About this lecture

During the Second Indochina War (1959–75), Thailand suffered from an externally-supported communist insurgency. The People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam targeted Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam for communist expansion. When the war ended, only Thailand had prevailed against insurgency: an achievement not by luck but by a combination of Thai strategies. Economic development in support of security and Thai State extension were two of the more significant strategies employed against the insurgency. Post-WWII, with U.S. and other development partner support, Thailand embarked on a nation-building campaign primarily for its northern and northeastern regions. This development fostered economic progress and acculturated rural populations, placing Thai government administration and services into previously inaccessible areas.  The notion that quality-of-life improvement provided a positive counterinsurgency effect was only a hunch at the time, which recent empirically-based counterinsurgency modeling and social science research have quantifiably confirmed. The Thai government built roads and hospitals, launched mobile medical teams, introduced new agricultural techniques and incorporated foreign educators and technicians into development. Thousands of Thai development officials, Bangkok college students, U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, monks, American educators, contractors and others descended upon the regions like never before. Intensive village surveys from 1963–87, statements from former communists, Thai academics, and Thai leaders show that the rural populations responded well to this effort, and the measures had a positive counterinsurgent effect.  This lecture examines the Thai effort and why it succeeded.

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