sayers solicited him not to undertake the expedition. He further said that they were late in their start and great delay was caused in having to come by way of Taninthari and to capture the towns on the way; that owing to the appearance of a great number of mosquitoes and flies, sickness had prevailed among the men; that they should leave the capital alone for the time being, but that when the rains were over they should invade simultaneously from three points, one column marching via Yahaing,¹ another through Tha Yaik² and a third by way of Dawè, and the principal towns should be captured by the months of Nadaw and Pyatho (December and January).

1. မြေပင် ဘုရား

2. တာယာက ?

Being moved by anxiety about his own health and in deference to the wishes of his chief officers, Alaung Mintayagyi approved of the proposal made by his son and Mingaung Nawrata and decided to return to his capital. He ordered the release of the five Siamese nobles taken prisoners in the fight at Thalan, together with their elephants. Leaving Mingaung Nawrata in command of five squadrons of Kathè cavalry containing 500 horse, and twelve regiments of infantry 6,000 strong, he left the Siamese capital on Thursday the 3rd of waxing Kasôn 1122 (May A. D. 1760), accompanied by the rest of his army. After a day's march he left Minhla Nawrata with a force of 200 horse and 3,000 men, with orders to keep himself in touch with Mingaung Nawrata, in case the latter might need assistance.

When the Siamese Monarch became aware of the retreat of Alaung Mintayagyi, he suspected that there must be some special reason why the Burmese King should withdraw, especially as he had the advantage of success in the preliminary engagements. He sent out men to try and find out the reason, but they came back without knowing it; they, however, discovered that the greater portion of the Burmese army had departed and only a very small force was left behind. His Siamese Majesty sent out a force of 400 elephants, 4,000 horse and 40,000 men to capture the whole of this handful of Burmese, and to pursue and attack the Burmese King while on the march. Undaunted by the overwhelming numbers of the Siamese forces, Mingaung Nawrata remained where he was and showed fight. The Siamese completely surrounded the Burmese; and when thus surrounded Mingaung Nawrata's lieutenants tried to prevail upon him to see the great inequality of the two forces; moreover, they said, the Siamese could, at a moment's notice, bring up further reinforcements, while they themselves were cut off from further help. They proposed that they should break through the Siamese forces on the north side and retreat. But the Burmese general would not listen, and his reason was that if they were to retreat the Siamese would certainly follow them, and were they to give battle within hearing of their Sovereign, who as they knew was not in good health, his march homewards would be retarded through his anxiety for their safety. He decided to fight the Siamese in spite of the great odds. Accordingly he ordered 100 horse and 1,500 men to attack the Siamese on the south side, a like number to assail the enemy on the north and west sides, while he himself led a force of 200 horse and 1,500 men against the enemy on the east side


where they were in greater number than in the other directions. The Siamese were routed in every direction, leaving many dead on the field. Mingaung Nawrata was able to secure the head of a Siamese officer whose rank entitled him to use a gilt umbrella. Considering the disparity of the two forces and the ground on which they fought, the result of the battle appears to be incredible. It is very probable that the Burmese realized their own unenviable position and became desperate, and sheer desperation drove them to deeds of heroism. Hearing the report of cannons and guns, Minhla Nawrata hurried back to the assistance of his brother general, but arrived after the fight was over. Mingaung Nawrata requested the well-meaning officer to go on ahead to overtake His Majesty, and to rest assured that His Majesty's confidence in his ability to repel any attack was not misplaced. He remained in his camp at Ban Tun for about five days more, and finding that the Siamese would not make any further attempt, he withdrew and followed the main army. Apparently the Siamese made no attempt to follow the retreating Burmese.

After twenty-four marches, His Burman Majesty reached a village outpost¹ on the border of Môttama district and expired there on Sunday the 12th of waning Kasôn 1122 (May A. D. 1760). The fact of the death was kept a secret, only his son and immediate attendants knowing it. The body was conveyed to Pegu and thence to Rangoon by water, and from there again up the Irrawady to Yadana Theinga, the capital built by him. Thus ended the career of a man of considerable energy and perseverance, who founded a dynasty which lasted just over one hundred and thirty years.



1. คำบด เมะกะโลก *ibid.* p. 265.

SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE'S ACCOUNT
OF THE SAME.



Alaunghprâ now determined to invade Siam. Pretexts for this measure were not wanting. Thousands of Talaings had taken refuge in Siamese territory, and bands of that race had made incursions on the Tavoy frontier, which had lately been re-occupied by the Burmese. The conqueror, it is stated, was also incensed against the King of Siam because he had refused to give him one of his daughters in marriage. He decided to march by the coast route to Ayuthiâ, as he had ships which could sail down the coast with provisions, and keep up communication with the army. Before he left Rangoon his principal officers advised him not to undertake the expedition; and the astrologers represented that the aspect of the planets foreboded evil. Disregarding these warnings, the army marched. Alaunghprâ took with him his second son, Myêdu Meng. Moving by Hansâwadi and Sittaung, the whole force, including the ships, assembled at Martaban. A Talaing officer had been appointed governor of that city. He was suspected of being in secret correspondence with Talabân, who was in the Zimmè territory during the late rebellion. The governor was now put to death. The army crossed the Salwîn river, and marched down the coast to Tavoy and Mergui. The port of Tenasserim, then occupied by the Siamese, was next entered; and a day's march in advance occurred the first skirmish with the Siamese forces. Alaunghprâ, traversing the low mountain range at this narrow part of the peninsula, debouched on the shore of the Gulf of Siam at or near the village of Banlaym. From thence marching northerly, a severe engagement with the enemy occurred at the Mayklaung river. The Siamese were defeated with heavy loss in killed and prisoners, elephants and guns. Alaunghprâ took up a position

Invasion of
Siam.

December,
A. D. 1759.

before the capital, Ayuthiā. He soon found himself in dangerous plight. The Siamese king rejected all offers of peace, and was determined to hold out until the rise of the river should flood the camp of the besieger. Alaunghprā was not prepared to support his army during a long siege. In vain he sent conciliatory messages, declaring that he came not to destroy the city, but as a Bodhisatwa to preach the law of holiness and deliverance from earthly desire. He would enter the city as his predecessor Goadama had entered Kapilawastu, his father's city, and subdue men's hearts by kindness. The Siamese, in reply, ridiculed his pretension and defied his power. While a glorious anticipated apotheosis was thus being announced, a grievous downfall was at hand. The destined Buddha revealed to his confidential attendants that he felt stricken by mortal disease. He had only been five days before the city he came to conquer, when a retreat was ordered. The route selected was the valley of the Menam river. The dying king was carried in a litter. The retreating army, much harassed by the Siamese, pushed on rapidly; and when near Rahaing, turning westward, reached Myawadi in the upper course of the Thaungyin. When halfway to the Salwin, Alaunghprā died. He was forty-six years old. The death was concealed as long as possible. The body was borne to Hansawadi and Rangoon. The Myêdu Meng proceeded without delay to the capital, and the body was conveyed there by the river. It was burnt with the funeral rites of a Chakravarti or universal monarch.

About
10th April
A. D. 1760.

Retreat and
death of
Alaunghprā.

Middle of May
A. D. 1760.

II.

On the death of Alaung Mintayagyi his eldest son,¹ Thiri Thudamayaza (Siri Sudhammaraja) Prince of Dabayin, who had already been appointed Crown Prince and left in charge of the capital during his father's absence in Hanthawadi and Siam, ascended the throne on the 9th of waxing Nayôn 1122 (June A. D. 1760), assuming the title of Thiri Pawara Maha Damayaza (Siri Pawara Mahā Dhammarāja).

Mingaung Nawrata,² Alaung Mintayagyi's most able and trusted general, raised the standard of revolt. Several attempts to win him over to the new Sovereign by peaceful means were made, but they all failed, as he was firm in his belief that his life was forfeit and that the amnesty and royal favour offered were only a snare to entrap him. He captured Ava with the intention of making it a base from which to extend his authority to Pagan, Toungoo, Hanthawadi and Môtama. It was a forlorn hope from the first start, as the whole of Burma proper was loyal to the descendant of the liberator of the Burmese from the Talaing ascendancy and the founder of the new dynasty, and it ended in utter failure. Ava was invested by the new King, and when it became evident that the town could not be held any longer, Mingaung Nawrata left it with a small band of adherents intending to make his way to Chiengmai. He was, however, pursued, overtaken, and killed in resisting capture.

Trouble did not end with the death of the rebel general. During the life time of Alaung Mintayagyi, he had appointed his brother Thado Theinkathu,³ Governor of Toungoo. Alaung Mintayagyi having died, Thado Theinkathu thought of setting up a kingdom of his own. The King came with an army and Toungoo was invested. Talabau,⁴ the famous Talaing general, who made good his escape after

1. มังดอ. Vide พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ พระราชหัตถเลขา เล่ม ๒ หน้า ๒๖๖

2 According to Siamese History he is called แมง อะ แมง กอง ibid.

3. According to Siamese History he is called โต๊ะหมากดีย์ชุกนา ibid p. 269.

4. ตะบอง ibid, p. 269.

the fall of Hanthawadi, had all this time eluded the Burmese, and had been living at a place called Kaw Kun. He and another Talaing noble by the name of Binnya Kyin with a force of 2,000 men marched to Sit-taung¹ with the intention of helping Toungoo. The Burmese King sent a force against them and they were forced to retire. Toungoo was stormed and captured on the 10th of waxing Tabodwè 1123 (February A. D. 1762). The King was very humane in his treatment of the conspirators; not only was the life of his uncle spared, but the nobles who had aided and abetted him were also pardoned: they were not even degraded from their offices, a very unusual procedure in the history of Burma.

Soon after his return from his expedition to Toungoo, the king of Burma despatched a force of four regiments consisting of 750 horse and 7,500 men under the command of Abaya Kamani² to take Zimmè together with her fifty-seven provincial towns and add them to the Burmese empire. At the same time another force of five regiments consisting of 3,500 men, under the command of the Wun (governor) of Lamaing, was sent down by water to go and capture Talaban, who had established himself with a following at Kaw Kun, to the east of Môttama river. The Burmese forces completely surrounded the Talaing general who, seeing resistance futile and escape impossible, surrendered himself. He was taken to the Burmese capital, and the Burmese King most magnanimously pardoned him and even allowed him to serve in the army.

King Thiri Pawara Maha Damayaza, the most humane and magnanimous King in the history of Burma, had not the good fortune to hold sway over united Burma for long. Death overtook him at the early age of twenty-nine years, having reigned only three years and a half. His reign was not illustrious, but it was unsullied by bloodshed. He died on the 9th of waning Nadaw 1125 (December A. D. 1763), and was succeeded by his next younger brother Thiri Damayaza,³ the Prince of Myedu.

In accordance with the wishes of Alaung Mintayagyi that all his sons should succeed to the throne of Burma one after another in

1. จิตตอง 2. อาบะระกามณี *ibid*, p. 271.

3. มังระมหาอปรราชอนุชา *ibid*, p. 273.

order of their seniority, his second son Thiri Damayaza, the Prince of Myedu, ascended the throne, on the 10th of waning Nadaw 1125 (December A. D. 1763), but the "Rajabhiseka" or coronation ceremony was performed on Wednesday the 7th of waning Nayôn 1126 (June A. D. 1764), on which occasion he assumed the title of Thiri Thudama Maha Yazadibadi (Siri Sudhamma Mahā Rājādhpati). He is better known in history as Sinbyushin, meaning Lord of the white elephant, and for the sake of brevity he will be called King Sinbyushin in this paper.

The expedition sent to Zimmè in the previous reign under the command of Abaya Kamani proved successful, the town being taken and occupied. Leaving behind Minyè Thiri in command of the force of occupation, Abaya Kamani returned to the Burmese capital, taking with him the Prince of Shwedaung together with his wife and children, and also a former king of Hanthawadi known as Singyashin Thamein Taw.¹ The former was a son of the King of Ava whom the Talaings deposed and took away to Hanthawadi. Besides these refugees Abaya Kamani also took away many arms, elephants, ponies, and valuables, as presents for his royal master. He arrived at the capital on the 13th of waxing Tabodwè 1125 (February A. D. 1764), about a month and a half after the new King had ascended the throne. King Sinbyushin appointed Abaya Kamani to be Governor of Zimmè, and conferred on Min-hla Thiri, one of the commanders in the Zimmè expedition, the title of Maha Nawrata² and appointed him to be minister in charge of cavalry. But soon after Abaya Kamani and Min-hla Thiri had left Zimmè with a portion of the Burmese forces, a rebellion was planned by Nwè Mano and Nga San Kôn, in which the governors of the following places were implicated, namely, Maing-yungyi,³ Tham-at-phabaung, Lagun, Lwèlun, Maing-that,⁴ and Maingpu.⁵ Minyè Thiri, the Burmese officer left in Zimmè, submitted a report of the rebellion to his Sovereign. On the receipt of the report, King Sinbyushin despatched an army with orders to suppress the rebellion, then to conquer the Kingdom of Linzin,⁶ and there-

1. According to Siamese History the Chief of Chiengmai พระยาจันทน์ was also taken away. *ibid*, p. 272.

2. มังมหานรธา

3. เมืองขวม

4. เมืองสาต ?

5. เมืองป

6. ด่านช้าง

after with the auxiliaries from Zimmè and Linzin to effect the conquest of Yodaya. The army was composed of eighteen regiments of infantry containing 100 elephants and 20,000 men, and ten squadrons of cavalry containing 1,000 horse. It was under the supreme command of Nemyo Thihapate,¹ with Kyawdin Thihathu and Tuyin Yamagyaw as seconds in command, and left the Burmese capital on the 6th of waxing Tabaung 1125 (March A. D. 1764).

Within a year of his accession to the throne King Sinbyushin entertained the idea of the conquest of Siam. He had, as Prince of Myedu, accompanied his father in the latter's invasion of Siam and was therefore not unfamiliar with the topography of the country and the war tactics and the fighting capacity of the Siamese. He made arrangements for the proper control and administration of his extensive territories, so that he could devote his whole attention to his scheme of conquest. To Toungcoo, Hanthawadi and the towns in the Talaing country, as well as to the frontier towns of Dawè and Myeik,² he appointed governors together with the necessary assistants; he also appointed two commissioners to reside in the courts of each of the Governors and Sawbwas on the east and west side of the Thanlwin³ river, such as Zimmè, Kyaing-rôn,⁴ Kyaing-tôn,⁵ Monè,⁶ Nyaung-ywe,⁷ etc; and also on the east and west side of the river Erawadi (Irrawaddy) and Thanlawadi (the Chindwin river), such as Kale, Mo-hnyin,⁸ Mo-gaung,⁹ Ban-maw,¹⁰ Thibaw,¹¹ Mo-meik,¹² etc. He then reorganized the various units of the military and civil services, forming them into bands of 40 to 60 men. each with a chief.

As soon as he had made the arrangements described above, he said to his ministers that Yodaya had never before been utterly destroyed and crippled, and therefore it might not be possible to attain the object in view with only such forces as were under Nemyo Thihapate sent via Zimmè. He said that, to expedite the success of the expedition, a force was necessary to enter Yodaya by way of Dawè and accordingly ordered that a force composed of 20 regiments of infantry containing 100 elephants and 20,000 men, and 10 squadrons of cavalry

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| 1. เมืองมหาเสนาบดี | 2. เมืองมฤค | 3. แม่น้ำคงหรือแชตวิน |
| 4. เชียงรุ่ง | 5. เชียงคอง | 6. เมืองหน้อย |
| | | 7. ย่องหวย |
| | | 8. เมืองยาง |
| 9. เมืองซ้องหรือเมืองทอง | 10. ม้านหม้อ | 11. ตีปอ |
| | | 12. เมืองมิด |

containing 1,000 horse, be sent via Dawè under the supreme command of Maha Nawrata¹ with Nemyo Gônarat and Tayin Yan-aung-gyaw as seconds in command. This force left the capital on the 8th of waxing Nadaw 1126 (December A. D. 1764).

Only about a month and half after the despatch of the forces to Yodaya to proceed by way of Dawè King Sinbyushin took an army of 300 elephants 1,000 horse and 40,000 men to Manipura,² the country of the Kathès. As usual the chief of the state after a feeble resistance took refuge in the wilds and mountain fastnesses, leaving his capital to the tender mercies of the Burmese soldiery. On this occasion the Burmese Monarch did not waste his time and energy in the pursuit of the chief, but took away with him nearly the whole population of the capital, including women and children. The expedition lasted only about three months.

From the time of his accession to the throne, King Sinbyushin had the intention of making Ava his capital, and it was there that he performed his coronation ceremony. Therefore soon after his return from Manipura, he had the old capital of Ava rebuilt, and on the 11th waxing of Tagu 1127 (April A. D. 1766) he transferred his capital from Yadana Theinga to Ava.

The forces under Nemyo Thihapate which were despatched to Zinmè arrived at Monè. There a levy of a regiment was demanded from each of the Sawbwars of Monè and Nyaung-ywe and the Myozas (governors) of Yatsauk,³ Maing-Kaing,⁴ Lè-gya,⁵ Maing-seik,⁶ and Maing-pun.⁷ These seven regiments contained 3,000 men who were made to march in the van, probably as a precaution against desertion. When they arrived in the town of Kyaing-taung,⁸ mounted messengers despatched by Minyè Thiri, the Burmese official in charge of Zinmè, also arrived with the request that they should hasten their march as quickly as possible. The Shan contingent of seven regiments together with three regiments of Burmese were placed under the command

1. มัง มหาวรธา. Vide พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ ๒ หน้า ๒๗๕

2. เมือง มณิบุร คือ เมือง กระแซ ฝ่าย ทิศ ตะวันตก ibid, p. 274.

3. ดอก จาก 4. เมือง ค่าย ? 5. ตาย ขา 6. เมือง จิต ?

7. เมือง ปุณ ? 8. เชียงตุง ?

of Sitkè (assistant in command) Tunyin Yamagyaw and ordered to march via Maing-pu and Maing-that. Nemyo Thihapate himself with 25 regiments marched by way of Maing-thwin¹ and Kyaing-rè.² On arrival at Lwè-lun hill, Nemyo Thihapate learned that the two rebel leaders Nga Thudit and Nga San Kôn, with their families and a following of over 3,000 men, had gone and laid siege to the town of Payaung.³ The Burmese then marched to Payaung, but the rebels not daring to contend with the Burmese raised the siege and went and joined Nwè Mano at the town of Labôn.⁴ The Burmese followed the rebels to Labôn, but on their approach Nwè Mano fled hastily from the town with only a small following, being unable to take even his family away with him. The Burmese general captured Labôn without resistance and he was able to seize over 200 elephants and a large quantity of arms. Taking these valuable spoils of war he went on to Anan,⁵ where he quartered during the rains, giving rest to his army and planning the campaign against Linzin and Yodaya.

Then orders from the Burmese capital were received that as soon as the rains were over Nemyo Thihapate was to operate against Maing-Lôn,⁶ Linzin and Maing-La and capture those towns. Accordingly on the 8th of waxing Tazungmôn 1126 (November A. D. 1764) the Burmese general left Anan with his 25 regiments, and proceeded by water via Maing-Leik and reached Maing-Lôn in 19 marches from Maing Leik. The ten regiments under Tuyin Yamagyaw proceeded by land and in 18 marches reached Maing-Lôn.

The King of Linzin mounted guns and guards for the defence of the town, and he and his nobles took out a force of 1,000 elephants, 2,000 horse and 50,000 men to make a stand against the enemy on the banks of the Me Kaung⁷ river to the west of the town. The Burmese attacked the Linzin forces, which suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded and were compelled to retire into the town. The invaders encamped on the banks of the river and, cutting off the heads of over 10,000 men of the Linzin army who had fallen in the battle, made a most ghastly pile of human heads, evidently with the object of striking terror into the defenders of the town. They seemed to have

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| 1. เมืองสวน ? | 2. เชียงราย | 3. เมืองพะเยา | 4. กำปง |
| 5. เมืองน่าน ? | 6. เมืองหลวง ? | 7. แม่ฟ้าหลวง | |

attained their object, as the Burmese historian was careful to say that the people in the town saw the pile, which must have been heart-rending and revolting in the extreme, and that the terror caused thereby was very great.

The town of Maing-Lôn was built on land between two branches of the river and offensive operations against the town were necessarily restricted. The Burmese therefore crossed the river, built platforms on which they mounted their guns and sent shells into the town day and night. For five days they did so, apparently with little or no effect. Then the Burmese Commander-in-chief said to his officers that their errand was not simply to conquer Zinmè and Linzin, but they had orders to operate against Yodaya also ; therefore they could not go on investing and shelling the town till the King of Linzin was forced to surrender, but they must hurry on the capture of it by a vigorous assault. In this he was unanimously supported by his officers, and accordingly orders were issued to the 35 regiments to build war chariots. With these they approached to the very walls of the town, and a very vigorous assault was made, some digging the base of the walls and some scaling the walls with ladders. The defence was equally vigorous, but owing to the obstinate determination of the attackers, half the town was captured, the defenders still maintaining hold of the other half. The Burmese then carried their big guns on to high ground and kept up an incessant cannonade into the camps of the defenders. The king of Linzin could not stand this heavy cannonade at short range, and was thus obliged to sue for peace. He sent eight priests and a minister with the title of Daw Baya, with presents, to the Burmese general to convey the message that he would make the customary offer of royal children, elephants, ponies and arms and acknowledge the suzerainty of His Majesty of Burma. Nemyo Thihapate administered the oath of allegiance to the King of Linzin, the governors of the following towns, namely, Maing-Lôn, Maing-Han,¹ Maing-San,² Maing-Myi, Maing-Thwin, Maing-La, Maing-Nyaung, and Maing-Thin, and the ministers and nobles. Then Letya Udain Kyaw was sent back to His Burman Majesty with the following presents and prizes of war:—Three daughters of the King of Linzin accompanied by daughters of the principal ministers as maids-

1. เมืองหาง

2. เมืองจันท

of-honour and over a thousand slave attendants including men and women, over two hundred viss of silver, fifty viss of gold, five hundred cannon, one thousand fusils, one hundred elephants, five hundred spears, five hundred swords, five hundred shields, five hundred boxes and five hundred caparisons. Thus Linzin together with her King, the master of a million elephants, became subject to Burma. So says the Burmese historian.

The Burmese forces left Maing Lôn on the 5th of waxing Tagu (April) and reached Lagun on the 10th of waxing Kasôn (May), where they set up their quarters for the rainy season, the second season since they left their homes. It is recorded that there was a very high flood that year, and both men and animals of the Burmese army were hard put to find suitable dry ground for their camps. The water spirit was summoned and, having been threatened with a drawn sword, was commanded in the name of His Burman Majesty to cause the flood to subside. The Burmese historian naively records that only when thus commanded did the water go down. During the recess in the rains, Nemyo Thihapate and his officers made arrangements to obtain contingents from Zimmè, Linzin and the Sawbwas and governors on the east side of the Thanlwin river, preparatory to the march against Yodaya.

The forces sent by way of Dawè under Maha Nawrata quartered at that place during the rains, making arrangements in the meantime to levy contingents from Hanthawadi, Môtama, Byeik,¹ Dawè, and Taninthari. When the rains were over the Burmese army was augmented by the addition of the following forces which came over to Dawè, namely, 3,000 men formed into six regiments under the command of Einda Yaza (Īndarājā) from Hanthawadi, 3,000 men also in six regiments under the command of Binnya Sein from Môtama, and four regiments of 2,000 men from Taninthari and Byeik under the command of Lakyawdin, while four regiments of 2,000 men levied in Dawè were placed under the command of the Governor of Môtama. The total of the forces after the addition of the levies amounted to 200 elephants, 2,000 horse, and 30,000 men. This army left Dawè for Yodaya on the 10th of waxing Tazaungmôn 1127 (November A.D. 1765). The governors of the towns in Siamese territory on the line of march of the Burmese

1. The same as Myeik, ^မမျိတ် မြိတ်.

got information of the entry of the enemy into Siam, and promptly repaired the moats, parapets, towers, etc., and made preparations to defend their towns to the best of their ability by laying down spikes, throwing up earth-works, setting up palisades, and mounting additional guns and men on the ramparts.

The Burmese arrived at the town of Byat-pi, the governor of which decided to defend the town as he dared not fight the enemy in the open. The town was, however, stormed and taken, the governor and all the inhabitants being captured. There was the usual looting, but arms and ammunition had to be sent to the camp of the commander-in-chief, and the rest of the booty, including men, women, gold, silver, etc., became the property of the person who had been able to seize it. Having administered the oath of allegiance to the principal officials of the town, and leaving a small force of occupation, the Burmese continued their march to Ratbi. Apparently the governor was taken away as a prisoner. The governor of Ratbi, having already heard that Byat-pi had fallen and its governor been made prisoner, gave up the idea of defending the town, and together with the principal officials went to the Burmese camp and tendered submission. The Burmese general issued orders to every regiment that the inhabitants of the towns which offered no resistance should not be molested in any way. He administered the oath of allegiance to the governor and the principal officials, and left them in charge of the town. The Burmese army then proceeded to Thapanbôn, the governor of which followed the example of the governor of Ratbi, met the Burmese general on the way with presents, and tendered his submission. They marched on to the town where the governor and the principal officials took the oath of allegiance. The next move of the Burmese was towards Kanpuri.¹ The governor of that town had stored up a large quantity of food supplies and had sufficient time to get men and arms into the town to defend it: so he decided not to submit, but, although a stubborn defence was offered, the town fell to the fierce attack of the Burmese. Many houses were burnt down and a general loot was allowed to the men, arms and ammunition being as usual considered as the State share of the booty. The oath of allegiance was given to the principal officials, the governor apparently

being taken away as a prisoner. A small force was left to occupy the town, as in the case of Byat-pi. The town of Saya,¹ was the next objective of the Burmese. The governor readily tendered his submission, and he and his officials took the oath of allegiance; they were allowed to assume the administration of the town as before. The general then proceeded to Sun-pyôn.² The governor of that town would not submit, but the defence must have been very feeble as the Burmese stormed and took it quite easily. There was the attendant looting in taking a town by assault, and the usual apportioning of the booty as regards arms and ammunition. As was the case with towns which offered resistance, the governor here was taken away as a prisoner, and the town was left in the charge of the principal officials, who had to take the oath of allegiance; a small force was also stationed to maintain order and suppress any attempt to organize armed resistance against the Burmese. The invaders then marched to the town of Salin³; the governor, having learnt of the fall of the towns lying on the west of it, went out together with his chief officials to meet the enemy, and tendered submission. They took the oath of allegiance and were allowed to resume their posts as before.

As usual with the Burmese invading army, each of the towns captured had to raise a levy and join the army to assist in the prosecution of the object of the invasion. It was no doubt a wise policy as the levy not only augmented the size of the army, but were also hostages in the hands of the conquerors for the good behaviour of the remaining population of the town. Moreover, the absence of a good portion of the fighting men from the town effectually crippled the power to rise in rebellion, thus enabling only a very small force to hold the town and maintain order. From each of the towns captured by the Burmese, the general commanding commandeered the best men, elephants, and ponies to join the army. Thus a levy of seven regiments was obtained, one from each of the following towns, namely, Byat-pi, Ratbi, Thapanbôn, Kanpuri, Saya, Sun-pyôn and Salin, and they were placed under the command of Mingyi Kamani Sanda.

1. ไชยา

2. ชุมพร

3. I have not been able to identify this town, which could not be very far from Chumpon.

The invading army thus reinforced then proceeded in the direction of Yodaya with the Siamese contingent marching in the forefront.

The King of Siam,¹ being informed of the incursion of the Burmese by way of Dawè, sent out an army consisting of 500 elephants, 500 cannons mounted on carriages, and 60,000 men, under the supreme command of Paya Pala.² This army took up its stand apparently outside the town of Thigôk³ towards the west of the capital. The Burmese cavalry acting as scouts discovered the Siamese army, and news of it was at once sent back to the main army. Maha Nawrata, the commander-in-chief, sent an order to the 57 regiments warning them of the nearness of the Siamese and requesting them to get ready to make an attack. The Burmese did not wait to ascertain the strength of their opponents and appeared to have discarded all tactical movements, making a frontal attack on the whole line of the Siamese army. A fierce battle ensued, resulting in the defeat of the Siamese, who were forced to retreat. Over a hundred elephants and 200 cannons were captured, and over 2,000 men made prisoners. The Burmese did not follow up the retreating army, but turned their attention to the town of Thigôk, which they stormed and captured together with its governor. The oath of allegiance was given to the principal officials while the governor was held a prisoner. Then leaving a small force to hold the town, the Burmese marched towards Yodaya, and encamped at Kanni village, to the west of the capital and within five days' march from it. A message was sent to His Burman Majesty conveying the news that all the towns to the west of Yodaya had been captured and that the Burmese army was encamped at Kanni village. They decided to give full rest to the forces and wait for the arrival of the army which was coming through Zinnè.

The Burmese army which had been spending the recess during the rains at Lagun received orders from the Burmese capital to proceed against Yodaya. So on the 8th of waxing Tawthalin 1127 (November A. D. 1765) it left Lagun for Yodaya, largely augmented

1. สมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ ๓ (พระที่นั่งสุริยามรินทร์)

2. พระยาพด ?

3. คำบด ตี กุ ก ibid: p. 282.

by the contingents commandeered from the territories of Zimmè and Linzin. Twenty regiments consisting of 10,000 men made up into four brigades of five regiments each, under the command of Tuyin Yamagyaw, were sent down the river with 300 war boats. Nine regiments were raised one from each of the following towns in Linzin territory, viz., (1) Maing-Lôn, (2) Maing-La, (3) Maing-Han, (4) Maing-San, (5) Maing-Myi, (6) Maing-Thwin, (7) Maing-Nyaung, (8) Maing-Thin, and (9) Maing Pan, and they were placed under the command of Thiri Yazathingran, who already had a Burmese regiment under him and who thus became the commander of the Linzin division. The ten regiments under him contained 100 elephants, 300 horse, and 8,000 men, and they formed the vanguard of the forces marching by land. Fourteen Yun regiments were levied, one from each of the following towns, namely, (1) Byè, (2) Anan, (3) Lagun, (4) Payaw, (5) Kyaing-Thin, (6) Kyaing-Kaung, (7) Kyaing-Lat, (8) Kyaing-Rè, (9) Maing-Leik, (10) Maing-That, (11) Maing-Law, (12) Maing-Pu and (13) Maing-Nwè and (14) a regiment under Paya Sapan; these were placed under the command of Thado Mindin, in addition to his own Burmese regiment. The fifteen regiments under him, forming the Yun division, contained 200 elephants, 700 horse, and 12,000 men and marched next to the Linzin division. The contingents levied from the towns subject to Burma or captured during an invasion were generally commanded by the governors of the towns, unless there was some valid excuse, such as infirmity, illness, or other incapacity to exempt them from following the army, in which case they deputed the command to some principal officer under them. Nemyo Thihapate, the commander-in-chief, with 13 regiments under his own command brought up the rear. The whole of the forces which came by the northern route, including the Linzin and the Yun contingents, amounted to 58 regiments consisting of 300 war boats, 400 elephants, 1,200 horse,¹ and 43,000 men.

All the towns on the line of march made the usual preparations to defend themselves against the impending attack. The first town stormed and taken was Ban Tet.² As usual in the case of towns which offered resistance, general loot was allowed, the governor taken prisoner, and a

1. The number given in the original is only 200, which is evidently a mistake.

2. บ้านตาก

small force left to occupy the town. The governor of Ywahaing,¹ having heard what had befallen Ban Tet, went to the Burmese general's camp and submitted. The people were in consequence not molested and the governor was allowed to retain his position and rank after taking the oath of allegiance. News of the surrender of Ywahaing reached Kamanpaik²; the governor thought it prudent to follow the example of Ywahaing, and so he and his principal officers went out with presents and met the invaders on the way. On arrival at the town, the oath of allegiance was administered to the governor and his officers, they being allowed to retain their offices. The Burmese then marched to Thuwunkalauk,³ the governor of which being fully prepared for the attack, would not submit. The town, however, fell quite easily to the attack of the Burmese, and shared the usual fate of towns which offered resistance. The governor was taken away and a small force left to garrison it. Then they proceeded to Thaukkatè,⁴ where the governor tendered submission. Having given the oath of allegiance to him, the invaders went to the town of Yathama,⁵ the governor of which met the enemy on the way and tendered his submission. The Burmese went to the town where they gave the oath of allegiance to the governor and his officers. From there they marched to Peikthalauk.⁶ The governor, trusting to the size and strength of his town, preferred resistance to submission. The town, however, could not withstand the attack of the Burmese and fell quite easily into the hands of the enemy. Looting was allowed and the governor made prisoner. Here the Burmese general rested his army for about ten days. He then sent a force of ten regiments under Thiri Nanda Thingyan, and another force of the same strength under Kyawgaung Kyawthu, in different directions to operate separately against the following towns:—Lalin, Peiksè,⁷ Tani,⁸ Biseik,⁹ Kunthanwun¹⁰ and Intaung.¹¹ None of these towns offered any resistance, they having heard that the Burmese had captured all the towns on the north and east, and that the main army was encamped at Peikthalauk. The two commanders

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| 1. เมือง ระแหง | 2. เมือง กำแพงเพชร | 3. เมือง สวรรคโลก |
| 4. เมือง ศรีไทร | 5. Or Rathama. | 6. เมือง พิษณุโลก |
| 7. เมือง พิษณุ | 8. เมือง ธานี | 9. เมือง พิจิตร |
| 10. เมือง นครสวรรค์ | 11. เมือง อ่างทอง | |

administered the oath of allegiance to the governors and chief officials of the towns, and taking with them the brothers or sons of the governors as hostages returned to Peikthalauk.

One hundred and fifty guns taking in charges varying from one viss weight to 15 viss weight, which were seized from the towns on the way, were sent back to Zinnè under an escort. The best elephants, horses, men and arms were commandeered from each of the following towns already captured, and an auxiliary division was formed of them and placed under the command of Nanda Udein Kyawdin, namely, (1) Ban-Tet, (2) Ywahaing, (3) Kamanpaik, (4) Thuwunkalauk, (5) Thaukkatè, (6) Yathama, (7) Peikthalauk, (8) Peiksè, (9) Lalin, (10) Tani, (11) Biseik, (12) Kunthanwun and (13) Intaung. This division consisted of thirteen regiments and raised the total of the regiments in the whole army to seventy-one. Then placing that latest addition to the army in the van, the Burmese marched towards the Siamese capital.

The King of Siam then thought it time to prevent the further approach of the enemy. He despatched two forces, one by land under the command of Paya Kuratit, consisting of the following arms:— 2,000 guns mounted on carriages and elephants, 300 elephants, and 30,000 men; and the other by water under Bra Karan, consisting of 30,000 men with 2,000 guns on 300 war boats, 300 junks and 300 smaller boats. They took up their stand on the bank of the river Mè-pein about two miles and a quarter to the north-east of Pananpathôk village. The Burmese attacked the Siamese in their position and defeated them, capturing 200 elephants, 500 guns, 300 boats and 1,000 men. Bra Karan, the commander of the forces by water, was taken prisoner in his own war boat. The invaders marched on without halting on the field of battle and encamped at Pananpathôk village, about a mile to the north-east of the Siamese capital, on the 5th of waxing Tabodwè 1,127 (February A. D. 1,765). Keeping the Mè-pein river in the middle, nine big camps were pitched on both banks of it and a rest was given to the men and animals.

When the army under Maha Nawrata, which had encamped at Kanni village, heard of the arrival of the army under Nemyo Thihapate, it moved on to get closer to the Siamese capital and encamped

on the west side of a pagoda built by King Bayin Naung Kyawdin Nawrata, about a mile and a quarter to the north-west of the city.

The King of Siam made all the preparations necessary for the defence of the city. Paya Kuratit, one of the ministers, advised His Majesty to fight the enemy without delay, so as to prevent them from getting a firm foothold on the positions occupied by them. To this, His Majesty replied that even if the Siamese did not try and dislodge the invaders from their positions, they would be compelled to make a hasty retreat when, on the setting in of the rains, the whole country round would be flooded and resemble a vast sea, and they would have no place to encamp. He said there was no need for anxiety and ordered that only those who approached close to the walls of the city should not be allowed to escape. His Siamese Majesty, however, sent out a force under Paya Kuratit, consisting of 500 elephants, 1000 guns mounted on carriages, and 50,000 men, to attack the Burmese forces under Nemyo Thilapate encamped on the eastern face of the city. The Burmese general arranged five regiments containing in all 100 elephants, 1000 horse, and 10,000 men to repel the attack. The Siamese were worsted in the fight and forced to re-enter the city. The Burmese captured over 100 elephants, 500 guns and 1000 men. There were many killed also.

About five days after the first attempt to dislodge the invaders from their position, another attempt was made, this time against the forces on the western face of the city. Two divisions were sent out, one under the command of Bra Than containing 400 elephants, 1000 guns on carriages, and 50,000 picked soldiers, and the other under the command of Paya Tet¹ containing the same number of forces as in the first division. The war elephants were protected with armour of sheets of iron round the temples and on the breast. Three guns were mounted on each of them together with the necessary men to work the guns.

Maha Nawrata, the Burmese general, was informed of the approach of the Siamese, and he arranged to meet them in two divisions. One of these consisted of 20 regiments containing 100 elephants, 500 horse, and 20,000 men, under the following five commanders, each

1. မာဏဝဏ္ဏ

having four regiments under him :—Nemyo Gônmarat, Satukamani, Thirizeya Kyawzwa, Letya Theikdi Kyaw, and Thiri Yandameik Kyawdin. The other division also consisted of 20 regiments with the same number of men and animals commanded by the following five officers :—Mingyi (minister) Zeyathu, Nanda Bala Kyawdin, Thurein Tazaung, Yanngu Thiri Kyawdin, and Thamein Kyawgaung. The Burmese took up their stand to receive the attack of the Siamese near the pagoda built by King Bayin Naung Kyawdin Nawrata, the two divisions being separated by it. The Siamese altered their tactics, apparently with a view to taking the Burmese by surprise, who expected to be attacked along the whole length of the two divisions. They combined their two divisions and fell upon the twenty regiments commanded by Mingyi Zeyathu and four others, opening the attack by an incessant artillery fire from the 1000 guns mounted on carriages and sending a regular shower of shots and shells. Then before the smoke from the guns had cleared away, Bra Than the Siamese commander drove his 400 elephants against the enemy, and delivered a fierce attack. The governor of Thapanbôn, true to the oath he had taken of allegiance to the Burmese, was first and foremost to receive the elephant charge. He was mounted on an elephant and assisted by twenty elephants disposed on the right and left of him and 500 fusiliers who generally followed close to the elephants. When Bra Than saw the governor of Thapanbôn coming forward, he drove his own elephant towards the governor saying that he had been looking out for him. The two men met in single combat, each on his own elephant. But just as the tusks of the opposing elephants came in contact, a shot from one of the Siamese fusiliers killed the governor of Thapanbôn. The Siamese commander then hurled the weight of his 400 elephants on the Burmese cavalry 500 strong and forced them to fall back. Following up their advantage the whole Siamese army delivered a fierce attack on the twenty regiments under Mingyi Zeyathu and four others, the attack of 800 elephants and the guns on carriages being particularly effective. The Burmese could not withstand the attack and were almost on the point of being put to rout, when their commander-in-chief, hearing an unusual firing of guns and fusils, came out from his camp with 200 elephants, one hundred of which were in front of him and fifty each on his right and left, supported by 3,000 fusiliers. The other division of the Burmese forces, which had up to the present remained idle, saw their commander-in-chief coming forward to the scene of battle.

The sight seemed to have roused them from their lethargy to life and energy, as they hurriedly made a flank movement round the east side of the pagoda, got behind the Siamese army and attacked the rear with vigour. Mingyi Zeyathu and his brother commanders tried their best to rally their wavering forces and make a stand. In this they were at last successful, as the attention of the Siamese was now divided, having to fight the Burmese in the rear as well. They sent a heavy artillery fire in rapid succession into the Siamese elephant corps. The elephants, about 200 in number, unable to stand against this shower of shot and shell, became unmanageable, turned round and stampeded into the ranks of the Siamese army, causing great confusion and creating a panic. The two Siamese commanders found it impossible to rally their forces, the panic being turned into a general rout; they gathered together as many of their scattered forces as they could and re-entered the city. The Burmese captured about 200 elephants, 200 guns and 2,000 men. The Siamese also lost a large number in killed.

The Burmese army returned to their camp. Maha Nawrata, the commander-in-chief, then assembled all the officers of the army and said that the governor of Thapanbôn, in spite of his being a Siamese and therefore fighting against his own countrymen, proved faithful to the oath of allegiance he had taken, by showing great courage and sacrificing his life in single combat with elephants, in the very front of the battle; whereas Mingyi Zeyathu and the four other officers of his division showed want of courage and remissness in the discharge of their duties, causing a reverse to the Burmese arms. He then ordered that the defaulting Mingyi Zeyathu and the four other brigade commanders be forthwith executed. One of the commanders, Tuyin Yan Aung Gyaw by name, pleaded on behalf of the condemned men, by saying that it was not owing to cowardice or to fear of death that they gave way to the enemy, but as they were greatly out-numbered even to the extent of ten to one, they had, according to the exigencies of warfare and adverse circumstances, to fall back to a place where they hoped to fight great odds with some chance of success. He was seconded in this by Nemyo Gônarat, another commander, who was in command of a brigade in the other division which took part in the fight and which, by its timely aid, averted what might have been a disastrous defeat; he said that the success of that day was attributable to the retreat of the

division under the command of Mingyi Zeyathu and his brother commanders. Maha Nawrata requested him to explain his apparent paradox. Nemyo Gônmarat explained that the division under Mingyi Zeyathu and the four others was on one side of a stream, and as it was greatly out-numbered, they could not possibly order the forces to cross it in the presence of the enemy on the opposite bank ; so the only alternative left was to draw the enemy across by a feint retreat. When the enemy had crossed the stream, the Burmese held their ground and gradually drove them back again to it where, owing to the delay in crossing, their forces got cramped up, and in consequence lost heavily in killed and wounded, especially as at that moment the other division of the Burmese was co-operating in the rear by a flank movement. As Maha Nawrata still remained silent and seemed unrelenting, Satukamani, another brigade commander who was in the fight also, came forward to intercede saying that what his two brother officers had stated was very pertinent, that the fortunes of a battle were as difficult to foretell as it was to know the condition of a chick in an egg, and that even in the fight between the Sakka and the Asuras there were successes and reverses on both sides. He further said that they were close to the Siamese capital and they had yet to accomplish the object of their invasion ; he begged that the defaulters might be pardoned for what had happened and that they be charged to prove their mettle in a subsequent encounter with the enemy. Maha Nawrata replied that, in conducting a war, it made no difference whether there was disparity of forces, or whether an offence was grave or not, or whether it was the first offence or a repeated one, the usual punishment for any default during war was death ; but as it was the wish of three commanders that the offenders be let off that time, he would accordingly pardon them.

The city of Yodaya was so surrounded by rivers and other water-ways that the Burmese found it difficult to approach the city walls. They decided to invest it by pitching camps round it. The forces of the column which had come from the south via Dawè were distributed as follows:—Nemyo Gônmarat, Mingyi Zeyathu and Kamani Sanda each with seven regiments were stationed on the western face of the city ; Kemayaza, Yanngu Thiri Kyawdin and Minngè Bala each with seven regiments were on the southern face. The northern column which had come by way of Zinnè was disposed of as

follows :—twenty-five¹ regiments under four commanders on the eastern face of the city, and twenty-one regiments under three commanders on the northern face. There were 88 regiments on the four sides of the city. Several attempts were made to assail the city by approaching the walls, but without success, and the reasons given for the failure were that the moat round the city was very deep and wide; that the walls were very high and very strongly built; that a river had to be crossed before any attack could be made; that the guns mounted on the ramparts were numerous and the fire so effective that they could not get even near the walls.

As the rains were approaching the commanders of the brigades and regiments suggested to Maha Nawrata, the commander-in-chief of the Dawè column, who had somehow assumed and been accorded the position of generalissimo of the entire Burmese army, to raise the siege and depart to some high ground, as their then camping ground would soon be like a vast sea. Maha Nawrata disapproved of the suggestion, saying that if they were to do as suggested it would be like letting the fish caught in a net free again. The Siamese, he said, would be able to communicate with the neighbouring towns, take in reinforcements and replenish their food supplies, and they themselves would thus lose all the advantages they already had of the siege. His plan was to seize all the provisions obtainable in the neighbourhood, to cultivate rice with the buffaloes and bullocks seized, to send their horses and elephants to some high grazing ground, and to build forts in places where the water was low and to station outposts between the forts as a means of communication between them. This plan was approved of by all the commanders and acted upon. About five days after they had started work the water rose very high. Many war boats were built, some of them were gilded and some others painted red.

Bra Than, one of the Siamese nobles, volunteered to attack first the Burmese forces encamped on the west side of the city, and when they had been put to rout, to attack the northern column on the north side. His Siamese Majesty rewarded him for his patriotism and supplied him with an army of 85,000 chosen men and a flotilla of 2,000 war boats

1. There is some mistake here in the original. The total of the regiments enumerated under the four commanders amounts to only 21 as follows :—5 regiments each with the Bo of Satpyagôn, the Bo of Thitsein, and Tuyin Thayagyaw, and 6 regiments under Thapanza.

and 500 smaller auxiliary boats. The war boats were armed with big guns. News of the coming of the Siamese was conveyed to Maha Nawrata by the outposts, and he accordingly sent seven brigades consisting of 35,000 men with 700 war boats to meet the Siamese army. The Burmese war boats were also armed with big guns. The two opposing armies came in contact and a fierce engagement ensued. The Siamese also used their heavy artillery on the ramparts of the city to throw shells among the Burmese boats. In the heat of the conflict the boats got mixed up, each boarded the boats of the other and there was a fierce hand to hand fight. Bra Than, the Siamese patriot, exhorted his men by walking up and down the bow and stern of his own boat and encouraging them to fight to their utmost. About twenty Burmese war boats surrounded his boat, and although all the other men in it were either killed or wounded he would not surrender but continued to fight single handed. A chief gunner by the name of Nga San Tun turned the bow of his boat towards Bra Than's with the intention of capturing the Siamese nobleman ; the latter did not wait to allow Nga San Tun to board his boat, but jumped on the enemy's boat with a drawn sword in hand. The chief gunner however employed his piston rod to strike a blow effectively and thus disabled the Siamese nobleman before he could get within reach of his sword. Thereafter, the Siamese forces, not seeing their commander in his boat and thinking that he must have been slain, abandoned the fight and re-entered the city. The Burmese pursued the Siamese and captured many of them. According to the Burmese historian they captured on that occasion over 50,000 prisoners, over 1,000 war boats and 500 auxiliary boats. There were many killed also. The prisoners were treated kindly, and they were sent out in several directions to induce the refugees to return to their homes. The headmen or leaders among the prisoners were given the oath of allegiance and made to serve in the Burmese army.

About ten days after the defeat of Bra Than, another nobleman by the name of Paya Kuratit offered to fight the enemy. He brought out a force of 50,000 men with a flotilla of 1,000 war boats and 500 junks fully armed with big guns. His object of attack was the Burmese forces encamped on the east side of the city, being a portion of the column under Nemyo Thihapate. News of the coming of the Siamese was conveyed by the outposts to the commander-in-chief, who ordered

five regiments containing 5,000 men to lie quietly at Uyin village on one bank of the Me Pein, and another five regiments with 5,000 men on the opposite bank. Then a force of eight regiments containing 10,000 men was detailed to oppose the Siamese on the river with 200 war boats. The Siamese unaware of the enemy forces at Uyin village thought they would be able to defeat easily the enemy on the river, and came on with great confidence. The Burmese gradually withdrew in front of the Siamese from the place where the kheda was built to where they had two forces ambushed on both banks of the river, thus drawing the unsuspecting enemy into a trap. In those days the art of scouting and the importance of the part it plays in warfare could not have been thoroughly understood or sufficiently appreciated, judging by the way in which a force could be so easily ambushed. When the Burmese found that their comrades on land could effectually operate on the flank of the Siamese, they made a firm stand and redoubled their attack which hitherto had only been a feint. The ten regiments on land opened fire when the Siamese forces were well within their grip and sent an abundant shower of shot and shell. Attacked on three sides, the Siamese found it impossible to continue the contest any longer and made a hasty retreat. One hundred war boats together with the officers in charge of each and over 5,000 men were captured.

As all attempts to strike a decisive blow at the enemy had failed, the King of Siam and his nobles, as well as the populace, became anxious about the safety of the capital. Consequently the gates of the city were entirely closed up with brick and mortar and the appliances and men for its defence were redoubled.

When the water had all subsided, His Siamese Majesty, in consultation with his ministers, made a fresh attempt to attack the enemy. A force containing 300 elephants, 500 big guns mounted on carriages and 30,000 men under the command of Paya Taik¹ was sent to attack the Burmese on the west side of the city under Maha Nawrata; and another force of exactly the same formation under Paya Bra Narit was despatched against the enemy on the north-east side of the city under Nemyo Thihapate. Maha Nawrata arranged to meet the Siamese with a force of 120 elephants, 1,200 horse and 12,000 men, and so did Nemyo Thahapate with a force exactly the same in strength. The Siamese were

1. Probably the same as Paya Tet; see foot-note on page 31 ante.

defeated in both directions, on the west side losing over 100 elephants, 200 horse¹ and 1,000 men; and on the north-east losing also about the same.

In spite of these repeated repulses, His Siamese Majesty did not appear to be discouraged in any way. He got many ships and boats laden with men and big guns and other armaments ready to resist any attack of the enemy by water, in which many obstructions, such as submerged dams, piles &c., were laid. Then for the better defence of the city by land, he had fifty forts constructed of brick, each 500 "tas"² in perimeter, built as quickly as possible round the city on the farther side of the moat. These forts were fully manned, provisioned and provided with every kind of armament both for offence and defence, and all manner of obstacles and impediments were constructed on the approaches round the forts.

About this time, there arrived fresh orders from King Sinbyu-shin to expedite the capture of the Siamese capital and its King. A council of war was held between the two commanders-in-chief and their officers, at which Maha Nawrata recapitulated the signal successes achieved by the Burmese and the severe losses suffered by the Siamese in every encounter either by land or by water, and said that in spite of such losses the Siamese Monarch seemed to be fully determined to make a stand to the last, as evidenced by the construction of fifty forts round the city. He said they would have to emulate the example of the Embryo Buddha Mahawthata (Mahosathā) who by tunnelling into the city of Pyinsalayit (Pañcālaraj) was able to carry away the princess Pyinsala Sandi (Pañcāla Candī). He recommended the construction of rival forts and the digging of tunnels into the city. Nemyo Thihapate and the other officers all approved of the recommendation, and immediate steps were taken to carry it into effect. The following forts were accordingly constructed:—To the north-east of the city of Yodaya and at a distance of 400 "tas" from it, Nemyo Thihapate, the commander-in-chief of the Zimmè column, built his fort 320 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the north-west of the city Shwedaung Sithu built his fort 200 "tas"

1. The presence of cavalry in the Siamese forces was not mentioned before; evidently a lapse of memory on the part of the Burmese historian.

2. "Ta" is a Burmese measure of length and is seven cubit long; a cubit is about 20 inches (English),

in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the east of Shwedaung Sithu's fort, Pônnya Kyawdin built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the east of the last named fort and on the east bank of a river which flowed from the city, the Chaung-U Bo built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the east of the last named fort, Kyawgaung Kyawthu converted the existing elephant kheda into a fort 300 "tas" in perimeter and eight cubits high; the five forts mentioned above were on the north side of the city. To the south-east of the kheda fort, Girinara built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the south of Girinara's fort, Tuyin Yamagyaw built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the south of the last named fort, Tuyin Yangyaw built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the south of the last named, Thiri Thaya-kyawzwa built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the south of the last named, Thiri Yazathingyan built his fort 300 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; the five forts just mentioned were on the east side of the city. To the south-east of the city, Shwedaung Kyawzwa built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of Shwedaung Kyawzwa's fort, Teza Bala Kyaw built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of the last named fort, Theikdi Kyawthu built his fort 200 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of the last named, Mingyi Zeyathu built his fort on the east bank of the Bangauk river, 200 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high. Across this Bangauk river which flowed into the city, iron chains were stretched to prevent the passage of ships, war boats and other vessels either way, into the city or out of it. On the west bank of this river and opposite Mingyi Zeyathu's fort, Nanda Udein Kyawdin built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of Nanda Udein Kyawdin's fort, Nanda Bala Kyawdin built his fort 150 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of the last named fort, Let-wè Kyawzwa built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high; to the west of the last named, Yanngu Thiri Kyawdin built his fort 170 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high. To the south-west corner of the city, Nandameik Sithu built his fort 300 "tas" in perimeter and seven cubits high. There were altogether nine forts on the south side commencing with the fort built by Shwedaung Kyawzwa and ending with that built by Nandameik Sithu. To the north of Nandameik Sithu's fort, Shwedaung Let-wè Nawrata built his fort 170

“tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; to the north of Shwedaung Let-wè Nawrata’s fort, Let-ya Bala built his fort 170 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; to the north of the last named fort, Thiri Yandameik Kyawdin built his fort 180 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; to the north of the last named, Theikdi Kyawdin built his fort 170 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; to the north of the last named, Thiha Damayat built his fort 200 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; to the north of the last named, Bala Pyanchi built his fort 200 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high ; the six forts just mentioned were on the west side of the city. All the forts mentioned above, with the exception of that built by Nemyo Thihapate, were built only a short distance from the moat of the city. To the north-west of the city and at a distance of about 500 “tas” from it, Satukamani built his fort 300 “tas” in perimeter and seven cubits high, surrounding the pagoda built by King Bayin Naung Kyawdin Nawrata ; to the west of the last named fort and at a distance of about 1,000 “tas” from it, Maha Nawrata, the commander-in-chief of the Dawè column, built his fort 500 “tas” in perimeter and nine cubits high and established his headquarters. There were twenty-seven forts¹ of brick built by the Burmese surrounding the city of Yodaya, and each was provided with gates, and raised platforms on which heavy artillery were mounted and a shower of shot and shell sent into the city day and night. Many of these shells killed and wounded the people carrying food to the men on duty on the ramparts of the walls of the city and forts.

About this time the people of Thuwunkalauk, Peikthalauk, Thaukkatè, Banna, and other provincial towns raised an army of 200 elephants, 2,000 horse and 20,000 men and marched towards Yodaya with

1. It might be possible to identify some of these forts. The Siamese History says—ฝ่าย เนเมียว แม่ทัพ ค่ายโพธิ์ สามัคคี จึง ให้ พด พม่า เข้ามา คุกเพลิง เผา ปราสาท ที่ พเนียด นั้น เสีย แล้ว ให้ ตั้ง ค่าย ลง ที่ พเนียด แล วัดพระเจดีย์แดง วัดสามพิหาร วัดมรฎป วัดกระโจม วัดนางชี วัดนางปลัด วัดศรีโพธิ์ ให้ปลุกหอระฆังบน ไหล่น้อย ขึ้นยิงเข้ามา ใน กรุง ทุกๆ ค่าย. See พระราชพงษาวดาร เล่ม ๒ หน้า ๓๐๐. Also at วัดกระชาย วัดปลัดพญาไชย วัดเคา วัดสุเรนทร์ วัดแดง, see *ibid* page 294.

the intention of attacking the Burmese. When they reached a village called Kundaw, about ten miles to the north of the capital, the commanders-in-chief received information of their coming. A draft of 100 elephants, 200 horse, and 3,000 men from the Zinmè column under the command of Thiri Yazathingyan, and another of the same strength from the Dawè column under the command of Thiri Nanda Kyawdin, were sent to meet this auxiliary Siamese force coming to relieve the besieged. They marched in two columns, the former on the east and the latter on the west. When they got near Kundaw, they chose about 1,000 men from among those Siamese on the way who had volunteered to serve with the Burmese army, and forming a regiment of them, appointed one Dewa Setkathu to the command of it. This Siamese contingent was placed in the front, followed by the Burmese forces at a short distance behind and on the right and left of it. The northern Siamese auxiliary first got sight of the Siamese contingent under Dewa Setkathu, and mistook it for another friendly force from some other Siamese town, which had come to join them. In consequence, they took no notice of the coming enemy, who fell upon them unawares and completely routed them. The Burmese captured about 100 elephants, 200 horse, and 1,000 men; many were left dead, and the rest fled into the neighbouring forests and valleys. The Burmese then returned to the main besieging army.

His Siamese Majesty then suggested that they should arm the ships, war boats, and other vessels which they had collected in Bangauk¹ river and deliver a crushing blow on the forts on the south of the city; when they had routed the enemy on the south side, then to land the men and arms and, dividing into two columns, attack the forts on the east and west side of the city. This suggestion was approved of by the princes and nobles. Accordingly, 10 ships, 500 ship's auxiliary boats, and 1,000 war boats were adequately armed with big guns and fully manned with Kala Panthes,² Chinese, Binga, Bashu,³ and Siamese, numbering over 60,000 men. They were placed under the command of four officers, namely, Paya Bala Dewa,⁴ Paya Kuratit, Paya Barabat, and Paya Ramaya.⁵

1. ဂၢၤဂၢၤကၢၤ 2. Portuguese. 3. Malays.

4. ပာယာဗလာဝေဝ 5. ပာယာရာမာယာ ?

Judging at the present day without knowledge of the special and local circumstances prevailing at that time, which might fully justify the above plan of attack, it appears that the plan showed want of generalship and lack of knowledge of strategy, because such an attack as contemplated would place the Siamese at a great disadvantage. In the first place, their enemies were on dry land and protected by forts; in the second, although the river might be very wide, still it could not possibly afford sufficient room for the free and easy movement of a large number of vessels, some of which, owing to their big size, would certainly be difficult to manage properly; and thirdly, they would have to face not only the artificial force of shot, shell, and other offensive weapons, but also to contend with the natural force of the element in which they were, such as adverse currents, death from drowning, etc.

This big flotilla went down the Bangauk river only to meet a fate which those in command had not foreseen. The Burmese had two forts commanding the river, one on the east bank where Mingyi Zeyathu and his troops were, and the other on the west bank held by Nanda Udein Kyawdin. Moreover, they had laid across the river, near where the two forts were, several iron chains to obstruct the navigation of the river. When the Siamese flotilla arrived at this point they found their passage barred by the iron chains, with the natural result that the vessels were crowded together at the point of obstruction. The two forts on the east and west banks of the river then began their artillery practice on the crowded and cramped up flotilla with dire results. Theikdi Kyawthu, Teza Bala Kyaw, and Shwedaung Kyawzwa, who were in forts to the east of Mingyi Zeyathu's fort, brought out their troops to co-operate, and so did Bala Nanda Kyawdin, Letwè Kyawzwa, Yanngu Thiri Kyawdin, and Nandameik Sithu who occupied forts to the west of Nanda Udein Kyawdin's. Over a thousand big guns mounted on carriages were employed by the co-operating forces to shell the hapless flotilla, which had more than enough to do to fight the current of the river in its attempt to withdraw. Confusion reigned supreme among this huge collection of boats; some of them were thrown athwart the river, hundreds ran foul of each other, and many were broken and sunk together with their crews. The four commanders made their escape hastily, with only about twenty war boats. The Burmese captured the whole of the ten ships, over 300

ship's auxiliary boats, 500 war boats, and 1,000 men; and there were many hundreds of men drowned.

Soon after the defeat of the Siamese on the river, the rice crop of the previous rains must have been ready for harvesting. The two commanders-in-chief and their officers arranged to gather in the rice crop, the greater part of which had been cultivated by the Burmese themselves. Then to beguile the men and to keep up their spirits, they were allowed to amuse themselves with music, dancing, and theatrical performances. With a view to deceiving the Siamese into believing that fresh reinforcements of Burmese were arriving constantly, the two commanders-in-chief sent out, in the darkness of the night, detachments of elephants, horse, and men to some distance back, enjoining them to make no noise whatever beyond what was unavoidable, and to return to camp in broad daylight with banners flying and bands playing. To make the deception look as real as possible, additional forts were built, with sheds erected in them, and a few men were detailed to watch these forts and set them aglow with camp fires at night. The Siamese seemed to have been taken in by this simple means of deception.

His Siamese Majesty then consulted the princes and nobles how best to compel the Burmese to raise the siege, as from appearances, he said, they seemed to be determined to continue the investment even for ten years or more. Paya Kuratit, one of the nobles, said that the present investing forces, though commanded only by officers, had been able to stop the food supplies of the city so effectually that the people were finding themselves hard pressed for food; and should the King of Burma himself arrive on the scene with reinforcements, the position of the besieged would be hopeless. Moreover, he said, the Burmese had taken into their forts ample supplies of food, and as the food stuffs available in the neighbouring towns and villages were completely at their mercy, it was very unlikely that they would raise the siege and return without having captured the city. He recommended the sending of a message offering to acknowledge the suzerainty of Burma and to undertake to send annual tribute of treasure, elephants, and ponies, with a view to inducing the Burmese commanders to raise the siege; and when they did so, the Siamese could take whatever steps they thought advisable. This recommendation was approved of by His Siamese Majesty, princes, and nobles, and a

letter to the following effect was sent:—That there had been peace and quiet between Siam and Burma for many generations and the tribute of elephants and horses and presents had been sent uninterruptedly, but of recent years, owing to the revolt of the Talaings, the payment of tribute had been interrupted. That henceforth the usual tribute would be sent. This letter addressed to the ministers of state was taken to the Burmese camp by four nobles all dressed in white. They were taken to Maha Nawrata, where the letter was translated into Burmese in the presence of the other officers. The two commanders-in-chief, in consultation with the other officers, sent the following reply:—That if the chances of success in this war between the two countries were contrasted, it would be like weighing in a delicate balance a “Chin-ywe”¹ weight in one scale with a viss² weight in the other. Such being the case, if it were the real intention of the Siamese to submit and pay the usual tribute of royal children, elephants, and horses, they should, as evidence of their bona fides, hand over to the Burmese the two famous guns they had in the city. If, on the other hand, the Siamese still desired to compare the personal prowess of individual soldiers, they should send out a thousand picked men and the Burmese would capture them all with only a hundred men; or if they wished to contend in open battle, they should send out a force of 10,000 picked soldiers and the Burmese would put them to rout with only a thousand men. This reply was sent back with the four Siamese who had brought the Siamese letter.

About five days after this fruitless attempt of the Siamese to hoodwink the Burmese generals, one of them, Maha Nawrata, died on account of illness, and Nemyo Thihapate assumed command of the Dawè column also. One Zeya Nara was sent back to report the death of Maha Nawrata to His Majesty of Burma. The report also mentioned the fact that Nemyo Thihapate had assumed command of both the columns, that the army, after having captured all the principal towns, was besieging the capital, and that, as the besieged were being reduced to straitened circumstances, Nemyo Thihapate expected shortly to capture the capital and the King of Yodaya. Zeya Nara arrived at the Burmese capital on the 10th of waxing Pyatho 1128 (January A. D. 1767). On learning the state of affairs in Yodaya,

1. The seed of *abrus precatorius*

2. A standard measure of weight in Burma equal to 100 ticals or about $3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. avoirdupois; the ratio of a Chin-ywe to a viss is 1 : 12,800.

King Sinbyushin announced that it was his intention to lead an army to China, and therefore ordered the capture of Yodaya to be hastened as much as possible; adding that, when captured, the whole city should be razed to the ground, and the King and the royal family brought to Burma. He also ordered that the honours usually paid at the obsequies of a high minister of state should be paid at the obsequies of Maha Nawrata. With these orders, those who brought the report from Yodaya were sent back without delay. King Sinbyushin then appointed Minyè Min-hla Uzana, the governor of Môttama, to the command of the Dawè column. He also sent to the newly appointed commander-in-chief, a force of 3,000 men with Thiri Yandameik Kyawdin, who was to act as second in command to him. With this force were sent 300 "paso" (cloth worn by the Burmese round the loins) of foreign manufacture and 500 silver medals to be given to those who had distinguished themselves in the operations against Yodaya. This small force left Ava on the 5th of waxing Tabodwè 1128 (February 1767), and was ordered to march as quickly as possible to the besieged city. On the arrival of Zeya Nara with orders from His Burman Majesty, the funeral rites of Maha Nawrata were performed with high honours.

The Burmese general then devised another plan to bring about the fall of the Siamese capital. He arranged to dig five tunnels into the city, and in order to be able to dispose of the excavated earth without attracting the attention of the besieged, he had three forts built on the northern face of the city, right up to the edge of the moat, each having a perimeter of 800 "tas" and a height of 10 cubits. These forts were not far from the main river into which the earth was probably thrown. The Bo (captain or leader) of Satpyagôn¹, the Bo of Thitsein,² and Thirdo Mindin, each with 2,000 men, were detailed to defend a fort each of these three new forts. Of the five tunnels, two of them stopped just beneath the base of the city wall, and for a length of about 100 "tas" under it running due east and west, the earth was removed, and wooden props of sizes between thirty and forty inches in girth were planted to support the wooden beams, by

1. คัมภีร์ โป่? See พระราชพงษาวดาร กรม ๒. page 275.

2. จิกสิน โป่? See พระราชพงษาวดาร กรม ๒. page 273.

which means the walls of the city were kept in position. The remaining three tunnels were dug below the base of the wall, and then upwards on the inner side of the wall, leaving a layer of earth about two feet thick.

About this time the besieged began to feel the effects of a close and prolonged investment. Food supplies were running short, especially as, before the commencement of the siege, the population in the city had been largely increased by reinforcements and refugees from the neighbouring towns. Every day, famished Siamese arrived in the Burmese camp, driven by hunger to leave the city and seek relief from suffering in the hands of their adversaries. Then Bra Mundari,¹ the brother of one of the concubines of the King, offered to make an effort with the best troops, elephants, horses, and arms. The offer was accepted by all, the Sovereign, the princes, and the nobles, and a specially chosen force of 500 elephants and 50,000 men was equipped and sent out to fight the enemy on the north of the city. The first assault was made on the three forts built to facilitate the digging of the five tunnels. After a preliminary bombardment, the Siamese stormed the forts. In the words of the Burmese historian, they swarmed round the forts like bees, some digging the base of the walls, some climbing the walls with ladders. The defenders on the ramparts of the forts mowed down everyone who attempted to reach the top and the execution thus done was enormous; but owing to the exhortations of Bra Mundari, the Siamese seemed to be heedless of death and, being solely intent on gaining the top of the walls, they stepped on the corpses of their comrades in their attempts to reach to the top. Despite the vigorous resistance, about a thousand Siamese got inside the walls and there was a fierce hand to hand fight. It seems as if the three forts were taken by the Siamese, although the Burmese historian did not admit it. Just at this moment, Shwe-daung Sithu, Pônnya Kyawdin, Kyawgaung Kyawthu, and the Bo of Chaung-U came, with a force of 200 elephants 1,000 horse, and 10,000 men, to the assistance of the forts attacked. The Siamese found they could not stand the attack in the front as well as in the rear, and re-entered the city with all the men they were able to withdraw. Of the 1,000 Siamese who succeeded in entering the forts, about 800 were

1. พระมุนต์

killed in the hand to hand encounter and about 200 were captured alive. The Burmese forces who came to assist their comrades also captured about 100 elephants, 200 horses, and 1,000 men. Bra Mundari, the commander, escaped capture owing to the swiftness of his elephant.

Finding that every attempt against the enemy had always resulted in failure, the King of Siam ordered that the great gun² called Dwarawadi, which had been regarded from ancient times as the guardian of the city, should, after the customary propitiatory offerings had been made to the presiding spirit, be brought out from the building where it had been carefully kept, mounted on the northern wall of the city, and fired against the enemy. He also ordered that all the inhabitants of the city, both men and women, young and old, should, with suitable offerings, propitiate the guardian spirits of the city, the country, and the weapons. In compliance with this royal command, the great gun was brought out with due ceremony and, with the help of mechanical appliances, raised and mounted on the northern wall of the city and directed against Nemyo Thihapate's camp. It was then loaded with an ample charge of powder and all kinds of shot, such as bar-shot, chain-shot, shrapnel, elongated bullets, etc., and fired with a fuse. The fuse burned all right and so did the priming powder, but the charge in the gun failed to ignite. Although repeatedly tried, the gun failed to discharge its load of shot. So the charge was taken out to discover the cause, and to the amazement of the officers and men, it was found that the powder had dissolved and water trickled down the mouth of the gun. According to the Burmese historian, who was evidently endowed with a faculty far more imaginative, than historical, the Siamese officers were alleged to have exclaimed that when even the great guardian gun of the city, a thing inanimate, had gone over the side of the King of Ava, they, who were animate beings, could not but submit. This incident, if true, probably the result of bad gun-powder coming in contact with the cold metal in

1. The presence of cavalry among the forces brought out by Bra Mundari was not mentioned before

2. The Siamese history mentions two guns by name (1) ^๔ปืนพระมหา
 กามฤคยวราช, (2) ^๕ปืนปราบหงษา. Vide ^๖พระราชนิพนธ์พงศาวดารกรุงรัตนโกสินทร์ ๒๓๑๔
 และ ๓๐๐๐

very damp weather, played so strongly on the superstition of the officers, both military and civil, that they beseeched their Sovereign to submit, bringing forward the following reasons:—that owing to the siege being prolonged to over two years, both the civil and military population in the city had been suffering from a scarcity of food; and as some of them had left the city stealthily and entered the camps of the Burmese, to find relief from the pangs of hunger, the enemy must have learnt the straitened circumstances of the besieged; that knowing the condition in the city, the enemy were showing greater activity in raising earthen mounds, mounting guns on them, and keeping up a continual bombardment; that owing to the arrival of reinforcements almost daily, the enemy were in high spirits; that repeated attempts to fire the great guardian gun of the city, had failed, the gun-powder obstinately refusing to catch fire; that for several days, the besieged had been subsisting on greatly reduced rations, ten to twenty men having to live on a “Salè”¹ of rice; that in about ten days more, they would scarcely have sufficient strength to hold their arms; and that a peaceful surrender, before a forcible entry by the enemy, would be the means of saving the population. To this appeal, His Siamese Majesty was, however, obdurate, remarking that even if the enemy were to build iron forts with iron walls, leave alone small brick forts, and continue the siege ever so long, the city honoured with the name of Dwarawadi was impregnable; that the city being well provided with all kinds of defensive works and ably supported by fifty auxiliary forts, the enemy forces could not possibly harm the inhabitants of the city, as they were not endowed with the power of flight. He ordered that the defence should not be relaxed, and the defenders should be exhorted to be always on the alert.

Nemyo Thihapate obtained definite information of the condition of the besieged from the refugees from the city arriving at the Burmese camp. He then called a meeting of the military officers and explained to them in detail how matters stood. He said that it evidently was the intention of the King of Siam to defend the city to the last, notwithstanding the fact that the people in it were almost starving; to storm the city would entail great loss of their men, as the moats were broad and deep, and the city was of large extent and very

1. A “Salè” is 1/64th part of a basket of 8 gallons capacity, equal to about one “Thanan” of Siamese measure.

strongly built; the heavy guns mounted on the ramparts of the city and of the fifty auxiliary forts were numerous and effective. He suggested that they should set up a big fire in the two tunnels where they had undermined the base of the walls and kept the walls in their position by means of wooden supports. This suggestion having been approved of by the officers, orders were sent to all the regiments and camps to have elephants, horse, and men ready for action. Then with firewood and other inflammable materials, the wooden posts and beams supporting the base of the walls in the tunnels were set fire to. Owing to the heat cracks were formed in the overlying ground; and the posts supporting the wall having been burnt away, about a hundred "tas" of the wall collapsed. The Burmese forces then made a general rush, some entered the city through the breach thus caused, some scaled the walls with ladders and got inside, while others also made their entry by the three tunnels leading into the city. The Siamese nobles tried their best to exhort the defenders to fight with all their might, but owing to their having been on reduced rations for a considerable time, the resistance was feeble and ineffectual. As soon as the Burmese gained a footing in the city they set fire to the houses, public buildings, monasteries, and other religious edifices. The Burmese soldiery seized men, women, gold, silver, jewels, etc., and confusion and disorder reigned supreme. The King of Siam, together with his Queen and children, left the palace in disguise by the western gate, probably with the intention of evading capture. But in the general confusion that prevailed, his identity was not recognized, and he was killed by a random shot. Thus died Kyauk-bwa Ekadat,¹ who assumed the regal title of Ekadathayaza (Ekādasarājā), and the capital of Yodaya² fell into the hands of the Burmese on Thursday the 11th of waxing Tagu 1129 (April A. D. 1767).

The first batch of Burmese soldiers who entered the palace found Bra-ôn-saw San, a brother of the King, in close confinement with an iron ring round his neck. He was removed from the place of his confinement and kept under guard. The Burmese officers made a

1. เจ้าฟ้าเอกทัศ Vide พระราชพงษาวดารเดิม ๒ หน้า ๒๓๘

2. The Burmese historian called the country Yawnaka Ayōkza (Yonaka Ayujjha) and the capital Tilawka-dwaravadi (Tiloka dvārāvātī) which is, I presume, the nearest Burmese transliteration of กรุงเทพมหานคร

careful search for His Siamese Majesty, but till dawn the following day they could not find him. They then removed the iron ring from Bra-ôn-saw San's neck and sent him round under a strong guard to make a thorough search both inside and outside the city. His Majesty's body¹ was at last found at the western gate of the city. Honours befitting a king were paid to the royal remains, and the customary funeral obsequies were performed.

A full enquiry was then made about the members of the royal family, and the following, according to the Hmannan history, were found :—Of the queens, Min Mauk, Man Min, Mun Thi² and Mun Thila³ were the chief. There were eight hundred and sixty-nine concubines, including those who were honoured with the titles of Bra-ôn and Bra-san. Of the brothers, there was one who had been king at one time ; and there were also Thu-u Padônmayaza,⁴ Kya-wa-an-sut, Bra-ôn-saw Taraik, Bra-ôn-saw Than, Bra-ôn-saw Neramun, Bra-ôn-saw Kun, Bra-ôn-saw Sarit, Bra-ôn-saw Bunara, Bra-ôn-saw Thin, Bra-ôn-saw Kun-meik, and Bra-ôn-saw Thu-chan, in all twelve. Of the sisters, the history says there were fourteen, but enumerates only thirteen, namely :—(1) Saw-bwa Paramat, (2) Saw-bwa Thurapôn,⁵ (3) Saw-bwa Einda-Thudawadi,⁶ (4) Saw-bwa Môn-Kwè, (5) Saw-bwa Kethun,⁷ (6) Saw-ôn Kra-Un, (7) Saw-bwa Kra-ut, (8) Hôn-saw Lanpu, (9) Hôn-saw Pa-Pwet, (10) Hôn-saw Krôn-kun, (11) Hôn-saw Than-an, (12) Hôn-saw Thôn-Kri, and (13) Hôn-saw Ein. There were three sons, Bra-ôn-saw Papaik, Bra-ôn-saw Thutin, and Bra-ôn-saw Thin, and four daughters, Ôn-saw Pabi, Saw-bwa Nwè,⁸ Thapan-bwin princess,⁹ and Saw Lutkra. There were fourteen grandsons, namely, Mun Chipi, Mun Sa, Mun Thuwati, Mun Thukri, Mun Thu-ngè,¹⁰ Mun Thu-lat,¹¹ Mun Thu Karun, Mun Thun-bu, Mun Thu-chun, Mun Thun Thin, Mun Marun,

1. The Siamese history says that the King escaped in the confusion, but died subsequently of starvation. See พระราชพงษาวดาร เดิม ๒ หน้า ๓๐๒ and

เดิม ๓ หน้า ๑๖ 2. หมิ่นศรี? 3. หมิ่นลิดา? 4. ปฐมมรรษา?

5. เจ้าฟ้าสุริยพงษ์? 6. เจ้าฟ้าอินทสดาดี 7. เจ้าฟ้าเกษร?

8. เจ้าฟ้าน้อย? 9. เจ้าหญิง ดอกมะเดื่อ. "Thapan-bwin" is Burmese

for ดอกมะเดื่อ. 10. "Ngè" is the Burmese word for young or younger.

11. "Lat" is the Burmese word for middle or second of three brothers or sisters.

Mun Thu-pan, Mun Ôttaman, and Mun Paik-tun, and fourteen grand-daughters, namely, Mun Manla, Mun Sara, Mun Zawet, Mun Un-paing, Mun Akun, Mun Apan, Mun Than, Mun Malaik, Mun Thurawut, Mun Sata, Mun Mwin, Mun Thit, Saw Thi, and Saw Tan. Of the children of the King's elder brother there were four, two sons, Bra-ôn-saw Tan and Bra-ôn-saw Min, and two daughters, namely,—Saw Dara¹ and Saw Shi. There were besides over 2,000 members who belonged to the royal family. Many noblemen were also found in the capital, of whom the following were the principal ones, namely—Ministers of the first rank, Paya Palakan,² Paya Bura; Ministers of the second rank, Paya Mun-thi, Paya Mun-thabo-taik; Minister of the Royal Treasury, Paya Barabat; Minister of the Royal Granaries, Paya Baladepa³; Minister in charge of the capital, Paya Ramaya⁴; Minister in charge of arms and ammunition, Lôn⁵ Hurataik.

Instructions were issued to every regiment⁶ that it should celebrate the great event by having music and dancing in the style of the Burmese, Talaing, Tavoyan, Tenasserim people, Shan, Yun, Linzin, and Siamese.

In the capital the Burmese found persons engaged in the following trades and professions, namely—musicians and dancers, carpenters, carvers, turners, black-smiths, gold and silver smiths, copper-smiths and braziers, masons, decorators with natural and artificial flowers, painters both in ordinary colours and illuminated with gold and bright material, workers of marquetry, lapidaries, barbers, persons skilled in incantations, charms, and magic; persons skilled in the cure of the diseases of elephants and ponies; breakers and trainers of ponies; weavers and workers of gold and silver threads; and persons skilled in the culinary art. There were also found the Tripitaka and treatises on astrology and medicine.

1. เจ้าคาวา

2. พระยาพระคลัง ?

3. พระยาพลเทพ ?

4. พระยายมราช ?

5. ทอด

6. Here the total number of regiments is given as 129, of which the Dawé column contained 58, including the reinforcements, and the Zinné column 71, including reinforcements. But it is hard to reconcile this number with the numbers given in the earlier part of the narrative.

A large quantity of royal treasure was found, in the shape of utensils set in diamonds, emeralds, rubies, and nine kinds of gems: also gold cups, bowls, trays used by the royalty; and gold and silver bullion and precious gems; cloths worked in silver and gold, and various other kinds of cloths the product of Kyin, Sein, and Gyun countries; seven richly gilt howdahs used by His Siamese Majesty.

Of military stores and appliances, there were found 2,000 war boats and 100 ships; 1,000 fusils inlaid with gold and silver tracery and over 10,000 ordinary fusils without any inlaid work; the famous twin big guns cast in bronze; and guns for dismantling city walls, guns for repelling enemy attacks, guns embossed with figures of dragons and sea monsters, guns constructed for mounting on carriages, at the bow of war boats, and on elephants, and breech loading guns, in all 3,550, some of which were cast in copper or bronze and some made of iron; over 50,000 shells of various sizes weighing from one viss to fifteen, twenty and thirty viss and manufactured in China, Yun country, Linzin, Kala¹ country, and Yodaya; big iron shells, each containing in it fifty to sixty shots; elongated iron shells covered with wire netting, each of which carried within it from 100 to 200 shots and, on bursting, cast its contents far and wide; chain-shots, bar-shots, fuses, etc. The Burmese historian said that the quantity found in the arsenals was innumerable. Among these military stores only the best and the curious were chosen and taken; of the rest, the greater portion was thrown into the sea or destroyed. Of the guns, one² measuring twenty cubits in length and two cubits at the mouth, and those taking in charges varying from 30 to 40 viss weight were taken out and thrown into the sea; other guns were destroyed by blasting with gun-powder.

In the midst of their enjoyment in celebration of the conquest of the country of Yawnaka Ayôkza (Yonaka Ayuñjha) by the capture of Yodaya, the capital, the commander-in-chief Nemyo Thiapate said to his officers, that news had been received that

1. A foreigner, either European or Indian.

2. The Siamese history mentioned one big gun ^๔ปืนพระพริณ as being destroyed at ^๕วัดเขมา; see พระราชพงษาวดาร เดือน ๒ หน้า ๓๐๔.

the Chinese Emperor had sent a vast army under the command of his brothers, sons, and sons-in-law to invade Burma; and that their brother generals and officers at the capital were distinguishing themselves and winning royal favour by successfully repelling the invasion, with great loss to the Chinese including their commander-in-chief. He added that as they had most successfully accomplished their mission by the capture of the Siamese capital, together with her king and royal family, it behoved them to return as quickly as possible, after demolishing the city, moats, and all defensive and offensive works, as commanded by their Sovereign, so that they might be in time to take part in the fighting against the Chinese and share the honours of war in that field also.

Having decided to return, a distribution of prisoners of war was made as follows:—To each “Tat-hmu¹” was given 100 families; to each “Sitkè” 75 families; to each “Nakan” 50 families; to each “Tat-ye” 5 families; and each soldier 2 families. There were 406 officers of the ranks just mentioned in the 58 regiments which started from the capital, and which composed the Zimmè and Dawè columns. The total number of families thus distributed and taken away was given by the Burmese historian as 106,100.²

1. The organization of the Burmese army was simple enough. A group of 10 soldiers (called “letnet-kaing” or holder of arms) was controlled by an “Akyat,” corresponding to a non-commissioned officer; 10 of these groups were in the charge of a “Tat-hmu” (chief a company), who corresponded to a captain; and ten of these companies formed a regiment (“tat” in Burmese) commanded by a “Bo,” who corresponded to a colonel. Then to each regiment were attached 2 “Sitkè” who corresponded to subalterns when attached to a regiment, and to staff officers or seconds in command when attached to an army corps or division; 2 “Nakan,” who were officers who transmitted the commanding officer’s orders; and 2 “Tat-ye” or “Tat-saye” who were regimental clerks. Then above all the “Bos” was the “Bo-gyôk,” who corresponded to a general commanding the whole forces or only a division.

2. It is incredible that such a large number of prisoners of war was taken away by the Burmese, because even calculating at the modest average of three persons to a family, the number of men, women, and children taken away would amount to 318,300 souls. Burmese historians of old were not very careful when figures were concerned, and they always had a tendency, almost amounting to a habit, to err on the side of over-estimation. Then again, according to the Siamese history about 200,000 Siamese died during the two years’ invasion of the Burmese, including those killed in the fighting and those who died of disease and starvation. (Vide page 305, end of vol II of พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ พระราชหัตถ์เลขา.) Therefore, when the capital fell into the

The city was then destroyed, and the Burmese forces left the Siamese capital on the 9th of waxing Nayôn 1129 (June, A. D. 1767) marching in the direction of Ta-yaik. The Hmannan history does not mention of any one being appointed to govern the newly conquered country or of any force being left to occupy the territory acquired.¹ As about that time the Chinese had already entered Burmese

hands of the Burmese, there could not possibly have been a very large population left in the city. The Siamese history admits that about 30,000 prisoners of war, including nobles and common people, both men and women, were taken away, which figure is more reasonable and is perhaps about the correct number.

(See พระราชพงษาวดาร vol. II page 303). If the distribution of prisoners were made in the manner stated here, it is more than likely that the Burmese officers and soldiery allowed or induced the prisoners to ransom themselves by payment in silver, gold, jewellery, and other easily portable property, as such an arrangement would be to the advantage of both. If so, the distribution recorded was only intended to show the relative shares of the officers and men, and did not mean that prisoners as distributed were actually taken away to Burma.

To the best of my knowledge there is not, at the present day, a single descendant of the Siamese, who were then compelled to make a home in Burma, who retains any trace of his ancestry in speech, manners, customs, or traditional beliefs. It is strange that so large a community as the Siamese then were, amounting at least to about 20,000 persons, should have entirely lost their national characteristics within a space of about 14 decades. It is otherwise with the Portuguese, Mahomedan, and Manipuri prisoners of war, who, up to the present day, retain a few characteristic beliefs and traditions of their ancestors. One probable explanation of this total disappearance of national and racial characteristics within a period of about six generations, is the identity of religion and the similarity of beliefs and notions outside the teaching of religion. The Burmese might have been very cruel in their conduct of war, but towards prisoners of war who were made to settle down in Burma, they were invariably tolerant and considerate, and oppression was almost unknown, provided, of course, these people themselves were loyal and law-abiding. Inter-marriage between the Siamese and Burmese would be very easy and common, as there was no barrier to their union, either religious or social, and inter-marriage is a great factor in the effacement of racial and national characteristics.—Thien.

1 The Siamese history says that one พระนายกอง ภาษาพม่า เรียกว่า ด้ก^๕ was appointed by Nemyo Thihapate as governor of the city ; and one มอญ^๕ a Burman was appointed assistant governor. Vide page 303, vol II., of พระราชพงษาวดาร. But on page 288 of the same พระนายกอง is said to be a Mon (มอญ). The word ด้ก^๕ is undoubtedly the Siamese equivalent of the Burmese word "Thu-gyi," who was a petty administrative official in charge generally of a village and sometimes of a township, but much lower in rank to a governor, who was called "Myo-wun." The Burmese history made no mention of the appointment probably because the position was not very important, and the appointment would be made without any orders from His Burman Majesty.

territory, it is very probable that the Burmese found it absolutely necessary to withdraw all their forces to meet the Chinese invasion. Another probable reason is that both officers and men were completely exhausted after their arduous task in effecting the capture of the Siamese capital, and thoroughly home-sick after having been away from hearth and home for about three years. Therefore, no one wished to suggest the leaving of a force to hold the country, and much less cared to remain behind. Moreover, it would have required a very much bigger force than the Burmese could possibly have spared at the time, to occupy the whole length and breadth of Siam, wherein every town of any importance was a fortress fully equipped with means of offence and defence.

A force of five regiments containing 5,000 men under the command of Min-yè Min-hla Uzana, governor of Môtama, made up of 3,000 men from the Burmese capital and 2,000 men from Môtama, was already on the way to Siam, via Ta-yaik, to reinforce the army operating against Yodaya, having been sent thither before the Burmese Monarch was apprised of the fall of the beleagured city. The two forces met at the confluence of two rivers, a place probably beyond Ta-yaik in Siamese territory. Here Sitkè Thiri Nandameik Kyawdin, an officer in command of one of three regiments sent from the Burmese capital as reinforcements, was specially entrusted with the task of conveying, by means of rafts, the big guns brought away from the Siamese capital. Over five hundred big guns were thus conveyed, special mention being made in the Hmannan history of twin guns made of bronze, whose measurements were given as follows:—one was twelve cubits long, the length from the breech end to the “waist¹” was six cubits and a third; the girth at the breech was eight cubits and at the muzzle six cubits and a third, the muzzle opening was one cubit and a third in diameter; and the other, on which was inscribed that 100,000 viss of bronze was used in casting it, was eleven cubits long, the length from the breech end to the “waist” was six cubits; the girth at the breech end was seven cubits and at the muzzle five cubits, the muzzle opening was one cubit and four finger breadths in diameter.

Bo-gyôk Nemyo Thihapate together with the forces marching by land reached the capital in Wagaung (August) of the same year. All

1. The Burmese word used here means “the waist”, but I do not know what part of the gun was called the “waist” by the Burmese historian. Probably it is that part where the hole for the priming was.—Thien.

the governors of the towns in Zinmè province, and of those on the east and west bank of the Thanlwin (Salween), and the officers of the Byeik, Dawè, and Taninthari contingents who took part in the invasion of Siam were suitably rewarded and allowed to return to their homes.

News of the accomplishment of the object of the invasion, of the return of the Burmese forces, and of the large booty of guns being conveyed by water must have been sent in advance to His Burman Majesty. He did not even wait for the arrival of his famous general, but despatched three officials with a flotilla of 100 war boats and 2,000 men to go and assist in the conveyance of the big guns. These officials met Thiri Nandameik Kyawdin at Ta-yaik. The two big guns and over 500 others were safely conveyed to Ava, arriving there in Tagu 1130 (April A. D. 1768), quite eight months after the arrival of the general and his forces at the capital.

Of the Siamese royal family who were taken to Ava, the queens, the King's sisters, daughters, nieces, and grand-daughters were given suitable residences within the palace enclosure and provided with comforts according to their rank and dignity, each being entrusted to the care of one or another of the officials of the Court. The King's brothers, sons, nephews, and grandsons were given residences outside the palace enclosure and were equally well provided for and looked after. The Siamese nobles and other Siamese were assigned certain localities to reside in. Among the royal family was one Kyauk-bwa Tauk-to,¹ who was in the priesthood when brought to Ava. He retained his yellow robe and died in the priesthood in the year 1158 (A. D. 1796), after the removal of the capital to Amarapura.

The Hmannan history then records a list of Kings who reigned at Yodaya which enjoyed the name of Dwarawadi. But the list is valueless, in that it gives no dates except a very few in connection with events which were of importance to the Burmese. The following is the list in the order of succession to the throne:—

1. เจ้าฟ้าคอกเคิบ See พระราชพงษาวดาร ฉบับ ๒ หน้า ๒๓๘

LIST OF KINGS WHO REIGNED AT AYUDHYA.

Serial No.	Name of King	Relationship	Remarks
1	Bra Yazapati		พระราชบิดา คือ สมเด็จพระรามายิตี ที่ ๑ Founded the capital of Yodaya in the year 710 (A. D. 1348).
2	Bra Ramathun	Son of No. 1	พระราเมศวร คือ สมเด็จพระรามเมศวร.
3	Parama Yaza	„ „ No. 2	บรมราชา คือ สมเด็จพระบรมราชาธิราช ที่ ๑.
4	Maha Damayaza	„ „ No. 3	มหาธรรมราชา. Probably refers to แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระรามเมศวรครั้งที่ ๒.
5	Bra Setkabat	„ „ No. 4	พระจักรพรรดิ. Probably refers to สมเด็จพระเจ้ารามราชาธิราช.
6	Pawra Pônthan	„ „ No. 5	Probably สมเด็จพระอินทราชาธิราช ที่ ๑.
7	Parama Yazadiyaza	„ „ No. 6	บรมราชาธิราช คือ สมเด็จพระบรมราชาธิราช ที่ ๒.
8	Parama Tilawka	„ „ No. 7	บรมทิโลกะ คือ สมเด็จพระบรมไตรโลกนาถ.
9	Bra Yazapati	„ „ No. 8	พระราชบิดา. Probably สมเด็จพระรามายิตี ที่ ๒.

Serial No.	Name of King	Relationship	Remarks
10	Bra Thadiyaza	Son of No. 9	Probably สมเด็จพระไชยราชาธิราช.
11	Bra Thiri Zurapa	„ „ No. 10	คือ สมเด็จพระยอดฟ้า.
12	Mother of No. 11		คือ นางพระยาแม่อยู่หัวศรีสุตาจันทร์.
13	Bra Thadiyaza		คือ สมเด็จพระมหาจักรพรรดิราชาธิราช. During this King's reign, Mintara Shweti, King of Hanthawadi, conquered Yodaya in the year 910 (A. D. 1548). But about a year afterwards Mintara Shweti died and Yodaya became again independent.
14	Bra Mahein	„ „ No. 13	In the year 925 (A. D. 1563), King Sinbyushin of Hanthawadi, the famous Bayin Naung Kyawdin Nawrata, invaded Siam and captured the capital. He placed King Bra Thadiyaza's eldest son Bra Mahein (คือ สมเด็จพระมหินทราธิราช) on the throne, and took away to Hanthawadi, King Bra Thadiyaza and his second son Bra Ramathun (พระรามศูร) and also Aukbra Setki (เจ้าพระยาจักรี). King Bra Thadiyaza was maintained in Hanthawadi in a double roofed house painted white. Subsequently, he got permission to enter the priesthood and to go to Yodaya on a pilgrimage.

Serial No.	Name of King	Relationship	Remarks
15	Sawbwa Thaungkyi or Bra Narit	Son-in-law of No. 13.	But on arrival there he left the priesthood and in conjunction with his son Bra Mahein declared independence. In the year 930 (A. D. 1568), King Sinbyushin of Hanthawadi again invaded Siam, and in the year following captured the capital. He then placed King Bra Thadiyaza's son-in-law, Sawbwa Thaungkyi (เจ้าฟ้าทองแก้ว ? คือ พระมหาธรรมราชา หรือ สมเด็จพระสรรเพชญ์ ที่ ๑), on the throne. In the year 934 (A.D. 1572), during the reign of his son Ngazu Dayaka, Sawbwa Thaungkyi assumed the title of Bra Narit ¹ (พระนเรศวรมหาราช) and declared independence.
16	Bra Thiri		พระศิริ. Probably สมเด็จพระสรรเพชญ์ ที่ ๕ (ปราสาททอง).
17	Bra Narayana	Son of No. 16	พระนารายณะ คือ สมเด็จพระวมาธิบดี ที่ ๓ (พระนารายณ์มหาราช).
18	Bra Beikta Yaza	„ „ No. 17	พระภิตตะราชา คือ สมเด็จพระมหาบุรุษ (พระเพทราชา).

1. The Burmese historian evidently thought that พระมหา ธรรมราชา and พระนเรศวร were one and the same person.

Serial No.	Name of King	Relationship	Remarks
19	Bra Burathat	Son of No. 18	คือ สมเด็จพระสรรเพชญ์ที่ ๘ (พระเจ้าเสือ).
20	Parama Zeta	„ „ No. 19	บรมเชษฐ คือ สมเด็จพระสรรเพชญ์ที่ ๘ (พระเจ้าท้ายสระ).
21	Bra Thiri Damayaza	„ „ No. 20	พระศรีธรรมราชา คือ สมเด็จพระบรมราชาธิราชที่ ๓ (พระบรมโกศ).
22	Kyaukbwa Taukto	„ „ No. 21	King Bra Thiri Damayaza had two sons, the elder was Kyaukbwa Ekadat (เจ้าฟ้าเอกทัศ) and the younger Kyaukbwa Taukto (เจ้าฟ้าดกเดือ). He ordered that on his demise his younger son Kyaukbwa Taukto should succeed him, as he thought the elder was incapable of ruling the country. On his death his instructions were carried out and Kyaukbwa Taukto was raised to the throne by the nobles. About four or five days after his accession to the throne, Kyaukbwa Taukto went to the monastery of the supreme head of the Buddhist Order and asked to be admitted as a priest. The Buddhist supreme head said it would not be right to admit him into the priesthood, and advised him to govern the country as desired by his father. About three

Serial No.	Name of King	Relationship	Remarks
23	Kyaukbwa Ekadat	Brother of No. 22	<p>months after, Kyaukbwa Taukto called his elder brother to the palace, and having handed over the palace and the kingdom to the latter, entered the priesthood.</p> <p>When the Siamese capital fell into the hands of the Burmese in the year 1129 (A. D. 1767), Kyaukbwa Ekadat was killed in the confusion following the capture, and Kyaukbwa Taukto was taken to Ava still wearing the yellow robe. He remained in the priesthood till he died in 1158 (A. D. 1796).</p>

SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE'S ACCOUNT
OF THE SAME.

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<p>Naungdoagyî succeeds to the throne.</p>	<p>Alaunghprâ, at his death, left six sons by his first wife. He had expressed a wish that those of his sons who survived him should succeed to the throne in the order of their seniority. The eldest son, who was Ainshêmeng, or heir-apparent, had remained at the capital as regent during the Siamese expedition. He is styled in Burmese history Naungdoagyî. Though at first there was in the attitude of Myêdu Meng some appearance of opposition, it soon became evident that he intended to be loyal to his brother; but resistance to the Ainshêmeng was made by the most trusty officer of Alaunghprâ, the cause of which has not been explained. When Myêdu Meng left the army to bear the body of his father to Motosobo, the command devolved on Meng Khaung Noarahtâ. He</p>
<p>Rebellion of Meng Khaung Noarahtâ</p>	<p>led the remnant of the army to Taungu, where a brother of Alaunghprâ was governor. The governor, acting upon orders from the capital, where suspicion of the designs of the general had been excited, attempted to arrest him. He escaped the snare which</p>
<p>A. D. 1760, about 25th of June.</p>	<p>had been laid for him, and seeing no safety for himself but in resistance, marched to Ava, and, expelling the governor of that city, occupied it.</p>

<p>About the 5th.</p>	<p>The king sent him a friendly message, inviting him to come without fear to the royal presence. He, well knowing that forgiveness was impossible, refused. Naungdoagyî, without delay, marched on Ava, and, establishing his head-quarters at Sagaing, closely invested the city. All attacks were repulsed by the garrison, but famine did its work, and the rebel general, seeing that surrender was inevitable, fled from the city, accompanied by a few horsemen, in December 1760. Not far from the city he separated from his escort and was shot in the jungle. The city surrendered shortly after.</p>
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In the following year the king's uncle, who still governed Taungu, fell under suspicion. He failed to obey a summons to submit himself, and the king marched with an army to reduce him to obedience. The city was encompassed by a high wall, beyond which was an earthen rampart with a broad and deep moat. The king himself remained in camp directing the operations. During the blockade the famous commander Talabân, who was now in the service of the king of Zimmè, entered the territory of Martaban with a considerable force, and for a time appeared to threaten an attack on the besieging army. It was not until January 1762 that the city surrendered. The King pardoned his uncle, and without delay ordered a march on Zimmè to punish the insult which had been offered by an invasion of Burmese territory. Talabân was still at the head of a force in the country between the rivers Salwîn and Thaungyîn. He, his wife, and family were captured; and though in the Burmese history it is stated that his life was spared, it is to be feared that the general who had nobly fought for the cause of the last king of Pegu, was secretly put to death. The expedition against Zimmè was successful. The capital of that state was occupied without much difficulty. The remaining months of the reign of Naungdoagyî passed without any important incident. He devoted himself to erecting religious buildings, and while so employed died suddenly about the end of November 1763.

Governor of
Taungu rebels.

Death of
Talabân.

Death of
Naungdoagyî

His next brother, Myêdu Meng, who has since become known as Hsengbyusheng, succeeded without opposition. He inherited his father's energy and military talent, and soon after his accession took preliminary measures for future operations against Siam, to avenge the insult which Alaunghprâ had received at Ayuthia. He reinforced the army at Zimmè with twenty thousand men under Thihapatè.

Hsenbyusheng
becomes King.

Preparations
against Siam.
February 7,
1764.

New officials were appointed to the provinces in all parts of the empire, including the Shan states to the north of the capital. The same year, as the position of Muthsobo was felt to be inconvenient for the seat of government, orders were given to rebuild Ava. In November an army of twenty thousand men under Mahâ Noarahtâ, which had been raised in the lower provinces, marched from Martaban on Tavoy to operate against Siam from the south-west.

- Expedition to Manipur. Not content with the extensive preparations against Siam, the king, in boundless confidence in his fortune and resources, determined at once to punish the chief of Manipur for some incursions which his subjects had made on the frontier. At the close of the rainy season, an army marched from the capital westward to Kannimyu on the Hkyengdwen, and there waited for the king, who went by water. The army of Manipur was defeated. The Râjâ and his family fled to the hills. The chief city was taken, and hundreds of people were carried off as captives. The king returned to his capital in April 1765. While his armies were operating in the distant enterprise against Siam, the building of the palace at Ava was completed by the middle of April, when the king and his whole court proceeded to that city. The large population which soon gathered, and the numerous foreign traders who established themselves, showed the advantages of this site for the capital over that of the native city of the founder of the dynasty.
- A. D. 1764.
- The city of Ava reoccupied. A. D. 1766.
- Operations in Zimmè and Laos. Thilapatè, who had been sent to command the forces in Zimmé, reduced the whole of the territory to obedience. In order to secure his rear when he should advance to the capital of Siam, he marched against the king of Lengzeng, whose capital was then Muanglim,¹ on the river Mèkhaung, to the north-east

1. This is the town where the expedition from French Cochin-China under M. de Lagrée left the river and proceeded by land to Kyaingtun.

of Zimmè. The king at the head of his forces met the Burmese army some days' march from his capital and was defeated. Thihapatè marched on the city, and the king submitted and agreed to be tributary to the king of Burma. Returning south, the general fixed his head quarters at Lagwun, subdued all the Shân states eastwards, levied contributions, and forced the chiefs to supply auxiliary contingents to his army.

Mahâ Noarahtâ, who commanded the southern army, remained at Tavoy during the rainy season of 1765. He received reinforcements from Pegu, and resumed his march about the middle of October. Proceeding southward to within a few marches of Mergui, he crossed the mountain range of the peninsula nearly by the route which had been followed by Alaunghprâ, and reached Kamburî. Marching from thence direct on Ayuthia, he had a severe battle with the Siamese to the west of that city, in which he was victorious. He took many prisoners, elephants, and guns. Not hearing of the army marching from Zimmè under Thihapatè, he halted at Kannî, a village in the neighbourhood of the Siamese capital.

The northern army marched from Lagwun about the middle of August. Thihapatè had under his command more than forty thousand men, chiefly Shâns. As he proceeded south he was much delayed by the resistance of the towns of some petty chiefs. At length all opposition was overcome, and the army having received additional Shân troops, assembled at Pitsalauk, a town on a branch of the Menâm in its upper course. The route was pursued down the valley of the river. The Siamese attacked the invaders, but were repulsed with heavy loss ; and Thihapatè, continuing his march, took up a position on the east side of Ayuthia about the 20th of January 1766. Mahâ Noarahtâ moved his camp to the north-west of the city, where communication with his colleague was more easy. The centre of his new position was at a pagoda which had been built

March of the
southern army
on Siam.

March of the
northern army.
A. D. 1765.

Capital of
Siam
invested.

by Bureng Naung.

Progress of
the siege.

The King of Siam had made careful preparations to defend his capital. The fortifications consisted of a high brick wall with a broad wet ditch. There were numerous guns or jingals mounted. The king, advised by his minister, Bayâ Kuratîr, attacked the force under Thihapatè before the junction of the two armies had been effected. The attack failed, and a few days later, when a sally was made against the army of Mahâ Noarahâtâ, a desperate battle ensued, in which the Siamese were defeated with the loss of several thousand men killed and made prisoners. The two Burmese armies now completely hemmed in the city with a line of works. The place was too strong and too well defended to be taken by assault, and as time passed and no signs of surrender appeared, the approach of the dreaded rainy season with the rise of the river, which more than once in former times had saved the city, caused alarm among the besiegers. Many officers of high rank advised Mahâ Noarahâtâ to retreat to another position until the dry season ; but he firmly refused, and was supported by his colleague Thihapatè. When the water rose and flooded the country, the besiegers occupied such bits of high ground as there were, and threw up dykes to keep out the water. They had collected hundreds of boats, which were kept fully manned, but the line of intrenchment round the city was for the time rendered useless. The Siamese made attacks, both by land and water, on the Burmese, who now were broken up into separate corps ; but these attacks were unsuccessful.

When the water subsided, the Burmese commanders, with steady persevering labour, again began the construction of earthworks round the city, and gained more complete command of the river than before. The citizens became straitened for provisions. A body of Shâns from the north attempted to relieve the city by an attack on the besiegers, but were repulsed

and dispersed. The King of Siam, with his family and a number of the leading inhabitants, attempted to escape but were driven back. The king, in despair, wrote to the Burmese generals offering to become tributary to Burma. The reply was in contemptuous terms, and required unconditional surrender. Just at this time Mahâ Noarahtâ died. But this event did not affect the operations of the war. Reinforcements and orders to persevere came from Ava. The Burmese, having command of the whole resources of the country, successfully prevented food supplies from entering the city. The garrison, unable any longer to defend the walls, yielded to a general attack by the besiegers. The city was entirely destroyed by fire¹. The king, Ekâdatha Râjâ, was killed in the confusion. His brother, Brâun Soasân recognised the body near the western gate of the palace. The queen and the whole of the royal family were taken prisoners and carried away captive. Immense treasures and stores of war material were found in the palace. The conquest was effected at a critical moment for Burmese interests. Thihapatè had received orders to return home, for the Burmese monarchy was once more threatened by a Chinese invasion. The army, marching rapidly, reached Ava in July; the Shân auxiliaries were allowed to return to their own countries.

City taken,
April A. D.
1767.

1. In the history of Siam it is correctly stated that this siege occupied nearly two years, 1766 and 1767 A.D. In a brief history of Siam published in the Chinese Repository, and said to have been written by the King of Siam, this siege is confused with that by Alaunghprâ in 1760. The date for the capture of the city is given as March 1767. See Bowring's Siam, vol. I., p. 58, and vol. II., p. 347.



